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STUDIES IN GERSONIDES

BY ISAAC HUSIK, University of Pennsylvania.

105. (L. 62, fifth line from bottom) = (K. 136, 6)

בלתי תכלית הוא מצד אשר הוא בו בלתי תכלית means *in so far as* it is infinite, and not 'weil es eben unendlich ist'. It is equivalent to the Greek τὸ ἀπειρον ἢ ἀπειρον ἀγνώστον, quoted by K. himself in a note (136, note 2).

106. (L. 62, fin.)

. אבל ישיג בו שהוא מתחלק אל מה שיתחלק, ולזה לא יהיה תכלית להחלק (להחלוקה?).

(K. 136 fin.)

Wohl aber begreift er *die Teilbarkeit als solche* (sc. *das Prinzip, das Gesetz*), und dass es für sie keine Grenze gibt.⁸⁸

This does not give the precise meaning of the original, though it renders it in a general way. A more precise translation is the following: '[The mind in apprehending an infinitely divisible magnitude does not apprehend it as infinitely divided]; it apprehends merely that it is divisible into parts which are divisible in turn (מתחלק אל מה שיתחלק), and hence there is no limit to the division'.

107. (L. 63, 19) = (K. 138, 5)

מין איש הודמן should always be translated 'ein beliebiges Individuum', and not 'ein zufälliges', as K. does here and, with an exception or two, *passim*.

108. (L. 63, 22) = (K. 138, 10)

בחקור וחפוש, K. translates, 'Bei eingehender Untersuchung'. חפוש is a technical term, and corresponds to the Aristotelian

⁸⁸ Italics mine.

ἐπαγωγή = induction. It is defined as follows in Averroes's compendium of logic:⁸⁹

החפוש, וזה המין מן הדברים הפועלים לאמות הוא שנגזור על ענין כללי במשפט כולל מחייב או שולל למציאות זה המשפט ברוב החלקים אשר יחדשו אותו הענין הכללי, דמיון זה המשפט שנספוט שכל גשם מחודש לפי שנמצא רוב הגשמים על זה התאר.

In our case G. first proved that the מושכלות are not universals by the deductive method. He now proceeds to prove the same thing by the method of induction. That is, he investigates the various kinds of מושכלות and shows that none of them is universal.

109. (L. 63, 22—64, 29) = (K. 138, 10—142, 2)

The passages are too long to quote *in extenso*, and the reader is expected to have before him the texts in question. He will then see that the errors of the translator are numerous. The most fundamental error is that K. does not understand the meaning of אמות (63, 23; 64, 17), which he renders 'Wirklichkeit' (138, 13) and 'Wirkliches' (141, 5). This leads him to misunderstand G.'s entire attitude towards the universal (141, note 2).

The contrast between ציור and אמות is not a difference between idea and reality ('Vorstellung' and 'Wirklichkeit'), and G. does not say that the ideal comes before the real ('und so geht die Vorstellung dem "Wirklichen" voraus'; 141, 7). Both ציור and אמות are here logical or, if you will, psychological, terms. They are subdivisions of the term מושכל, *intelligibile* (המושכל הוא אמות אם ציור אם אמות). The difference is that ציור is the *single concept* ('Begriff', or 'Vorstellung') whereas אמות represents the true *judgement* (wahres Urteil), especially as it appears in the conclusion of a true syllogism. We shall prove this statement by quoting from Averroes's compendium of logic (בל מלאכת ההגיון), ed. Riva di Trento, 1560). P. 2 a we find this statement:

... המבוקשות הנכספת ידיעתם בכל המלאכות המחשבויות שני חלקים ציורי ואמות, והיה הציור הוא הבנת הדבר במה שיעמיד עצמותו או במה שיחשב שהוא מעמיד עצמותו והוא הנשאל בעבורו על הרוב

⁸⁹ Hcb. translation, בל מלאכת ההגיון, ed. Riva di Trento, 1560, p. 58 a.

ותחלה במלת מה כמו אמרנו מה הוא הטבע ומה הוא הנפש, ויהיה האמות הוא קיום הדבר או הרחקתו, וזה על שני פנים אם במוחלט כמו אמרנו הרקות נמצא ואם בתנאי כמו אמרנו אם העולם מחורש וזה המין מן הדרישה הוא נשאל ממנו לעולם במלת אם. והיה ראוי שיקדם כל אחד משני אלו אצל המתלמד שני חלקים מהידיעה אם פועל ואם הישרה. ואולם ההישרה לציור הנה הוא מה שיורה עליו המלה הנפרדת ואולם הפועל לו הנה היה בדברים אשר יתקיים בו הדבר והוא חלקי הגדרים, ואולם ההישרה לאמות הנה יגיע האמת אצל המבקש בשני חלקים מתנגדים או חלקים מתהפכים ואמנם הפועל לו ההקש.

'The things we desire to know in all theoretical disciplines consist of two parts—*conceptual* and *verificatory*. By concept (ציור) we mean the understanding of a thing through that which constitutes, or is thought to constitute, its essence. This is that which usually and primarily answers to the question "What?" (*τί ἐστί*), as for example when we say, What is Nature? What is the Soul? Verification or true conclusion (אמות) is the affirming of a thing or denying it. This again may be of two kinds, (1) absolute, as when we say, A vacuum exists, or (2) conditional, as when we say, Whether the world is created. This investigation is always introduced by the question "Whether" (*εἰ ἐστί*). Each of these two must be preceded in the mind of the learner by two elements of knowledge—the *efficient* and the *directive*. The directive of the concept is that which is denoted by the single word. The efficient thereof consists of those things which constitute the thing in question, namely, the parts of the definition. As for the directive of a *true conclusion*, truth is arrived at in the mind of the investigator as a result of two opposite or contrary parts (judgements). The efficient of a "true conclusion" is the syllogism.'

It is clear now that ציור is the concept, i.e. the true understanding of the essence of a thing. We start with a word, say 'man'. We ask, What is man? and the answer is, the definition, namely, 'rational animal'. The parts of the definition, 'rational' and 'animal', constitute the concept (ציור). We ask next, whether man is mortal or not. We express our problem in the form of two contrary or opposed propositions—man is mortal, man is not mortal. One of these is true, the other is not true. We arrive at the true

opinion (אמנות) by means of a syllogism. Our conclusion is, let us say, man is mortal. This true conclusion is אמנות.

The 'Categories' in Aristotle's logic deals with ציור primarily, with אמנות secondarily only, in so far as אמנות presupposes ציור. You cannot have a judgement without a subject and a predicate, and the subject involves ציור. Beginning with the *De Interpretatione*, we pass over to אמנות, for here we are dealing with propositions, dividing them into affirmative and negative, contrary and contradictory, universal and particular, and so on. This is the first step in the direction of verification (אמנות), or obtaining a true conclusion (אמנות). After we have done this, we proceed to combine propositions in a syllogism, which is the actual efficient or agent in producing the true conclusion. This is treated in the *Prior Analytics*. Thus we read in the same treatise of Averroes, p. 9 a :

והאמנות שני סוגים סוג באמתת הבקשה וחלוקתה אל שני חלקי ההגבלה
עד שיחיה האמת מניע באחד מהם והסוג השני באמתת המאמר המורכב
הפועל לאמנות והוא המכונה בהקש.

The second error of K. is that he renders the word גדר by 'Begriff', which corresponds to ציור. גדר should always be translated 'definition', as K. does in the first part of the paragraph. P. 139, note 2, K. says, 'Hier scheint Gersonides platonische Bahnen im aristotelischen Sinne zu wandeln'. There is no warrant at all for such a statement in the present discussion, and least of all does it apply to the sentence in G. to which it is attached by K. What G. says in that part of the argument is that the definition cannot denote the universal (כללי), because if it does, it must refer to it (the universal) either in the sense of the unitary thing embracing all individuals, or in the sense of the sum of all the individuals. In neither case would the definition denote the essence of the individual thing, for the latter is not identical with either of these two senses of universal, and hence could not be covered by the same definition, for different things require different definitions. How any one can see anything Platonic in this argument I fail to understand.

The other mistakes concern the misunderstanding and mistranslation of sentences and expressions of the discussion in

question. Thus L. 63, 27 reads ולזה היה בלתי אפשר שחרבק בו נדר הכולל. This K. renders (139, 3) 'Deshalb kann bei ihr (sc. *der Vorstellung*)⁹⁰ die Universaldefinition überhaupt nicht Platz greifen'. The correct translation is, 'Therefore the definition of the universal cannot denote it (sc. the individual)'.

L. 64, 4 reads:

ונאמר שהוא בלתי אפשר שיהיה הנדר לכולל בצד שהוא כולל ומקיף,
והוא הצד אשר הוא סוג או מין.

This K. renders (140, 5):

'Wir behaupten nun, dass der *Begriff auch*⁹¹ nach der "um-schliessenden, umfassenden" Seite (*Vielheitsseite*),⁹¹ also nach der Genus- und der "Artseite" hin, kein Universales bildet.'

This is not correct, for it is clear not only from the expression itself (לכולל בצד שהוא כולל ומקיף), but also from the sequence of the argument, that it is not the '*Vielheitsseite*' that is now being discussed, but the '*Einheitsseite*'. The argument is this (L. 63, 33—64, 4 ff.): The definition must denote unity, for in defining man we do not say 'rational animals', but 'rational animal'. If now we prove that the definition cannot denote the universal on its unitary side, it will follow that the definition cannot denote the universal at all. And in the sequel G. proceeds to give this proof, viz. that the definition cannot denote the universal on its general and embracing side (בצד שהוא כולל ומקיף), i. e. the *unitary side* (cf. also L. 63, 26; וזולת הכולל המקיף בו כי האיש האחד הוא זולת הכולל המקיף בו, והוא גם כן זולת האישים הרבים, which shows clearly that הכולל המקיף, as contrasted with האישים הרבים, signifies unity and not plurality).

The continuation of this argument K. disfigures beyond recognition. The Hebrew reads (L. 64, 5):

וזה שאלו היה הנדר לכללי, והוא הסוג או המין, הנה מפני שהוא מזה הצד מצטרף, הנה יחויב שיהיה זה ההצטרפות לקוח בגדר, ר"ל ההקפה על מה שיקיף בו, כמו שנקח בגדר העבד ההצטרפות אשר בינו ובין האדון, וזה דבר בלתי אפשר בגדרים.

⁹⁰ Italics mine.

⁹¹ Italics mine.

This K. translates as follows (140, 8):

‘Wäre nämlich der *Begriff*⁹² ein Universales, also eine Art oder ein Genus, *so müsste er dies von seiten der Relation sein, denn gerade die Relation wird durch den Begriff gewonnen,*⁹² d. h. also die entsprechende Umschliessung, wie wir ja auch unter dem Begriffe “Knecht” die Beziehung verstehen, die zwischen ihm und dem Herrn besteht, etwas Derartiges aber ist bei den Definitionen nicht möglich.’

G. says nothing of the kind. The correct translation is as follows:

‘If the definition denoted the universal, namely, the genus or the species, it would follow that since it is in this sense a relative (cf. L. 56, 2 ff. = K. 114, 20), this relative aspect should be included in the definition, namely, this aspect of embracing that which it embraces, as we include in the definition of “servant” the relation between him and “master”; but this is impossible in definitions.’

The meaning is that we should define man, for example, as ‘rational animal, embracing all individual men’.

(L. 64, 17)

ואולם האמות הוא גם כן מחויב שלא יהיה לכללי. וזה כי אין לאמות (האמות x.) כי אם משפט על מה שיצויר, ולזה היה הציור קודם האמות. ובהיות הענין כן והיה שכבר התבאר שאין הציור לכללי הנה הוא מבואר שאין האמות לכללי.

K. (141, 5) translates as follows:

Aber auch als *Wirkliches* (*sc. Wahres*)⁹³ kann es (*sc. das Intelligibele*) kein Universales sein. Denn das *Wirkliche*⁹³ ist nur ein Urteil über die Vorstellung, und so geht die Vorstellung dem ‘*Wirklichen*’⁹³ voraus. Wenn es sich aber so verhält und doch erwiesen ist, dass die Vorstellung kein Universales ist, so kann auch das *Wirkliche*⁹³ kein Universales sein.

⁹² Italics mine.

⁹³ Italics mine.

To this he adds in a note (141, note 2):

‘Auch diese Anschauung geht auf falsch verstandenen Platonismus zurück, nach welchem die psychische und logisch-technische Organisation des Individuums ein Primäres gegenüber den Dingen bildet.’

As a matter of fact the argument quoted from G. has nothing to do with Platonism, true or otherwise. We should rather say of K.'s note, ‘Diese Anschauung geht auf falsch verstandenen Gersonidismus zurück, nach welchem אמות “Wirklichem” gleich sei’.

We discussed the meaning of אמות before, and we found that אמות and ציור are both logical terms. ציור denotes the single concept, to which the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ do not apply, אמות denotes a judgement, the result of syllogistic proof, and may be spoken of as ‘true’ or, if one finds fault with the syllogism by which it was arrived at, as ‘false’. אמות is made up of ציור, it is a judgement upon the ציור, hence ציור comes first. The translation of the Hebrew quoted above is as follows :

‘[Having divided the *intelligibile* (מושכל) into concept (ציור) and true conclusion (אמות), and having shown that the former as expressed in the definition (גדר) does not denote the universal], we shall now prove that a true conclusion (אמות) cannot denote the universal either; for the true conclusion is nothing else than a judgement concerning the content of the concept, and hence the concept comes before the true conclusion. This being so, and since we have proved that the concept does not denote the universal, it follows that the true conclusion does not denote the universal either.’

Does any one see any Platonism here? I do not. The entire argument is within the logical sphere, and there is nothing said here as to the relation between the ideal and the real. Accordingly the contradiction of which K. speaks in his excursus, p. 281, does not exist, and needs no solution.

That אמות is a logical term like ציור and the only difference is that given above, namely, the difference between the judgement

and the single concept, is also confirmed by the argument immediately following the one just discussed. This new one is also intended to prove that אמות cannot refer to the universal. But instead of the *a priori* manner in which this was proved in the last argument, G. now uses an illustration. And what is the illustration of אמות?—a universal proposition (גזרה כוללת). Here, too, K. commits several mistakes which must be rectified. The Hebrew text reads (L. 64, 20) as follows :

ועור כי הגזרה הכוללת מבואר מענינה שאינה שופטת אל הכללי במה שהוא כולל ומקיף, לפי שהנושא אשר היא שופטת עליו אינו מורה על הכולל במה שהוא נושא (כולל r.) ומקיף. וזה שאם היה הנושא בה מורה על הכולל במה שהוא כולל, הנה כבר יונה בה מתרבה מה שהוא בלתי מתרבה, והמשל שאמרנו כל אדם מדבר מורה על רבוי באדם, ולזה הושמה זאת (בזאת r.) הגזרה תיבת כל. ואם היה המובן באדם המין, הנה יושם בה זה המין מתרבה, והוא מבואר שהמין איננו מתרבה ולא ימצאו שנים במספר, ולזה הוא מבואר בגזרה הכוללת שאין הנושא בה כולל ומקיף, ובזה (וכזה r.) יחויב שיהיה הענין בגזרה הסתמית, כי אין החומה משנה הוראת הנושא, וזה מבואר בנפשו.

K. (141, 11) renders this as follows :

Und ferner: Aus dem Begriffe des generellen Urteils folgt, *dass es nur insofern das Universale zum Urteilsgegenstande erhebt, als es selbst etwas Einschliessendes und Umfassendes ist*, weil doch der Träger, über welchen es urteilt, nicht auf das entsprechende Universale hinweist. Würde nämlich sein Träger auf das Generelle hinweisen, *das er umschliesst*,⁹⁴ so müsste dasjenige als pluralisierbar angenommen werden, was gar nicht pluralisiert werden kann. So weist beispielsweise unser Satz: Alle Menschen reden — auf eine Mehrheit von Menschen hin; deshalb wurde in diesem Urteile das Wort 'alle' gesetzt. Wird aber unter 'dem Menschen' die Art verstanden, so müsste in ihm (sc. dem Urteile) die Art als pluralisierbar gesetzt werden, während doch erwiesenermassen die Art nicht pluralisiert werden kann, und eine numerische Zweiheit nicht existiert. Mithin ist erwiesen, dass in einem generellen (allgemeinen) Urteile das Subjekt nichts Generelles und

⁹⁴ Italics mine.

Umschliessendes ist (sc. kein Genus und keine Art), *und so muss es ein unbestimmtes (סתמית) Urteil sein,*⁹⁵ denn der Umfang ändert nichts an der Bedeutung des Subjekts, und das ist selbstverständlich.

The italicized passages are in every case incorrect. What G. says is this: It is clear from the nature of a universal proposition that it does not express a judgement concerning the universal as universal and embracing. For the subject concerning which the judgement is expressed does not denote the universal as universal and embracing. For if the subject of the proposition denoted the universal *as such* (lit. as universal), it would follow that that is multipliable which is not multipliable. Then follows the illustration, which is clear. If we say 'all man is rational', the pluralization is expressed by the word 'all'. If then the subject 'man' denotes the species, it would follow that the species 'man' may be pluralized, which is absurd. Then he adds, but the same thing is true (read *ובזה* instead of *וכזה*) of an indefinite proposition [for example, '(some) man is rational']. For the quantitative particle (*חומה*) does not change the meaning of the subject, as is self-evident.

Having discussed all the difficulties of the passage referred to at the beginning of this number, and seeing that K.'s translation is unusually defective, I deem it proper to close this number by giving a correct translation of the entire argument in question.

'It seems as a result of an inductive investigation that these *intelligibilia* are not universals. For (1) an *intelligibile* is either a concept or a true conclusion. Now it is clear that the concept, i.e. the definition, does not denote the universal, for if it did denote the universal, it would have to do this either in the sense in which the universal is one, or in the sense in which it is many. And whichever it be, it would follow that the definition does not denote the essence of the individual thing, for the individual thing is not the universal embracing it, nor is it the many individuals. Therefore the definition of the universal could not be connected

⁹⁵ Italics mine.

with it, for different things require different definitions. And in general, as the definition of house does not pertain to the brick, and the definition of the number ten does not apply to the number two, so, according to this hypothesis, the definition could not apply to the individual, as is evident. But it is clear from the meaning of definition that it does denote the essence of every one of the individuals to which the particular definition applies. Hence it is clear that the definition does not denote the universal. Again (2), if the definition denoted the universal, it would have to do so in the sense in which the universal is a unity, for we see no plurality in the definition. We do not say in defining man, he is "rational animals", but "rational animal". Hence it appears that the object of a definition is a unitary *definitum*. This being so, if we now prove that the definition cannot denote the universal in the sense in which it is a unity, it will be clear that the definition cannot denote the universal at all. We shall now prove that the definition cannot denote the universal in the sense in which it is universal and embracing, i.e. the sense in which it is a genus or a species (sc. the universal as a unity). For if the definition denoted the universal as genus or species, then, since it (the universal) is in this sense a relative, it would follow that this aspect of relation would have to be expressed in the definition, I mean the fact that it embraces what it does embrace; as we include in the definition of "slave" the relation between him and "master". But this cannot be done in definitions. Again, it is clear that each of the parts of a definition is necessarily predicable of the thing defined. Now if the definition denotes the universal, the result would follow that the species is identical with its genus, which is utterly absurd. For example, as man is "rational animal", man is "animal", and the species is identical with its genus. It would result further from this assumption that the last species is identical with the highest genus. For as man is "animal" and the definition of animal is "nutritive sensitive", man would be identical with "nutritive"; and as the definition of "nutritive" is "growing body", it would follow that man is identical with "body", and so the matter would go on until the result would

be that "man" which is the last species is identical with the highest genus, which is utterly foolish and absurd.

'But neither can a "true conclusion" refer to the universal. For a conclusion is nothing more than a judgement concerning the object of the concept; and hence the concept is prior to the conclusion. This being so, then, since we have proved that the concept does not denote the universal, it is clear that the conclusion does not denote the universal either. Again, it is clear from the nature of a universal proposition that it does not denote the universal as universal and embracing, because the subject concerning which the judgement is expressed does not denote the universal as universal and embracing. For if the subject denoted the universal *qua* universal, it would follow that that which is not multipliable is multipliable. For example, the proposition, "all man is rational" denotes plurality in man. This is the function of the word "all" in this proposition. Now if "man" denotes the species, the species is pluralized in this proposition. But we know that the species cannot be pluralized and cannot be numerically two. Hence it follows that the subject in a universal proposition is not universal and embracing. But the same thing is true of an indefinite proposition, for the quantitative particle ["all"] does not change the meaning of the subject, as is self-evident.'

The paragraphing in the Leipzig edition is wrong, and it seems to have misled K. L. 64, 4 should not begin a new paragraph, neither should line 6 from the bottom of the same page; whereas line 17, beginning האמות ואולם, should be the beginning of a new paragraph.

110. (L. 65, 22)

ועוד כי מפני שזוויתיו שוות לשתי נצבות, הנה הן כפל הזוויה הנצבת
הכוללת אשר היא בלי תכלית, ויהיה מה שאין תכלית לו כפל למה שאין
תכלית לו, וזה מבוואר הבטול והגנות.

(K. 144, 2)

'Und ferner: Da doch seine Winkel zwei Rechte betragen,
und die Doppelheit der 2 R gleichfalls eine unendliche Zahl (sc. von

*Einzelwinkeln) einschliesst,*⁹⁶ so wäre doch die eine Unendlichkeit gleich dem Doppelten der anderen Unendlichkeit, was offenbar absurd ist.'

The italicized passage is evidently incorrect. What G. says is that if we say that the angles of the infinite triangle are equal to two right angles, they are double the one universal right angle which is also infinite, and then we have one infinite double another infinite, which is absurd. Whether K.'s criticism in his note (144, note 2) will apply now is not clear to me. For G. is not arguing about a theoretical double, but about an actual one. This infinite universal triangle, if its angles are equal to two right angles, does actually contain the double of two universal infinite right angles, hence the absurdity.

111. (L. 66, 4) = (K. 145, 10)

In the text K. has *Περὶ Κόσμου*, in the note (note 1) *De Caelo* ! Cf. above, No. 32.

112. (L. 66, 6)

ומהם, שאם היו אלו הנושאים והנשואים אשר בנורות האלו כוללים ומקיפים כמו שהוא מחויב מזאת ההנחה, היה נשיאות הסוג על המין כוב, כי המין לא יהיה סוגו ולזה יהיה, דרך משל, אמרנו באדם שהוא חי כוב, וזה מבואר הבטול.

(K. 145 fin.)

Ferner : Wären die Subjekte und Prädikate in diesen Schlüssen Generalia, wie sich solches aus der Annahme ergibt, so wäre die Prädizierung des Genus für die Spezies falsch, denn die Spezies ist nicht mit ihrem Genus identisch, *sonst müssten wir beispielsweise sagen: Der Mensch ist ein lügnerisches Lebewesen* ; das ist aber offenbar absurd.

The italicized passage is incorrect. What G. says is this. If the subjects and the predicates in general propositions denoted universals, we could not predicate a genus of its species, for they are not the same. For example, the proposition, 'man is animal', would be wrong כוב חי, אמרנו באדם שהוא חי, כוב. The

⁹⁶ Italics mine.

Hebrew sentence quoted is an illustration of the statement just made, and *כזב* goes back to *יהיה* and is not connected with *חי*.

113. (L. 66, 26)

ובהיות הענין כן, הוא מבואר שאון הנורה הכוללת שופטת על הכלל, לא בצד שהוא בו אחד ולא בצד אשר הוא רבים, על שתשפט עליהם משפט אחד יחד' ולזה יחויב, אם היתה הנורה הכוללת שופטת על הכולל שתשפט עליו במה שהוא רבים על שהוא משפט על אחד אחד מהם.

(K. 147, 1)

Wenn es sich aber so verhält, so trifft das allgemeine Urteil offenbar über das Allgemeine keine Entscheidung, weder nach der *Einheits-* noch nach der *Vielheitsseite* hin, *obgleich*⁹⁷ es über sie eine einzige Gesamtentscheidung fällt. Entscheidet deshalb das allgemeine Urteil über das Allgemeine, so trifft es diese Entscheidung nach der Vielheitsseite hin, *obgleich*⁹⁸ es über jedes einzelne Individuum urteilt.

The two phrases beginning with 'obgleich' in the above passage are incorrect. 'Obgleich' is the wrong word and destroys the meaning of G. Similarly, 'Trifft deshalb, &c.', the beginning of the sentence following immediately upon the passage above quoted, is incorrect, and obscures the connexion of the thought; and the wrong use of 'obgleich' is again repeated below (147, 15).

It is clear from the Hebrew text and the argument that the possible signification of a universal proposition is classified by G. in the following way: It may express a judgement concerning the universal as (1) a *unity* embracing all individuals, or it may refer to the universal as (2) a *plurality* of individuals. This latter mode of signification may again be of two kinds. It may refer to a plurality of individuals (a) *collectively*, or (b) *distributively*. The Hebrew expressions for these different modes of reference are as follows: (1) הכלל בצד שהוא רבים, (2) הכלל בצד שהוא רבים על אחד, (a) בצד אשר הוא רבים על, (b) במה שהוא רבים על שהוא אחד יחד.

This latter is again divided into (a) בצד אשר הוא רבים על, שתשפט עליהם משפט אחד יחד, and (b) במה שהוא רבים על שהוא אחד יחד.

⁹⁷ Italics mine.

⁹⁸ Italics mine.

משפט על אחד אחד מהם. Now what G. says in the passage above quoted is this: Summarizing the preceding argument, he says, This being so, it is clear that the universal proposition refers to the universal neither (1) in so far as it is a unit, nor (2 a) in so far as it is a *collective* plurality. It follows, therefore, if the universal proposition refers to the universal, that (2 b) it refers to it as a *distributive* plurality. For, he goes on to say, in the passage immediately following upon the one quoted above, a universal proposition has the following possible modes of reference, &c. (giving precisely the classification mentioned above).

114. (L. 67, 2)

ולפי שאין בכאן לאלו הרבים חלק מוגבל יתכן שתשפט עליו זולת האיש, הנה יהיב שתהיה שופטת על כל איש ואיש מהם. ואולם שאין לאלו הרבים חלק מוגבל יתכן שתשפט עליו זולת האיש הוא מבוואר במזרות שנושאם הוא מין אחרון, כאמרנו כל אדם מדבר, כי אין בכאן לאישי האדם כלים מוגבלים נחלקים קצתם מקצתן יתכן שיאמר בהם שהמשפט יהיה על כלל כלל מהם יחד.

(K. 147, 18)

‘Da aber die Vielheit als abgegrenzten Teil des möglichen Urteils nur das Individuum enthält, so kann es nur über jedes einzelne Individuum urteilen. Dass aber die Vielheit als Gegenstand des Urteils keinen anderen bestimmten Teil als das Individuum enthält, lässt sich aus jenen Urteilen erweisen, deren Subjekt die *höchste*⁹⁹ Art enthält, wie unser Satz: Jeder Mensch redet; denn die menschlichen Individuen unterscheiden sich nicht durch organische Bestimmtheiten derartig von einander, dass über ihre verschiedenen Klassen ein einziges Gesamturteil gefällt werden kann . . .’⁹⁹

Before taking up the meaning of the argument, I wish to say that ‘*höchste Art*’ as a translation of מין אחרון is liable to misunderstanding. One might suppose it meant in our case the highest species, namely, the human species, which is given in the example. Needless to say, it means nothing of the sort. It means literally the *last* species, i.e. the one which does not in

⁹⁹ Italics mine.

turn embrace a narrower species. It is equivalent to מִין הַמִּינִים, and means rather the *lowest* species than the highest.

Now as to the general argument. It is this: G. has come to the conclusion that a universal proposition expresses a judgement concerning a plurality taken distributively. Being a rigorous analyst, he does not at once jump to the conclusion that therefore it refers to the *individuals* taken distributively. It may conceivably refer to some other unit higher than the individual. No, says G., the unit in the denotation of the universal proposition cannot be anything higher than the individual. This is clear if we take as our universal proposition one in which the subject represents the last species, such as, 'all man is rational'. What unit can there possibly be here, to the plurality of which taken distributively the proposition can refer? There is not any except the individual. In a proposition having a *genus* as its subject, such as 'all animal is mortal', it is conceivable that the unit may be not the individual but the species, but, as G. says in the sequel, if so, all the absurdities shown above would result here again from this supposition. Hence it is proved that a universal proposition refers to the plurality of individuals taken distributively.

To the credit of K. be it said that he understood the argument correctly, though there are some difficulties in the Hebrew text, which obscure it. There is one sentence in the Hebrew which, as it stands, cannot be rendered so as to give the desiderated meaning. I refer to the following (67, 6):

כִּי אֵין בְּכֹאן לְאִישֵׁי הָאָדָם כְּלִים מוֹנַבְלִים נַחֲלָקִים קִצְתָם מִקִּצְתָן יִתְכַן
שִׂיאֹמֵר בָּהֶם שֶׁהַמְשַׁפֵּט יִהְיֶה עַל כֻּלָּל כֻּלָּל מֵהֶם יִהְיֶה.

This can only be translated as follows:

'[That there cannot be in this plurality any other definite part to which the proposition can refer except the individual, is clear in a proposition whose subject is a last species, for example, all man is rational], for in this case the individual men have no definite organs distinguished from each other, so that we might say that the reference [of the proposition] is to the individual groups of them [sc. the organs].'

But the translation gives very poor sense. It might seem to signify, taken by itself, that G. desires to guard against the possibility that the unit of reference may be something less than an individual,—an organ of an individual. But in the context this cannot be the meaning. K., once more be it said to his credit, felt the correct meaning, and despite the bad text endeavours to get the following translation, italicized above :

‘Denn die menschlichen Individuen unterscheiden sich nicht durch organische Bestimmtheiten derartig von einander, dass über ihre verschiedenen *Klassen* ein einziges Gesamturteil gefällt werden kann.’

The only difficulty is that the Hebrew will not bear this translation. נחלקים קצתם מקצתן refers to כלים of any given individual man, and not to organs of one individual as differing from those of another. And the words בהם and כלל מהם similarly must refer to כלים and not to אישי האדם.

The solution, I think, is a very simple one, and moreover one which will be seen to be correct the moment it is mentioned. כלים is a corruption for כללים. The unit of reference in a universal proposition whose subject is a last species cannot be anything higher than the individual, for in the proposition, ‘all man is rational’, there are no groups of individual men distinct from one another to which the proposition may refer in a ‘collective-distributive’ manner (על כלל כלל מהם יחד). The meaning of the last phrase is that the group, say Chinese, Japanese, Hindus, &c., or white men, black men, yellow men, &c., be taken collectively, whereas ‘man’ as consisting of these groups be taken distributively as *per* these groups and not *per* the individual men.

This is clearly the true solution, and is vouched for, too, by 67, 12 :

ויהיה החלק ההוא כלל אחד מהכללים המונבלים אשר יחלק אליהם.

115. (L. 68, 1)

ואולם קרה זה בגורה הכוללת שתורה על רבוי מה להיותה מורכבת מהשכל והחוש.

(K. 151, 9)

'*Dagegen kommt es vor*,¹⁰⁰ dass im allgemeinen Urteil auf die bestimmte *Mehrheit* hingewiesen wird, *die sich*¹⁰⁰ in der Zusammensetzung des Intellekts mit den Sinnen *vollzieht*.'¹⁰⁰

'Dagegen' for וואלם in this case is too strongly adversative to be correct. וואלם continues the argument, trying to show wherein the plurality resides in a universal proposition if not in the *intelligibile* as such. But the more serious error is the translation of להיותה מורכבת by 'die sich . . . vollzieht'. The Hebrew words agree with נורה and not רבוי. The German should read, 'weil es aus dem Intellekt und den Sinnen zusammengesetzt ist'.

116. (L. 68, 19) = (K. 152, 5)

Concerning אמות (K. 'Realität'), see above, number 109.

117. (L. 68, 24)

והנה מפני שהמושכל הוא לאיש במה שהוא איזה איש הזרמן, היה
שנקנה המושכל מהחוש עם ההשנות.

(K. 152, 13)

'Da nun das Intelligibile nur für das zufällige [better 'beliebige'] Individuum gilt, so gewinnen wir das Intelligibile aus den Sinnen in Verbindung mit den *Perzeptionen*.'¹⁰¹

K. reads ההשנות, but it seems to me that L. is correct in reading ההשנות, repetition. The meaning is that the fact that we acquire the *intelligibile* as a result of *repeated* sense perception, and not from a single perception, is another proof that the *intelligibile* does not denote a definite individual but any individual at all; the idea being that if the *intelligibile* denoted a definite individual, one perception of an individual should be sufficient to give us the *intelligibile*. G. probably has in mind Aristotle's statement in the *Metaphysics*, i, ch. 1, 980 b 29 αἱ γὰρ πολλὰ μνήμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν. Also *ibid.* 981 a 5 γίνεται δὲ τέχνη, ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου γέννηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις.

¹⁰⁰ Italics mine.

¹⁰¹ Italics mine.

118. (L. 68, 25)

זוה בשיפשיט השכל מהאיט המוחש המשיגים ההיולאניים אשר השיג
אותם בעבורם ההתרבות.

(K. 152, 16)

Dies geschieht aber so, dass der Intellekt von dem sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Individuum jene *von ihm begriffenen*¹⁰² Attribute abstrahiert, um derentwillen sich die Pluralbildung vollzog.

The italicized words form a wrong translation of השיג. The word means here to pertain to as an attribute, and its subject is ההתרבות, not שכל. The correct translation is as follows: [The *intelligibile* is acquired from sense perception by dint of repetition (see last no.), by the intellect abstracting from the material attributes of the sensible individual, through which attributes multiplicity attaches as an attribute (השיג) to them (sc. sensible individuals).

119. (L. 69, 5)

ועוד שהטבע הכולל הוא המהות אשר לו, והמהות משים הרבר בעל
המהות נמצא בפועל, ר"ל שכבר יאמר בו שהוא נמצא בפעל מפני
המהות אשר לו.

(K. 153, 8)

Und ferner: Das Universale bildet doch sein Wesen, *das Wesen jedoch, das eine Sache zum Träger des Wesens macht, existiert in actu, d. h. man kann deshalb von ihm sagen, dass es aktuell existiert, weil es ihr (sc. der Sache) Wesen bildet.*¹⁰³

The italicized passage is incorrect. The correct translation is as follows: 'Again, the universal forms its essence (sc. of the individual), and the essence makes the thing possessing the essence an actual existent, I mean that we say it is an actual existent by reason of its essence'. G. is not saying yet that the *essence* is an actual existent, but that the thing possessing the essence is an actual existent by virtue of its essence. Then he argues *in the sequel*, that that which makes another an actual

¹⁰² Italics mine.

¹⁰³ Italics mine.

existent must *a fortiori* be itself an actual existent. According to K.'s translation the rest of the argument in G. would be irrelevant.

In a note (153, note 4), K. attributes to L. the reading המהות (69, 11 last word), which would be wrong, and adopts the correct reading מהמהות, which he attributes to MSS. O and P. He is evidently mistaken, for L. has the correct reading מהמהות.

120. (L. 69, 18) = (K. 154, 2)

K. translates באחור *a posteriori*. If *a posteriori* is used in German as it is in English, it is decidedly an inappropriate translation of באחור. באחור is here opposed to תחלה, in other cases it is opposed to בקרימה, neither of which means *a priori*. Predication may be of three kinds, *synonymous* (בהסכמה), *homonymous* (בשותף), and what for want of a better term may be called *analogous* (בספוק or ואחור בקרימה). The first two Aristotle defines in the beginning of the Categories. If we apply a term to two things homonymously (*δμωνύμως*), it signifies that the two things are quite different in essence, but they happen to have the same name. The example Aristotle gives is the word animal (*ζῷον*) as applied to a real man and to the picture of a man (*οἶον ζῷον ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον*). A term predicated of two things synonymously has exactly the same definition in the two cases, because the two things to which it is applied have the same essence, generic if not specific. Thus the same word animal (*ζῷον*) is predicated synonymously of man and ox (*οἶον ζῷον ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βόως*). The third mode of predication Aristotle discusses in the *Metaphysics*, iv. 2. He calls it *πρὸς ἓν* as opposed to synonymous predication (*καθ' ἓν*) on the one hand, and to homonymous predication (*δμωνύμως*) on the other. It is intermediate between the two. Thus the term 'existent' (*ὄν* = נמצא) is predicated of substance (*οὐσία* = עצם) as well as of the various qualifications and affections of substance (*πάθη, φθοραί, στερήσεις, ποιότητες, ποιητικά, γεννητικά—οὐσίας*). In this case the term is applied primarily (*πρώτως* = תחלה or בקרימה) and properly (*κυρίως*) to substance (*οὐσία*), secondarily (*באחור*) to the

other things mentioned above.¹⁰⁴ While the predication is here not synonymous, for the definition of the term existent would not be the same in all these cases, it is not homonymous either, for the things in question *ἵπποισι* one and the same nature—substance (τὸ . . . ὃν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν, καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως . . . οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὃν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μὲν, ἀλλ' ἅπαν πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι, ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δ' ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας, τὰ δ' ὅτι ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν, ἢ φθοραὶ ἢ στερησεις ἢ ποιότητες ἢ ποιητικὰ ἢ γεννητικὰ οὐσίας, ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν λεγομένων, ἢ τούτων τινὸς ἀποφάσεις ἢ οὐσίας).

This is what G. means in this place, and it is clear at the same time that the reference in G. to Aristotle is not to *Metaphysics* vii. 3, as K. thinks (153, fin.), but to iv. 2, as just indicated. In vii. 3, the discussion is what is meant by substance (ὄν = οὐσία). Here the question is in what sense the term existent (ὄν = נמצא) is applied to substance as well as to the accidents of substance. Aristotle sums up the same thought in vii. 1, p. 1028 a, 13–15, especially in the words, τοσανταχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος φανερὸν ὅτι τούτων πρῶτον ὃν τὸ τί ἐστίν, ὅπερ σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν.

121. (L. 70, 3)

ועוד שאם יודו שמה שבמציאותו נמשך לשנוי במקרה הוא היולאני, הנה יתחייב להם שיהיה היולאני המושכל אשר יגיע לשכל ההיולאני בהשיגו השכל הפועל. וזה שהם יאמינו כי זאת ההרגשה (ההשגה) צריכה במציאותה אל השגת אלו המושכלות אשר הם צריכות במציאותם אל דבר הוא נמשך לשנוי בעצמות.

(K. 155, 10)

Und ferner: Geben sie zu, dass dasjenige, was in seiner Existenz mit einer Veränderung *akzidentell* zusammenhängt, hylisch ist, *so kann dieses Hylische nur dadurch ein sich im hylischen Intellekte realisierendes Intelligibele werden, dass es der aktive Intellekt perzipiert.*¹⁰⁵ Nach ihrer Meinung bedarf nämlich

¹⁰⁴ Cp. Husik, *Judah Messer Leon's Commentary on the Vetus Logica*, Leyden, 1906, p. 84.

¹⁰⁵ Italics mine.

eine derartige Perzeption für ihre (*sc. der Intelligibilia*) Existenz der Perzeption *solcher*¹⁰⁶ Intelligibilia, die wiederum für ihre Existenz auf eine solche Sache angewiesen sind, die *substantiell* mit einer Veränderung zusammenhängt.

The passages italicized by the present writer in the above translation are incorrect, and whatever they may mean do not represent what G. desires to say. The correct translation is as follows: 'Besides, if they admit that a thing whose existence depends upon a certain change *per accidens*, is material, it will follow according to them that the *intelligibile* which the material intellect acquires when it comprehends the active intellect is also material. For they believe that this comprehension (*sc. of the active intellect on the part of the material intellect*) requires for its existence the apprehension of *these intelligibilia* (*sc. the sub-lunar intelligibilia*), which in turn require for their existence a thing dependent upon a change essentially.'

122. (L. 70, 20)

והשני שאלו המושכלות הם כלליות, והמציאות אשר יהיה לכללי הוא מצד הפרטי הנמצא חוץ לנפש.

(K. 156, 4)

Und zweitens: Weil die Intelligibilia Universalia sind, *die Existenz der Universalia jedoch nach ihrer individuellen Seite hin ausserseelisch ist*.¹⁰⁷

The italicized words are incorrect. The correct translation is: 'Secondly, because these *intelligibilia* are universals, and the existence of the universal is dependent upon the particular, existing *extra animam*.'

123. (L. 71, 9)

ומהם, שכבר יתחייב מזאת ההנחה שתהיינה אלו המושכלות היולאניות ובלתי היולאניות יחד, וזה בלתי אפשר. וזה שאם ההתרבות הוא במושכל מפני חלוף האישים אשר התחדש מהרגשם, יקרה מזה שיהיה המושכל אשר אצל אנשים רבים אחד במספר, אם התחדש בהם מהרגש

¹⁰⁶ Italics mine.

¹⁰⁷ Italics mine.

אישים אחרים. 'ויהיה אחד במספר ברבים, ומה שזה דרכו הוא בלתי היולאני, כי אי אפשר ברבר ההיולאני שיהיה אחד במספר ברבים, וכבר היה היולאני, זה שקר.

(K. 157, 11)

Ferner: Nach dieser Annahme müssten doch die *Intelligibilia* gleichzeitig hylisch und nichthylich sein, das ist jedoch nicht möglich. Wenn nämlich das *Intelligibile* deshalb einer Pluralisierung zugänglich sein soll, weil seine Entstehung auf der Empfindung verschiedenartiger Individuen beruht, so müsste bei einer Vielheit von Menschen das *Intelligibile* eine numerische Einheit bilden, *obgleich es bei ihnen durch die Empfindung anderer Individuen entsteht (sc. weil doch die Intelligibilia Identitätscharakter besitzen)*,¹⁰⁸ dann aber wäre es trotz der Vielheit (der perzipierenden Subjekte) eine Einheit. Was aber derartigen Charakter besitzt, ist nicht hylisch, denn das Hylische kann nicht in einer Vielheit eine Einheit bilden, und doch soll es hylisch sein, mithin ist die Annahme falsch.

The trouble with this translation, which follows the Hebrew text, is that the argument is a *non sequitur*. The assumption of the opponents, which G. is trying to reduce *ad absurdum*, is that the *intelligibile* is material because like other material forms it is multiplied with the multiplication of the subject, i. e. since the *intelligibilia* are dependent upon the extra-mental particulars, different extra-mental particulars give rise to different *intelligibilia*. In other words my idea of man would be different, say, from that of Gersonides, because his was built upon the individual men of his generation, and mine is based upon the individual men of to-day.

Now G. argues from this (according to K. and the Hebrew text as it is) that the *intelligibilia* of different persons would form a numerical unit, even though these *intelligibilia* were formed in the minds of the different persons on the basis of the perception of different individual men (i. e. as objects of perception)! And G. gives no reason for such an extraordinary

¹⁰⁸ Italics mine.

inference. It is just like saying, if you maintain that *a* is *b*, it follows from your assumption that *a* is not *b*, without giving any reason. Here K. comes to the help of G. by adding in parenthesis, 'sc. weil doch die Intelligibilia Identitätscharakter besitzen'. But surely G. would not have omitted what is so essential to his argument. But this reason is no reason at all. The 'Identitätscharakter' is the very point at issue. The opponents of G. claim that the *intelligibilia* have no 'Identitätscharakter' because, like other material forms (צורות היולאניות), they are multiplied with the multiplication of their subjects (מתרבות בהתרבות נושאייהם). Cf. L. 54, 16 ff. and especially 55, 22 ff., and above, numbers 95 and 96.

The solution of the matter is extremely simple, and the error of K. reminds me of a frequent saying of a teacher of mine when one of his pupils blundered and blamed it upon a mistake in the book. טעות בספר, טעות בשכל, he used to say in his quaint way, with emphasis upon ספר and שכל. In our case too there is a טעות בספר. The ך in אחרים is a mistake for a ד. The word G. wrote is אַחְרִים, which he uses in the sense of 'same'. See above, No. 50.

The meaning is now clear. If the pluralization to which the *intelligibilia* are subject is due to the difference of the extra-mental individuals they perceive, then it will follow that the *intelligibilia* of different persons (as subjects) will be one, if they were formed in their minds on the basis of the SAME extra-mental things. The rest of the argument is now clear and needs not to be repeated.

There is still a word to be said about the words אשר התחדש אשר מהרגשם (l. 11). The sequence demands אשר התחדש מהם הרגשם, and it is possible that the ם fell out and the two words read as one מההרגשם. The next copyist threw out the superfluous ה.

124. (L. 72, 24) = (K. 159, 26)

אחרים should be אחדים, cf. last number. K.'s translation based on the reading אחרים makes no sense.

125. (L. 73, 3) = (K. 160, 14)

In my mind the text as it is is corrupt and makes no sense. The statement, moreover, לפי שהם מתרבות בהתרבות הנושאים, contradicts the statement at the bottom of the preceding page (72), הנה לא תהיינה המושכלות מתרבות בהתרבות הנושאים מפני זה הסמיכות. I should therefore read שאינם instead of שהם. Cf. below, No. 127.

126. (L. 73, 8) = (K. 160, 23)

ובכלל הנה יהיה בלתי אפשר שיהיה לנו מושכל במה שהוא נמנע מצד אפשר מצד מה שהוא אפשר.

Here, too, it seems that a word has fallen out before מה. I should read בלתי אפשר שיהיה לנו מושכל במה שהוא נמנע מצד אפשר מצד, אפשר מצד, מצד מה שהוא אפשר. The same applies to the similar statement on the preceding page (72, 19). And the translation would be, 'In general it would be impossible, in reference to a thing which is in one sense possible, in another impossible, to have an *intelligibile* of that thing in so far as it is possible'.

127. (L. 73, 22)

ועוד שאנתנו ואם הורינו במושכלות שתהיינה כלליות, הנה לא יחויב מפני הסמיכות אשר להם אל האיש שתהיינה מתרבות. וזה שהוא מבואר בנפשו כי הם אמנם יסמכו אל האיש במה שהוא זה האיש, ומזה הצד לא יהיה רבוי באישים.

(K. 166, 1)

Und ferner: Geben wir schon zu, dass die Intelligibilia Universalia sind, so brauchen sie sich trotz ihrer Berufung auf die Individualität (sc. ausserseelische) nicht zu vermehren. Denn offenbar beruhen sie nur insofern auf der Individualität, als es sich gerade um eine bestimmte handelt, von dieser Seite aus gibt es jedoch keine Pluralisierung . . .

Upon this K. remarks in a note, 'Nach Riva und Leipzig. P u. O haben folgende Lesart: כי הם אמנם יסמכו אל האיש במה שהוא זה האיש. Da der Schluss falsch ist, so kann nur die Lesart von R. L. richtig sein'.

How K. arrives at this conclusion is a mystery to me. On p. 63, 18, G. says, ואולם השגת השכל ההיולאני הוא לאיש לא במה שהוא איש מה, אבל במה שהוא איזה איש הורמן, וזה דבר נמצא חוץ לנפש בפעל ר"ל האיש וכבר יתבאר זה בשלמות במה שאחר זה, רצוני שהמושכלות הם לאיש במה שהוא איזה איש הורמן.

On p. 67 fin., we read likewise: כי אין אצל המושכל ציור באיש מצד יהיה בו אפשר הרבוי, וזה כי הוא אמנם ישיגהו מצד שהוא איזה איש הורמן, לא מצד שהוא זה האיש.

On p. 68, 20 we have again: והיה שכבר התבאר שאין אחר מהם כללי אבל הוא לאיש במה שהוא איזה איש הורמן.

And similarly, l. 24, והנה מפני שהמושכל הוא לאיש במה שהוא איזה איש הורמן.

Finally, on p. 72 fin., we read: ואולם אם הנחנו שתהיינה המושכלות נסמכות אל איזה איש הורמן מהאישים הנמצאים, לא מצד מה שהוא זה האיש, הנה לא תהיינה המושכלות מתרבות בהתרבות הנושאים מפני זה הסמיכות הנמצא להם אל האישים.

It is quite clear from all this that G. is of the opinion that *in so far as the intelligible denotes sublunar extra-mental things* (his own view is that the primary reference of the *intelligibile*, or at least the cause of it, is the *intelligibile* in the active intellect), it refers not to a definite individual, but to any individual at all. And it is also clear from the passages quoted that in so far as the *intelligibile* refers to any individual at all, no plurality attaches to it by reason of the variety of the individuals. That is, the *intelligibile* of man is one and the same in A and B, yesterday and to-day and to-morrow, just because it does not denote, and hence is not dependent upon, any *definite* individual. The only statement contradicting this is that on p. 73, 3, which was discussed in No. 125. And we were forced to change שהם to שאינם. Now in the face of all this, when there is a choice between two readings, one of which is in accordance with good sense and logic, and in conformity with G.'s opinion as expressed elsewhere, and the other the reverse of all this, K. adopts the latter on the

ground that 'der Schluss falsch ist'! What 'Schluss' is 'falsch'? If we adopt the reading of the MSS. P and O, everything is all right. Moreover, G.'s example in the sequel proves beyond a doubt that the reading of P and O is the only correct one. He uses as an illustration the number 'three'. If we say the number three is small we are establishing a relation between the number three and all other numbers greater than three. But it does not follow from this that the *intelligibile* 'small' as applied to the number three is multiplied with the variety of numbers with which the number three stands in relation. The idea 'small' is one and the same whether we compare three with four or with five. And why is this so? Because, says G., when we speak of three as small we are putting it in relation with all numbers greater than three, not as definite numbers, say four or five, but merely as numbers greater than three. In this respect one number will do as well as another provided it is greater than three, and the idea 'small' will not change with every new number taken for comparison.

Now whither does this illustration point? Surely to the reading of P and O. The *intelligibile* 'man' never changes or multiplies with the introduction of new individual men, because it is not affected by the individual as a *definite* individual. All individuals look alike to the *intelligibile* provided they are men.

To be sure K. misunderstands the illustration also. He adds a long note (167, note 1) on the concept of infinity, which, so far as I can see, has not the least bearing on the question at issue. What G. says in the illustration which he adduces from the number three, does not commit him to any theory on the nature of infinity, and is something that any one might say who never heard of infinity. There are also some errors in K.'s translation of that passage, hence we must examine it more carefully in the next number.

128. (L. 73, 26)

כי המצטרף האחד כבר יצטרף במקרה אל דברים רבים, ולא יחויב מפני זה במצטרף ההוא שיהיה מתרבה. והמשל שהמין האחד מהמספר,

הוא השלשה דרך משל, הנה כשיתואר כשהוא מעט, הנה יצטרף במקרה אל כל אחד מהמספרים הרבים ממנו, ולא יחויב מפני זה שיהיה מתרבה במספר הדברים אשר הוא מצטרף אליהם, כי ההצטרפות אשר לו בעצמות מצד זה התאר הוא אל המספר אשר הוא יותר רב ממנו מצד מה שהוא יותר רב ממנו, לא מצד מה שהוא ארבעה או חמשה.

(K. 166, 8)

Denn da sich die Relationseinheit mit einer Vielheit von Dingen akzidentell verbindet, so ergibt sich für sie (sc. die Relationseinheit) keine Pluralisierung. Nehmen wir beispielsweise die Drei als Zahleneinheit an. *Wird sie nun in ihrer geringen Quantität qualifiziert (sc. durch andere Zahleneinheiten), so verbindet sie sich*¹⁰⁹ akzidentell mit jeder der Zahlen, die grösser ist als sie. Daraus aber ergibt sich nicht dass sie sich selbst durch die Zahlen *vergrössert*, zu welchen sie in Beziehung tritt, denn die Relation, die sie *substantiell* kraft dieser Eigenschaft zu der Zahl gewinnt, die grösser ist als sie, hat sie nur insofern, als die Zahl *grösser* ist als sie, nicht insofern sie eine vier oder fünf ist (sc. *Also ist das bereits vorhandene Plus gegenüber der Relationseinheit die Bedingung der Relation, nicht aber bedingt die Relation das Plus. Aus diesem Grunde ist der absolute Wert der grösseren Zahl gleichgültig.*¹⁰⁹

I admit this translation is absolutely unintelligible to me. I do not know what is meant by 'Wird sie nun in ihrer geringen Quantität qualifiziert (sc. durch andere Zahleneinheiten)'. I do not know what is meant by 'Daraus aber ergibt sich nicht dass sie sich selbst durch die Zahlen vergrössert, zu welchen sie in Beziehung tritt'. Does any one claim that the number three is *increased* by its relation to other numbers? Quite the contrary. Any one would say that it is its relation to other numbers that makes it three and nothing else. Nor do I understand the meaning of the last remark in parentheses. And finally, I can see no coherence in the passage as a whole, and, what is more to the point, no resemblance to the meaning of G., which is quite clear to me.

¹⁰⁹ Italics mine.

To take up the significant phrases in the Hebrew text first, והמשל שהמין האחד מהמספר, והוא השלשה דרך משל, הנה כשיתואר בשהוא מעט, הנה יצטרף במקרה אל כל אחד מהמספרים הרבים ממנו, I understand to mean the following: 'If we take the number three, for example, and describe it as small, we put it into accidental relation with all numbers greater than it.' He clearly makes a distinction between *essential* and *accidental* relation. Three as three is in essential relation with all numbers on either side of it. Three as 'small' is not in *essential* relation with any number at all, as a *definite quantity*. It is in *accidental* relation with all numbers greater than three as *definite quantities*. In *essential* relation it is with all numbers greater than three, not as definite quantities, but only as *greater than three*.

The next statement, ולא יחויב מפני זה שיהיה מתרבה במספר, והדברים אשר הוא מצטרף אליהם, means 'It does not follow (sc. because it is in accidental relation with so many other numbers) that it (the number three as small) is pluralized (not "vergrössert sich") in accordance with the number of things with which it is in relation'. This means, that three as small is one idea, one *intelligibile*, and it does not change its character as small according to the variety of the numbers with which it is compared; because, as he goes on to say, ההצטרפות אשר לו בעצמות מצד זה התאר הוא אל המספר אשר הוא יותר רב ממנו מצד מה שהוא יותר רב ממנו, לא מצד מה שהוא ארבעה או חמשה. 'The relation which the number three bears *essentially* by reason of this quality (sc. the predicate "small") is a relation to the number greater than it *qua* greater than it, and not *qua* four or five.'

The inference is that if the number three as small bore an essential relation to the numbers greater than it as definite numbers, as four or five or six, &c., the character of the *intelligibile* 'three as small' would have as many forms as there are numbers greater than three with which it is compared.

Now what is the point of this whole illustration? It is obviously this: that in every other *intelligibile*, since it concerns not the definite individual as this definite individual (איש מה), but any individual at all of a given species (איזה איש שהזרמן), it is

always the same, no matter how many individuals are actually denoted by it. The bearing of this on the discussion in the preceding number is obvious. Why this harmless passage should have been chosen by K. for a lengthy disquisition on the concept of infinity is more than I can say.

129. (L. 74, 9 and 10) = (K. 171, 6 and 8)

We have here again פִּעַל , *actus*, mistaken for $\text{פִּעַל} = \text{agens}$. Cf. above, No. 64.

130. (L. 75, 17) = (K. 175, 23)

ככרים here is a weight, and means talents, not 'Brotlaibe', which would be ככרי לחם .

131. (L. 77, 1)

שהמושכל אשר בנפש השכל הפועל מהצורה הדמיונית הוא יותר ראוי שייהיה מושכל לנו מהצורה הדמיונית.

(K. 178, 34)

Dass . . . das Intelligibele *welches der aktive Intellekt von der vorstellenden Form gewinnt*,¹¹⁰ weit eher unser Intelligibele sein muss als die vorstellende Form.

The words italicized constitute a very serious error. How can any one make G. speak of the active intellect as acquiring his *intelligibile* from the form in the imagination! Does not K. know that according to G., and in fact generally in the middle ages, the active intellect was regarded as the cause of the sublunar world and not the effect thereof? In particular would any one dream of making anything in the mind of the active intellect dependent upon the imagination in the mind of man? For that is what *צורה הדמיונית* is, the *φάντασμα* in the human faculty of imagination. G. of course does not say this. He speaks of the *intelligibile* in the mind of the active intellect which corresponds as a *prototype* or *cause* to the form in the human imagination.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Italics mine.

¹¹¹ It is perhaps possible that I am doing injustice to Kellermann, and that his sentence should be construed 'Dass das Intelligibele von der vorstellenden Form, welches der aktive Intellekt gewinnt', &c. But the very word 'gewinnt' is inapplicable to the active intellect, which does not *acquire* his ideas. He has them all the time.

132. (L. 78, 1)

הנה לא יתבאר מזה שיהיה אפשר לשכל ההיולאני שישכיל זולת אלו המושכלות.

(K. 181, 8)

'[Wenn es sich aber so verhält], ist hieraus nicht erwiesen, dass *ihn* (*sc. den akt. Intellekt*)¹¹² der hylische Intellekt *ohne*¹¹² die sublunaren Intelligibilia begreifen kann.'

The word 'ihn' is not represented in the Hebrew of L., and K. does not indicate that he has any manuscript authority for it. As a matter of fact such a conclusion as K. draws is an unexpected one. The preceding arguments do not merely not show that we can perceive the active intellect without the sublunar *intelligibilia*, they do not prove that we can perceive the active intellect at all. The conclusion therefore is a negative one, to be sure, but it is the following if we follow the text of L. 'It has not been proven that the material intellect can perceive anything except these (i. e. the sublunar) *intelligibilia*.'

133. (L. 78, 11-12) = (K. 181, 24-27)

The parenthetical remark, 'sc. obgleich sie zu ihnen direkt gelangen könnten', is beside the point. Those natural things which attain to their ultimate perfection by means of intermediate stages of lesser perfection cannot do otherwise. And in the material intellect, too, the argument is that the sublunar *intelligibilia* are not the final stage of its perfection, but only a way-station, so to speak, a 'Nachtasyl', by means of which it will arrive at the Active Intellect.

134. (L. 78, 23)

זה שאם יתנועע אל שלמות בעבור שלמות אחר, ולא היה בכאן שלמות שלא יהיה בזאת התנועה בעבור שלמות אחר, הנה לא יהיה לזאת התנועה תכלית.

¹¹² Italics mine.

(K. 182, 11)

Würde es sich nämlich *nicht*¹¹³ zu einer Vollkommenheit um der anderen Vollkommenheit willen hinbewegen, — *und es gibt keine*¹¹³ Vollkommenheit, die nicht in der Bewegung um einer andern willen stattfindet — so wäre diese Bewegung *zwecklos*.¹¹³

The word 'nicht' has nothing corresponding to it in the Hebrew of L., and K. does not indicate a variant. The introduction of the negative makes the argument a *non sequitur*. For if every perfection is *not* for the sake of another perfection, there is an ultimate perfection, which is the 'Zweck', and we cannot draw the conclusion, 'so wäre diese Bewegung zwecklos'. This conclusion can have validity only if we assume that there is no ultimate perfection, that every perfection is for the sake of another perfection. In this case we have indeed an infinite series, and the motion is 'zwecklos'. From this consideration it is clear, too, that the parenthetical passage in K., 'und . . . stattfindet', is also incorrectly rendered, and for the same reason as above. In fact, it is not a parenthesis at all in the original, it is part of the condition. Accordingly we should translate the passage as follows: 'If a thing moves to one perfection for the sake of another perfection and there is no perfection in this motion which is not for the sake of another perfection, then this motion has no end at all.'

135. (L. 79, 33 and 34) = (K. 184, 26 and 27)

דעות and דעת mean here 'opinion' or 'idea' and not 'Kenntnis'.

136. (L. 80, 2) = (K. 184, 33)

לא ימנע מחלוקה means '*it cannot escape* division', not 'es ist *nicht unmöglich* . . . durch folgende Alternative zu erklären'. Cf. above, No. 45.

137. (L. 83, 6)

וזה כי כשהיה נפסד מה שמציאות השכל הנקנה הוא מצדו, יפסד בהכרח השכל הנקנה.

¹¹³ Italics mine.

(K. 192, 13)

Denn wenn *etwas an der Existenz des erworbenen Intellekts vergänglich ist, so ist es nur von dieser Seite aus (sc. der physischen Perzeptionen)*; ¹¹⁴ also muss der erworbene Intellekt vergänglich sein.

This translation is incorrect. The correct translation is as follows: 'For if that upon which the existence of the acquired intellect depends is subject to dissolution, the acquired intellect itself necessarily is subject to dissolution'. This agrees with the immediately preceding context.

138. (85, 19)

וכן אם היה אפשר לו שישני כל אלו המושכלות, והיה בלתי אפשר
בו שישני הצד אשר הוא בו אחד.

(K. 201, 4)

Und kann er nicht alle Intelligibilia (sc. die einzelnen) begreifen, so kann er sie auch nicht nach ihrer Einheitsseite hin erkennen.

G. says, of course, nothing of the sort. What he does say is this. 'And similarly if he *can* perceive all sublunar *intelligibilia*, but cannot comprehend them in their unitary aspect [sc. then also he cannot perceive the active intellect].

139. (L. 87, 26-9) = (K. 206, 8-13)

The parenthetical passage in K., 'sc. also der hyl. Intellekt wertvoller als der aktive', strikes one like a bolt from the blue. One cannot see the motive of it, and one wonders what it has to do with Gersonides's argument, which it gives a stunning blow on the head. For surely a conclusion like the one expressed in the words in question can only be intended as a *reductio ad absurdum*, whereas G.'s words immediately preceding, והיה מחויב, שתהיה הצורה שהיא תכלית יותר נכבדת מהצורה שהיא אמצע, dann aber müsste die Endform (sc. *in actu*) wertvoller als das Mediale

¹¹⁴ Italics mine.

sein', is not at all a *reductio ad absurdum*. It expresses G.'s own opinion. And the only conclusion to be drawn from it is that there cannot be two co-ordinate forms (שהוא בלתי אפשר שהיינה) — 86, 26).

As K.'s words can only be due to a confusion, it will be well to resume briefly G.'s argument in this chapter (12). The question is whether it is possible for man to comprehend the Active Intellect. Two conditions are necessary for such comprehension: (1) The material intellect must have a knowledge of *all* sublunar *intelligibilia*. (2) He must know them not as an aggregate of separate ideas, but as a unitary system. Now G. argues: In the first place it is impossible for man to know all sublunar *intelligibilia*. In the second place, granting that this is possible, he cannot know them as a unitary system. In order to prove the latter, G. tries to show in various ways that all nature, i. e. all the processes in the sublunar world, form one great teleological progress, in which the primitive matter endeavours to attain the highest form, viz. the form of man. Every detail in nature is a link in this one chain. This point he makes clear in his second argument, beginning in the middle of p. 86, where he shows that every single form in nature outside of the first and the last stands between two other forms, one above or antecedent to it, which is matter in relation to it, and the other below or subsequent to it, to which it stands in the relation of matter. *There cannot be two co-ordinate forms*. For, he goes on to say, if there are two co-ordinate forms, we have the following three possibilities. Either (1) they are both final ends of the series, or (2) they are both means, i. e. intermediate terms in the series, or (3) one is an end and the other a mean. He proves the first impossible (we need not go into the argument). He proves the second impossible by showing that the two supposed means must be in one motive process, and hence cannot be co-existent but successive (which is the reverse of the hypothesis). And from this follows the impossibility of no. 3. For if one form is an end and the other a mean in one and the same motive process, it follows as before that the end is superior to the mean, and hence they are not co-existent but

successive, not co-ordinate, but the means is subordinate to the end (which is contrary to hypothesis). This is all that G. has proved so far, namely, that there cannot be two co-ordinate forces. There is not a word said or intimated so far about the relation between the material and the active intellect. His proof is not yet complete. He concludes his argument on p. 88, 6 ff. It is not, he says, in the power of man to understand the relation of every single form in this universal process. He may know in a general way that the inorganic is in the relation of matter to the plant, the plant to the animal, &c. He may even understand the relations of certain subdivisions in these three kingdoms, but he can never know the actual relation of every single *intelligibile* or form, and any knowledge short of this does not enable its possessor to comprehend the active intellect.

140. (L. 87 fin.)

והיא מה שקרב יותר אל הדקות הולך מהלך הצורה ממה שקרב אל העובי.

(K. 211)

Und das dem Dünnen näher stehende *weit eher den Weg der Form beschreitet als*¹¹⁵ das dem Dicken näher stehende . . .

The italicized words are incorrect. The מ of ממה is not comparative. The expression הולך מהלך הצורה . . . is an Arabism, corresponding to . . . تنزيل منزلة الصورة من . . . , and signifies that one thing is in the relation of a form to another thing : cf. above, No. 21.

So in our passage the meaning is that the mixture which approximates 'thinness' bears the relation of form to the mixture which approximates 'thickness'. That is, the latter is like matter to the former.

141. (L. 88, 10)

והחי החסר הוא במדרגת ההיולי לדמי השח, ודמי השח הוא במדרגת ההיולי לדמי המעופף, ודמי המעופף הוא במדרגת ההיולי לדמי ההולך.

¹¹⁵ Italics mine.

(K. 213, 15)

Das unvollkommene Tier auf der Stufe des Hylischen gegenüber der *gebückten Gestalt*,¹¹⁶ die *gebückte Gestalt*¹¹⁶ auf der hylischen Stufe gegenüber der fliegenden, und die fliegende auf der Stufe des Hylischen gegenüber der gehenden.

K. translates דמי as if it were דמות = 'Gestalt', and שח as if it were שח or שחח, 'gebückt'. It is clear from the context that דמי means 'having blood', and שח means 'aquatic', lit. 'swimming', contrasted with מעופף, flying = aerial, and הולך, walking = terrestrial.

142. (L. 90, 22) = (K. 217, 26)

בהתמדה means 'continuously', not 'vervollständigt'.

143. (L. 90, 32)

כי הערבות אשר נמצא בזה בחיינו מתחלק חלוף נפלא.

(K. 218, 20) translates :

Denn die in unserem Leben sich geltend machende Annehmlichkeit ist *von jener (sc. nach dem Tode)*¹¹⁷ weit verschieden.

This does not seem to be correct, I mean especially the parenthetical remark. There would be no particular relevancy in making this statement at this time. What G. means is no doubt that there must be a great difference between the happiness arising from the knowledge of inferior *intelligibilia* and that caused by *intelligibilia* of a higher kind—after death, since the difference is so enormously great also in this life. The sequel confirms this interpretation.

144. (L. 91, 5)

ולזה אמרו כל ישראל יש להם חלק לעולם הבא. כי הם עם מה שהישירה אותם התורה לקנין המושכלות זאת ההישירה הנפלאה אשר תמצא בת, הנה אי אפשר שלא יקנו הרבה מהם שיעור מה המושכלות אם מעט ואם הרבה ויהיה אמרם כל ישראל במדרגת רוב ישראל . . .

¹¹⁶ Italics mine.

¹¹⁷ Italics mine.

(K. 219, 3)

Deshalb sagen sie: Ganz Israel hat Anteil am künftigen Leben. Sie meinen nämlich: *Obgleich sie durch die Thora in so ausgezeichnete Weise zum Erwerb der Intelligibilia angeleitet werden, können doch viele von ihnen nur ein kleines oder grösseres Mass von Intelligibilien erwerben.*¹¹⁸ Es steht also¹¹⁸ ihr Ausdruck 'Ganz (כל) Israel' auf der Stufe von den 'Meisten in Israel'. . .

K. also adds in a foot-note (219, note 1), 'Das Wort "ganz" soll darauf hinweisen, dass sich nicht *jeder* in Israel einen Teil von Intelligibilien erworben hat.'

K. gives an entirely wrong impression of G.'s meaning. He makes it appear that G. is trying to show that only a few Israelites and not all will get a share in the world to come, whereas G. says the very opposite; namely, that by reason of the Torah, which exhorts to contemplation and study in so remarkable a manner, a great many Israelites cannot but acquire some measure of *intelligibilia*, whether it be much or little. To be sure, there are exceptions even in Israel. There are men who do not heed the law and do not acquire any *intelligibilia*. For this reason G. adds that the word 'all' (כל) need not be taken strictly. It means rather the greater number. This last remark is more or less incidental, and not a conclusion of what precedes. The main contention of G. is positive and not negative. He means to say that many Israelites do have a knowledge of *intelligibilia* rather than that a great many do not.

145. (L. 91, 21)

ולפי זה הוא מבואר שכבר יחויב למי שיאמין זה שימשך לאמונתו.

(K. 219, fin.)

Also muss der *Gläubige offenbar solches mit seinem Glauben in Übereinstimmung bringen.*¹¹⁹

This is not the correct meaning of the Hebrew passage. The proper translation is as follows:

'Therefore it is clear that the person who believes this (sc. that our conclusions are opposed to the Torah) should follow his faith

¹¹⁸ Italics mine.

¹¹⁹ Italics mine.

(sc. and reject our theories).’ The sequel shows also that this translation is the correct one.

Conclusion: Our task is now done. We have examined the more glaring errors and misconceptions and tried to correct them. K. has also a number of lengthy and erudite notes, which we have left out of this discussion. After all, the first duty of a translator is to *translate*. The next thing incumbent upon him is to add brief explanatory notes wherever the text offers some difficulty, textual, terminological, or logical. Of these there is by far too little in K. The translator’s own philosophical standpoint, and his criticism of his author from that standpoint, is quite a secondary matter. If he has done his duty properly and adequately by the first two requirements, we may be grateful to him for his additional criticism. But to indulge in the latter at the expense of the former is unjustifiable. And this is the charge we make against Kellermann. We have examined his translation rather carefully, though not too critically, and found it wanting in a great many more instances than is allowed to a competent translator. A more critical search, and a consideration of the finer points would no doubt reveal a good many more instances open to question. K.’s defects as a translator of Gersonides may be classed under the following heads.

1. He does not seem to be sufficiently familiar with the Hebrew style of the mediaeval Jewish philosophers.

2. He does not in many cases understand the meaning of technical terms (cf. Nos. 74, 90, 91, 95, 96, 97, 101, 108, 109, 118, &c.).

3. He exhibits a lack of imagination in failing to see the point of an argument or the sequence of thought (cf. Nos. 64, 80, 81, 82, 95, 96, 98, 102, 109, 113, &c.).

4. This makes it difficult or impossible for him to see in a number of instances evident corruptions in the text, which call for obvious and simple emendations (cf. Nos. 74, 79, 114, 123, &c.).

5. Even though he had the advantage of several MSS., he failed to draw from them the benefit they were calculated to give, and for reasons stated before (Nos. 3 and 4) allowed in some instances a valuable reading to slip through his hands, the adoption of which made a difficult and obscure argument clear and transparent (cf. Nos. 62, 65, 66, 77, 88, 117, 127, &c.).

Dr. Kellermann intends to proceed with his translation of the *Milhamot*, of which he has given us so far about one-fifth. He also intimates that he may undertake to edit the Hebrew text on the basis of the MSS. We feel it our duty to advise Kellermann to proceed slowly and with caution in either of these tasks. The reader who has followed us to this point (I fear he is not very numerous) will, I think, agree that the volume here reviewed should have undergone a thorough revision *before* it was published. May we suggest in all humility and seriousness that in future Kellermann may join with a specialist in this line, and collaborate on the translation as well as on the edition of the text. A translation or an edition of a mediaeval Jewish philosophical text is a rare event in these practical days, hence we must see to it, in the name of Jewish science and its mediaeval heroes, that when they are presented to the modern world (none too favourable to them as it is) it should be in as nearly perfect a form as is humanly possible.