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U.S. Navy

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

16 OCTOBER - 31 DECEMBER, 1943

PG Numbers 31845 - 31849

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
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
WAR DIARY

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CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

16 - 31 OCTOBER, 1943

PG/31845



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16 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

U 360 AB 3568)
U 713 AB 3523) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 737 AG 7590.
U 956 AG 78.
U 355 Spitsbergen ("Kreuzritter").

Atlantic:

U 212, 309, 419, 420, 426, 470.

In port:

U 307 Hammerfest,
U 277, 354, 387 Narvik,
U 302, 601, 625, 703, 711 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 629, 636, 586 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0900 U 960 put in to Trondheim from Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance and reconnaissance of Ice Fjord - Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Nothing to report. Flying route not exhaustively covered. Ice Fjord not covered.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes.
One Ju 88 reconnaissance of Faeroes area.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

In AF 5240, 140 miles northwest of Trondheim, submarine on course 60°, when approached, alternating courses.

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(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. Freighter "Roschal", in Belushya since 5 October, will shortly put to sea. At 1410 on 15 October a motor vessel passed to the west of a signal station in the Naryan Mar area on a northeasterly course, altered course at 1530 and disappeared from sight on a southwesterly course on a bearing of 252°.
2. Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
3. Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweeper No.55.
4. Amderma area: destroyer "Uritski".

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats in Bear Island passage,
2 boats off Ice Fjord.
No reports.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 355 (La Baume) on meteorological operation
"Kreuzritter".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

Radio message Most Secret 6259 of 16 October received from Admiral Commanding U-boats:

"Reference: Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 3355 of 11 October:

Re 1. It is intended to bring the 11th U-boat Flotilla up to strength with own boats, date cannot yet be given as it depends on the development of the situation in the Western theater and especially on dockyard and accommodation capacity.

Re 2. Reduction of flotilla personnel can only be permitted insofar as there may be surplus men who would be left idle; the number remaining must be sufficient to ensure that boats on through passage will not be delayed, and, if need be, boats must be able to put in without delay.

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- Re 3. The answer to your question is in the affirmative. As matters now stand in the Northern area, the withdrawal of building workers would cause intolerable delays in the completion of the base, and if and when the need arises it would not be ready.
- Re 4. The dockyard capacity and facilities at Bergen must be developed and completed in accordance with the original plan, however, the reduction of personnel to correspond with the number of boats actually making use of the dockyard is unavoidable.
- Re 5. The extension of Bergen dockyard and construction of U-boat pens must go ahead as originally planned; a final ruling on this subject has been requested from Naval War Staff, Quartermaster's Office Dept. 5, also re paras. 3) and 4).
- Re 8. It was not possible to inform Captain U-boats, Norway earlier about the removal of boats from the 11th U-boat Flotilla."

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re 16 October, para. III. b) :-

The submarine spotted from the air northwest of Trondheim cannot be U 960, now proceeding southwards, as this boat would hardly proceed at such a great distance from the coast. For the same reason it could not have been an Atlantic boat, so that it must be assumed that it was an enemy submarine.

Otherwise no comments.

(Signed) Peters.

17 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

- U 360 proceeding from AB 3568 to AB 3973.
- U 713 proceeding from AB 3523 to AB 3917.
- U 737 AG 7590.
- U 956 AG 78.
- U 355 Spitsbergen ("Kreuzritter").

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Atlantic:

U 212, 309, 419, 420, 426, 470.

In port:

U 307 Hammerfest,
U 277, 354, 387 Narvik,
U 302, 601, 625, 703, 711, 960 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 629, 636, 586 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance and reconnaissance of Ice Fjord - Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Nothing to report. Nothing to report from Ice Fjord. Flying route not exhaustively covered.

8 FW 190 on armed shipping reconnaissance, Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet. No shipping traffic observed.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, Vaernes - Jan Mayen - AB 7151 - Vaernes without sighting enemy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. The survey vessel "Migalka" was in Bugrino on 15 October.

Minesweeper No.411 was on patrol in the Yarossel area (Yugorski Straits) on the evening of 16 October.

2. Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "M 105" and "M 174" mentioned by name.

3. Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweepers Nos.102, 107, guardships Nos.20, 71, 72, 81, guardboat No.505 and probably another (6635).

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4. Dikson area: 2 aircraft on morning of 16 October.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats in Bear Island passage,
2 boats off Ice Fjord.

2300 Radio message 2216/732 received from U 737 (Brasack):

"1. "Mohs" please report whether he was off Advent Bay in Ice Fjord at 2030.

2. Attack periscope out of order, 105 cbm."

2400 U 956 (Mohs) reported in short signal 2348/733:

"No."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 355 (La Baume) on meteorological operation "Kreuzritter".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re 17 October, para.IV.b):-

U 737 (Brasack) apparently suspected that an enemy submarine was off Advent Bay. It is possible that British submarines are bringing supplies to what remains of the base in Ice Fjord. According to the observations made by U 355 (La Baume) and U 277 (Lübsen) we may assume that Advent Bay or Coal Bay is the unloading place for these supplies.

(Signed) Peters.

18 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

U 360 AB 3973)
U 713 AB 3917) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 737 AG 7590.
U 956 AG 78.
U 355 Spitsbergen ("Kreuzritter").

Atlantic:

U 309, 212, 419, 420, 426, 470..

In port:

U 307 Hammerfest,
U 277, 354, 387 Narvik,
U 302, 601, 625, 703, 711, 960 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 629, 636, 586 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0800 U 601 put out of Trondheim for Bergen.
0800 U 703 put out of Trondheim for Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance, Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - northwest tip of Spitsbergen - $80^{\circ} 30' N, 10^{\circ} E$ (flight to ice limit and position of "Kreuzritter") - Banak. Flew as far as $80^{\circ} 30' N, 10^{\circ} E$. Flying route not exhaustively covered, Ice Fjord and Forlandsund only partly. "Kreuzritter" not found. Otherwise nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 on shipping reconnaissance, area north of Vardø - middle of Kongsfjord - AC 8148 - 8166 - Kirkenes. Nothing to report. Flying route exhaustively covered.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of Faeroes area without sighting enemy.

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, Vaernes - AA9390 - Vaernes without sighting enemy.

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3 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance between 57° and 58° N, and westwards as far as 3° E. No report of enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. The destroyer "Gremyashchi" (formerly described as destroyer "A") put in to Belushya on the evening of 16 October. Minesweeper No.32 and guardship No.75 put out from Belushya for Khabarova at 0000 on 18 October.
2. Minesweepers Nos.53 and 106 were expected in Bugrino (AW 3331) on 17 October. Minesweeper No.103 passed Bugrino on a westerly course at 2210 on 17 October.
3. Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "V 105" mentioned by name.
4. Belushya/Kara Sea area: guardship No.81, minesweepers Nos.107, 108.
5. Amderma area: minesweeper No.102.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats in Bear Island passage,
2 boats off Ice Fjord.

Radio message 1207/736 sent to group "Spitsbergen" in answer to yesterday's radio message from U 737 (Brasack):

- "1. Possible that submarines are supplying Barentsberg. Unloading in Advent or Coal Bay. "Lübsen" found Coal Bay inhabited on 14 September. Two 7 cm. guns were manned on the pier at Barentsberg on 24 September. Radio traffic resumed since the beginning of October.
2. "Mohs" not to cross 78° northwards.
3. "Brasack" free to attack submarines in Ice Fjord."

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(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 355 (La Baume) was informed of air reconnaissance of "Kreuzritter" area in radio message 1133/734.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

19 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

U 360 proceeding from AB 3973 to AG 7820.
U 713 proceeding from AB 3917 to AG 7570.
U 737 AG 7580.
U 956 AG 7830.
U 355 Spitsbergen ("Kreuzritter") proceeding to AG 7580/90.

Atlantic:

U 212, 309, 419, 420, 426, 470.

In port:

U 307 Hammerfest,
U 277, 354, 387 Narvik,
U 302, 625, 711, 960 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 629, 636, 586 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1800 U 601 put in to Bergen from Trondheim.

1800 U 703 put in to Bergen from Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance and reconnaissance of Ice Fjord. Flying route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Flying route not exhaustively covered, Ice Fjord exhaustive. Nothing to report.

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2 FW 190 on shipping reconnaissance, Fisher Peninsula - Kola Inlet. No shipping movements observed. Reconnaissance area only partially covered.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance of Faeroes area without sighting enemy. Broken off in AE 9798.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. Broken off in AB 7464. No enemy sighting report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

1050 Short signal 1018/744 received from U 956 (Mohs):

"1 steamer, 2 destroyers in AG 7579 on easterly course."

1400 Radio message 1210/748 received from U 737 (Brasack):

"5 destroyers putting in to Ice Fjord."

2355 Radio message 2232/756 received from "Mohs" (U 956):

"Most Immediate: 4 vessels putting out of Ice Fjord, course 270°, speed 16 knots."

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. On 15 October at 1400, 1 minesweeper proceeded from Khabarova to Naryan Mar, and on 18 October at 0600 1 minesweeper from Khabarova to Amderma.
2. Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "M 105" and "M 200" mentioned by name.
3. Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweepers Nos. 57, 102, 110.
4. Guardboat No. 510 was beached in Varneka Bay (near Cape Greben).

5. At 1055 on 10 October minesweeper No.57 proceeded with survey vessel "Schtorm" from Belushya towards Yugorski Straits, and put in to Khabarova (AT 8827) at 0605 on 12 October. One convoy, composition unknown, arrived there at the same time. Survey vessel proceeded towards Amderma, time unknown, and returned to Khabarova at 1600 on 15 October.

At 0900 on 11 October R-boat No.401 from Khabarova to patrol area No.13. Convoy "BA 29" consisting of the destroyer "Uritski", 1 guardship and 1 freighter, put in to Khabarova at 0815 on 12 October. The guardship proceeded at 1510 on 15 October towards the western exit of the Kara Straits for reconnaissance. At 1200 on 15 October minesweeper No.57 proceeded from Khabarova to Belushya.

6. Reports on shipping movements are regularly sent from Khabarova to Dikson, as well as to the Staff of the White Sea Fleet at Archangel, but seldom to Belushya. This leads to the conclusion that there is a command post in Dikson for shipping and convoy movements in the Yugorski Straits/Dikson area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats in Bear Island passage,
2 boats off Ice Fjord.

1145

Radio message 1145/746 sent:

"Group "Spitsbergen" to operate on 1 steamer, 2 destroyers in AG 7579, course east, as reported by "Mohs" at 1018."

Group North/Fleet has temporarily released boats of group "Eisenbart" for attack on enemy formation reported and has requested Luftflotte 5 for a reconnaissance of the approaches to Ice Fjord.

Radio message 1158/747 was therefore dispatched:

"1. "Eisenbart" to proceed to AG 7820 at high speed.

2. "La Baume" not to pass 79° southwards."

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1440

Radio message 1440/749 sent:

- "1. New attack areas: "Gosejakob" AG 7570, "Becker" AG 7820, "Brasack" 7580 and 90, "Mohs" 7830.
2. Only "Brasack" permitted to enter Ice Fjord. Permission for "Mohs" by position short signal, giving last 3 grid square figures, from "Brasack".
3. "La Baume" to proceed towards AG 7810 at maximum speed. "Kreuzritter" to remain north of 79° 30' N."

In this way the approaches to Ice Fjord will be patrolled by 4 boats, and "Brasack" will be able to call "Mohs" to his assistance inside Ice Fjord.

2130

Radio message 2050/750 received from U 956 (Mohs):

"Query: permission to enter Ice Fjord. Weather. 60 cbm."

2206

Radio message 2206/751 sent:

"Mohs" permitted to enter Ice Fjord."

In radio message 2304/755 the boats were once more reminded that one of our own trawlers is stationed north of 79° N for operation "Kreuzritter".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 355 (La Baume) has separated from "Kreuzritter" in accordance with radio message 1440/749 and will also operate on the enemy formation in Ice Fjord.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

Teleprinter message Most Secret S.O.s only 970/43 A 1 received from Group North/Fleet:

"Group North/Fleet considers ice situation in the Barents Sea to be more favorable. Freezing up under the coast is not expected until the end of November. Traffic through the Yugorski Straits normally runs until about February with the help of ice-breakers. Opportunities of inflicting damage on enemy shipping by minelaying operations are to be fully exploited. To make this possible the second boat off Ice Fjord is to be withdrawn. Thus U 956 is not to be replaced after exhausting its endurance at sea. The following tasks of the third part of the minelaying operations are to be attempted: operations "Eistorte", "Eiszapfen",

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"Eisschrank", "Eisfuchs", "Eisente", and "Eiswagen". On account of uncertain ice conditions, minelaying U-boats are each to be given the entire plans for the above-named minelaying operations and left to choose the most suitable areas, only with the general proviso to begin with the most easterly minefields and work westwards. Captain U-boats, Norway is to issue further orders. Report plans in good time."

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re 19 October, paras. III.a) and IV.b):-

1. It is possible that the formations sighted putting in to Ice Fjord by U 956 (Mohs) and U 737 (Brasack) were one and the same. As far as can be judged at present, the destroyers are either taking fresh supplies to Barentsberg, or else have come to take off the remainder of the garrison.
2. U 355 (La Baume) and group "Eisenbart" will not reach their attack areas until after midnight. This is unfortunately rather late, but I hope that the enemy formation will not have left the fjord by then. The length of its stay will depend on its task.
3. When the U-boats will have occupied the attack areas ordered, adequate patrol of the entrance to Ice Fjord will be ensured. Only U 737 (Brasack) will at first be allowed to enter Ice Fjord, in order to obtain a clear picture of the situation, since it must be assumed from a recent report that there is at least one British submarine still in the fjord.
4. U 355 (La Baume) will be able to provide valuable help through his exact knowledge of Ice Fjord.

(Signed) Peters.

20 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

U 360 AG 7820.
U 713 AG 7570.
U 956 AG 7830 and reconnaissance of Ice Fjord.
U 355 AG 7580/90.

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Atlantic:

U 212, 309, 419, 420, 426, 470, 586.

In port:

U 307 Hammerfest,
U 277, 354, 387 Narvik,
U 302, 625, 711, 960 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 601, 629, 636, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 737 proceeding from Ice Fjord to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance with reconnaissance of Ice Fjord. Flying route: Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - Ekmanfjord - Dicksonfjord - Billefjord - Sassenfjord - Templefjord - Advent Bay - Coal Bay - Gronfjord - Van Mijens Bay - Sveagruva - 78° 30' N, 7° E - 77° N, 8° E - Bear Island - Banak. Nothing to report. Exhaustive reconnaissance of flying route, except between 77° N, 8° E to 76° N, 13° E on account of measurements above clouds, Ice Fjord and adjoining fjords exhaustively covered. Single icebergs off west coast of Spitsbergen, especially in Ice Fjord.

1 BV 138 on shipping reconnaissance, route Billefjord - AB 3257 - AG 7557 - 7518 - AB 3275 - Billefjord, without any observations. Flying route exhaustively covered.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

2 BV 138 (with radar) and 5 BV (without radar) on reconnaissance of enemy convoy route 100 km. on either side of Jan Mayen as far as Ice Fjord. Almost exhaustive, no report of enemy sighted. Enemy jammer on Jan Mayen.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - AE 3720 - Vaernes without sighting enemy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

0010 After U 956 (Mohs) had reported 4 vessels putting out of Ice Fjord on course 270° at 2232 on 19 October, short signal 2354/788 was received from him:

"Convoy in grid square 7586, westbound, speed 20 knots."

And radio message 0026/760:

"Have lost contact. Last position AG 7816, course 250°, speed 20 knots....."

U 737 (Brasack) reported in radio message 2346/761:

"In afternoon 3 destroyers, 1 light cruiser with ship's aircraft in Advent Bay, 1 destroyer at Barentsberg.....
Enemy made off westwards at 2200."

And in radio message 0229/762:

"Barentsberg clear....."

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "M 105" and "M 200" mentioned by name.

2. Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweeper No.102.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in Ice Fjord area.

0230

U 956 (Mohs) reported in radio message 0026/760 that he had lost contact with the formation putting out from Ice Fjord. He therefore received orders in radio message 0254/763:

"Occupy attack area ordered, permitted to enter Ice Fjord."

0322

Radio message 2346/761 received from U 737 (Brasack):

"1. In afternoon 3 destroyers, 1 light cruiser with ship's aircraft in Advent Bay, 1 destroyer at Barentsberg.

2. After bridge rammed when attacking destroyer at 1655. Damage: main ballast tank 1, watertight stern out of action. Both aerials torn off, upper deck torn open. One rudder probably damaged.

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3. Position AG 7673, am withdrawing westwards to investigate damage. Starboard Diesel already damaged on 18 October. Running on gear wheel-, camshaft- and blower propulsion.
4. Boat able to dive to all depths. Enemy made off westwards at 2200."

0324

Radio message 0229/762 received from "Brasack":

"Barentsberg clear. Am leaving Ice Fjord."

The boats were informed of the air reconnaissance of Ice Fjord and of the wavelength to be used.

0450

Radio message 0450/765 sent:

1. "La Baume", "Gosejakob", "Becker" to report time of arrival in attack area by short signal.
2. "Mohs" reconnaissance of Ice Fjord.
3. "La Baume"'s new attack area AG 7580 and 90.
4. "Brasack" to proceed homewards to Andfjord-Narvik."

Arrival in attack area was reported by:

U 360 (Becker) in short signal 0607/766:

"2300."

U 713 (Gosejakob) in short signal 0624/766:

"0000."

U 355 (La Baume) in short signal 0642/768:

"1015."

1107

Radio message 1107/722 sent:

1. "La Baume" to report day "Kreuzritter" will probably commence homeward passage.
2. "Mohs" to reconnoiter Advent Bay, Coal Bay and Grönfjord. To report vessels or signs of occupation on shore at once."

2316

Radio message 2120/782 received from U 956 (Mohs):

"Grönfjord, Coal Bay and Advent Bay reconnoitered. No vessels or movement ashore. Several burning coal mines at Barentsberg, Advent Point and Longyearby. 53 cbm. All torpedoes."

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(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 355 (La Baume) reported in short signal 1238/773 that "Kreuzritter" would probably start return passage on 21 October. In reply radio message 1355/775 was sent:

"Kreuzritter"'s homeward passage will be ordered separately."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re 20 October, paras.III.a) and IV.b):-

The enemy operation was a very short one. Our own boats closing in from south and north were too late to intercept the enemy formation, which put to sea at night at high speed. It may be assumed from the last report of U 956 (Mohs) as well as from the situation as a whole that the enemy units took off the remaining garrison from Barentsberg and Advent Bay. Results of further air reconnaissance will have to confirm this assumption.

(Signed) Peters.

21 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

U 360 proceeding from AG 7820 to AB 3568.
U 713 proceeding from AG 7570 to AB 3523.
U 956 patrolling Ice Fjord.
U 355 Spitsbergen (proceeding from AG 7580 to "Kreuzritter").

Atlantic:

U 212, 309, 419, 420, 426, 470, 586.

In port:

U 307 Hammerfest,
U 277, 354, 387 Narvik,
U 302, 625, 711, 960 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 601, 629, 636, 703 Bergen.

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(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 737 proceeding from Ice Fjord to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 for meteorological reconnaissance and reconnaissance of Ice Fjord, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Exhaustive reconnaissance of Ice Fjord and adjoining fjords, but not of flying route. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance south of Jan Mayen without sighting enemy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0718 Meteorological Reconnaissance Staffel 1 reported a submarine in AF 7599, course 90°, speed 1 knot. Light anti-aircraft fire. Submarine submerged at 0720.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. On 16 October, minesweeper No.102, with the Fortress Commander of the Novaya Zemlya base at Belushya on board, proceeded from Anderma to Khabarova (AT 8827). Returned to Anderma at 0400 on 18 October.
2. At 0410 on 16 October destroyer "Gremyashchi" and one other destroyer from Belushya to Iokanka.
3. Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "M 105" mentioned by name.
4. Belushya/Kara Sea area: guardship No.28, minesweeper No.35.
5. Dikson area: minesweeper No.108.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
 - 2 boats Bear Island passage,
 - 1 boat Ice Fjord.

0019 Radio message 0019/785 sent:

"1. "Eisenbart" to proceed back to northern attack areas in Bear Island passage. After 0000 on 23 October resume mobile patrol every 4 days.

2. "Mohs" to remain to patrol Ice Fjord."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

0015 Radio message 0015/784 sent to U 355 (La Baume):

"Rejoin "Kreuzritter", then free to commence return passage. Propose rendezvous by position short-signal, and if already arranged with "Kreuzritter", add "Yes"."

He thereupon reported in short signal 0151/786 that rendezvous position is AG 7219, agreed upon with "Kreuzritter". This position is Magdalena Bay on the northwest corner of Spitsbergen.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1. Sailing order for U 636 (Hildebrandt):

- "1. Put out from Bergen on forenoon of 24 October, proceed via inner leads to Trondheim.
- 2. After reporting and delivering cargo, proceed further at a distance of 50 miles from the coast to Westfjord - Narvik.
- 3. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave.
- 4. Minelaying gear at readiness."

2. Sailing order for U 387 (Büchler): See Appendix III.

3. Operational Order for U 354 (Herbschleb):

See Appendix IV.

V. Reports of successes: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re 21 October, paras. III.b) and IV.c):-

1. The submarine sighted northeast of the Shetlands may have been U 586 (Götze) on its way to the Atlantic.
2. Operation "Kreuzritter" seems to have been completed with the setting up of the alternative camp in Magdalena Bay.

(Signed) Peters.

22 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

U 360 AG 3568)
U 713 AG 3523) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 956 patrolling Ice Fjord.
U 355 Spitsbergen ("Kreuzritter").

Atlantic:

U 212, 309, 420, 426, 470, 586.

In port:

U 307 Hammerfest,
U 277, 354, 387 Narvik,
U 302, 625, 711, 960 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 601, 629, 636, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1000 U 737 proceeding from Ice Fjord to Narvik.
U 354 put out from Narvik, 1705 put in to Harstad.
1235 U 387 put out from Narvik, 1705 put in to Harstad.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance and reconnaissance of Ice Fjord, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - 73° N, 13° E - Banak. Exhaustive reconnaissance of Ice Fjord

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and adjoining fjords, but not of flying route owing to weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AA 9377 - AE 3182 - Vaernes without sighting enemy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Two new 10-15 m. high radio masts 500 m. northeast of the old buckled up transmission masts near Tunheim on Bear Island. A coal mine on the southeastern slope at Longyearby burning.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. At 2200 on 16 October guardship No.30 proceeded from Iokanka to Khabarova, and at 0440 on 17 October guardship No.22 proceeded from Belushya to Kanin Nos. On the afternoon of 21 October guardship No.28 in Dikson.

2. Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "M 105" mentioned.

3. Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweepers Nos.32, 53, 62, 108, 110.

4. Amderma area: guardship No.72, minesweeper No.106.

5. On the afternoon of 21 October one "DB 3" on reconnaissance of Kara Sea sea area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats in Bear Island passage,
1 boat off Ice Fjord.
No reports.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 355 (La Baume) is meeting "Kreuzritter"
(on meteorological operation) in Magdalena
Bay for homeward passage.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

Radio message received from German Naval High
Command, Naval War Staff, Director of Naval
Meteorological Service:

- "1. The steamer "Feodosia", with two meteorological buoys and one meteorological shore transmitter on board, will probably not reach Narvik until 3 November.
2. The meteorological buoys are to be set up by "Regierungsrat" Dr. Wilken and not by "Regierungsrat" Neumann. He will arrive in Narvik at the end of October with Inspector Werner to assist and advise on the preparations at the jumping-off port. Dr. Wilken will supervise the construction of chutes according to his specifications on the repair ship "Kamerun".
3. In order to shorten the time it will take to lay the meteorological buoys, it will be necessary to carry out a practice laying in the jumping-off port with the crew intended for the operation.
- 4) Lay meteorological buoy No. 124, transmitting frequency 5155 kc/s., at position 70.5° N, 8.5° W, at a depth of 200 m. (Jan Mayen).
Lay meteorological buoy No. 125, transmitting frequency 4215 kc/s., at position 73.0° N, 35.0° E at a depth of 200 m. (Barents Sea).
5. The meteorological shore transmitter No. 29 is to be prepared for operation on Bear Island by Inspector Werner."

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re 22 October, paras III.b) and VI:-

1. The upright radio masts at Tunheim are probably those already reported by U 212 (Vogler) on 20 June 1943.
2. U 277 (Lübsen)'s departure will be delayed for at least a week by the late arrival of the meteorological gear. With the present shortage of boats this is particularly unfavorable, as has already been proved on earlier occasions.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

U 360 proceeding from AB 3568 to AB 3973.
U 713 proceeding from AB 3523 to AB 3917.
U 956 patrolling Ice Fjord.

Atlantic:

U 212, 309, 420, 426, 470, 586.

In port:

U 307 Hammerfest,
U 387 Harstad,
U 277 Narvik,
U 302, 625, 711, 960 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 601, 629, 636, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1452 U 737 put in to Harstad from the operational
area.
0700 U 354 put out from Harstad for Tromsø.
0930 U 387 put out from Harstad for the operational
area.
U 355 proceeding from AB 2249 to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance and reconnaissance on route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Hornsund - Banak - Nautsi. Owing to weather conditions, flying route covered only from the coast to Bear Island and from South Cape to Hornsund.

2 FW 190 on armed shipping reconnaissance. No shipping traffic observed. Fisher Peninsula harbors not covered owing to weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, flying route Vaernes - AA 9390 - 9910 - Vaernes, no enemy sighting report.

CONFIDENTIAL

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

2 aerial masts and meteorological hut sighted about 500 m. northeast of the old radio station near Tunheim on Bear Island, otherwise nothing to report.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

2. Dikson area: minesweepers Nos.31, 37, guardship No.19.

3. Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweepers Nos.108, 110, guardship No.28.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats in Bear Island passage,
1 boat Ice Fjord.
No reports.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 355 (La Baume) on return passage with "Kreuzritter" meteorological operation from Spitsbergen.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re 23 October, para.III.b):-

Further observations by air reconnaissance of the radio station at Tunheim coincide with previous aerial photographs and U 212 (Vogler)'s report.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

24 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

U 360 AB 3973) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 713 AB 3917)
U 956 patrolling Ice Fjord.

Atlantic:

U 212, 309, 420, 426, 470, 586.

In port:

U 307 Hammerfest,
U 354 Tromsø,
U 277 Narvik,
U 302, 625, 711, 960 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 601, 629, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1445 U 737 put in to Narvik from Harstad.
U 387 proceeding from Narvik to AB 3523.
U 355 proceeding from AB 2249 to Hammerfest.
0600 U 636 put out of Bergen for Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance and reconnaissance on route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Flying route only partly covered. Otherwise nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 on shipping and airfield reconnaissance, route Petsamo - Vardø - AC 8839 - Belushya - Kolguev North - Kanin Nos - Kirkenes only partly covered because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes without sighting enemy.
1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of Faeroes sea area without sighting enemy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Automatic meteorological transmitter definitely recognized about 300-400 m. north-east of the old transmitting station near Tunheim on Bear Island.

Probably 13 single-engined aircraft on Belushya airfield.

2 coastal freighters totaling 1,400 G.R.T. in Belushya harbor, aerial photographs of harbor and airfield taken. 1 coastal freighter of 300 G.R.T. in AW 2311. Course 70°, low speed.

1 ship of 300 G.R.T. about 10 km. west of Kanin Nos, course and speed not made out.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. The destroyer "Uritski" was in the Belushya area on the afternoon of 23 October. Chirachi (AT 8464) sighted 1 minesweeper at 0900 on 23 October on bearing 290°, at a distance of 7 miles.

2. Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

3. Belushya/Kara Sea area: guardships Nos. 83 and 84 (both appeared for the first time on 21 October). Guardship No. 72.

4. Dikson area: minelayer No. 90, guardships Nos. 19, 28, minesweepers Nos. 31, 37.

5. Yugorski Straits area: guardship No. 26.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats in Bear Island passage,
1 boat off Ice Fjord.

U 713 (Gosejakob) reported in answer to query in short signal 1723/718 that he will require dockyard facilities and more than a small working party for the boat's overhaul.

0025

Radio message 0025/710 sent:

"1. On 23 October U 387 will put to sea from Andfjord to deliver mail to U 360 at 0900 on 25 October in AB 3917, and to relieve U 713 at 1800 in AB 3523. To join group "Eisenbart".

CONFIDENTIAL

2. U 355 to proceed from AB 2249 to Hammerfest with steam trawler."

2315 Radio message 2315/725 sent to U 956 (Mohs):

- "1. New reconnaissance to see if Advent Bay, and more especially Barentsberg, are still occupied.
2. Relief intended about midday on 28 October off Ice Fjord.
3. If necessary, obtain cipher material from relieving boat."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1. U 355 (La Baume) proceeding homeward with "Kreuzritter" meteorological operation to Hammerfest.
2. U 354 (Herbschleb) in Tromsø taking on meteorological party "Svartisen".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 737 (Brasack), third operation (see Appendix II/1).

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re 24 October, paras. III.b) and VI:-

1. We cannot be certain about the existence of the radio station reported near Tunheim until confirmation is obtained through photographs by the air reconnaissance.
2. U 737's report also confirms the assumption that the destroyer group did not bring supplies to Barentsberg, but only took off the rest of the garrison.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

25 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

U 360 proceeding from AB 3973 to AB 3568.
U 713 proceeding from AB 3917 to AB 3523.
Relieved by U 387 at 1800.
U 956 patrolling Ice Fjord.

Atlantic:

U 212, 309, 420, 426, 470, 586.

In port:

U 307 Hammerfest,
U 277, 737 Narvik,
U 302, 625, 711, 960 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 601, 629, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0730
1045

U 387 proceeding from Narvik to AB 3523.
U 354 out of Tromsø to Hope Island.
U 355 put in to Hammerfest from Spitsbergen.
U 636 proceeding from Bergen to Trondheim.
U 713 proceeding from AB 3523 to Narvik via
AB 3490.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance and reconnaissance on route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Flying route almost exhaustively covered. Aerial photographs of Bear Island, Bruce Settlement and the Pyramid pit (Ice Fjord).
6 FW 190 in 3 waves on shipping and meteorological reconnaissance Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet. Area only partially covered.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AE 1665 - Vaernes without sighting enemy.
3 BV 138 reconnaissance of reported enemy M.T.B.s.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

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(b) By air reconnaissance:

Three huts in good condition at Bruceby. Near Pyramid pit, a fair-sized, partly new, timber building, no signs of occupation observed.

One vessel at anchor in both Eina and Motka Bays.

From AF 5668 to AF 5673 1 enemy M.T.B.

Attack by 6 fighters at 1150, explosion and flames on M.T.B. Boat sank at 1300, no survivors. 1 enemy M.T.B. in AF 5588, several attacks with aircraft armament, hits observed. Boat made off westwards.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. Guardboat No.620 in Bugrino area on evening of 22 October, probably damaged.

2. Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "M 174" mentioned by name.

3. Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweeper No.40.

4. Amderma area: destroyers "Uritski" and "H", guardship No.28.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats Bear Island passage,
1 boat Ice Fjord.

1135 Radio message 1135/735 sent:

"After being relieved, "Gosejakob" to proceed homeward to Andfjord - Narvik via AB 3490."

1715 Radio message 1345/744 received from U 956 (Mohs):

"1. Advent Bay is occupied. 2 apparently new wooden huts and radio masts. Boat was attacked by anti-aircraft guns from the shore.

2. Barentsberg: no significant observations. No reply from shore defenses even after firing with quadruple guns."

In radio message 2253/760 the boats were informed that U 354 (Herbschleb) is proceeding to Hope Island.

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(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Herbschleb) reported in short signal 0707/728 that he put out from Tromsø for Hope Island at 0600 with meteorological party "Svartisen".

U 355 (La. Baume) put in to Hammerfest from meteorological operation "Kreuzritter".

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 307 (Herrle):

- "1. Put out from Hammerfest on forenoon of 26 October.
2. Occupy attack area AB 3973, depth of sweep 30 miles, at 1600 on 27 October.
3. Group "Eisenbart": U 387 (Büchler) AB 3523 to 3917, U 360 (Becker) AB 3568 to 3973. Transfer attack areas every second day. Set off at 0000 on 27 October from the northern end, proceed on varying courses, at a uniform rate of advance, arriving at the southern end at 0000 on 28 October. At 0000 on 29 October again turn northwards, and so on. U 956 (Mohs) off Ice Fjord. U 354 (Herbschleb) Hope Island. Daily meteorological flight by 1 Ju 88.
4. Operational Order for Northern Waters U-boats No.1, Northern Waters radio service."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

Radio message received from "Regierungsrat" Dr. Holzappel from Tromsø:

"U 354 will put out from Tromsø on the forenoon of 25 October. On board, complement of station "Svartisen" and provisions, fuel and equipment for 8 months. The U-boat commander will report on erection of station and further requirements of the station's personnel which will become apparent on the spot.

The commander requests that the area around the station should not be flown over, as this would interrupt unloading, until he has reported that the erection of the station has been completed. In order to arrange for the further supply of the station from the air I request that the necessary orders will be transmitted to the meteorological Staffel at Banak."

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re 25 October, para. IV. b):-

CONFIDENTIAL

The report from U 956 (Mohs), who was sent into Ice Fjord once more in order to round off the operation by a final reconnaissance, has shown, contrary to our previous assumption, that Advent Bay is still occupied by the enemy. Apparently, at least one newly equipped British meteorological station was left behind in Advent Bay.

(Signed) Peters.

26 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

U 387 AB 3523)
U 360 AB 3568) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 956 patrolling Ice Fjord.

Atlantic:

U 212, 309, 420, 426, 470, 586.

In port:

U 307, 355 Hammerfest,
U 277, 737 Narvik,
U 302, 625, 636, 711, 960 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 601, 629, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 354 proceeding from Tromsø to Hope Island.
U 713 proceeding from AB 3523 to Narvik via
AB 3490.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - Banak. Reconnaissance of Bear Island - Ice Fjord. Exhaustive reconnaissance of Bear Island - Ice Fjord, but not of flying route. Aerial photographs of Bear Island and Longyearby.
12 FW 190, in 3 waves, on armed shipping and air-field reconnaissance, Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet. No shipping movements observed.

CONFIDENTIAL

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

No reports of operations.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

When flying over Longyearby 3.7 cm. anti-aircraft fire from the town.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. At 1410 on 25 October, minesweeper No.80 put to sea from Matochkin Straits on easterly course after discharging provisions for the polar station. Simultaneously a motor vessel coming from the south entered the Matochkin Straits on a westerly course near Cape Vikhodnoi (AT 4519).
2. Norwegian polar coast: very lively radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "M 174" mentioned by name.
3. Amderma area: destroyers "Uritski", "H", guardship No.28.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweepers Nos.32, 103, guardship No.75.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats Bear Island passage,
1 boat Ice Fjord.

2019 Radio message 2019/794 sent:

- "1. U 307 (Herrle) will put out from Hammerfest on 26 October for AB 3973, will join group "Eisenbart".
2. U 387 (Büchler) will put to sea at 0000 on 27 October to patrol Ice Fjord, relieving "Mohs" at 1800.
3. As from 28 October U 360 (Becker)'s new attack area will be AB 3917 to 3523.

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4. "Eisenbart" to continue mobile patrol, moving north again on 29 October."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re 26 October, para.III.b):-

The anti-aircraft fire at Longyearby confirms that Advent Bay is occupied.

(Signed) Peters.

27 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

U 387 proceeding from AB 3523 to AG 7580.
U 360 proceeding from AB 3568 to AB 3917,
at 1500 proceeding to AG 7820.
U 956 patrolling Ice Fjord and AG 7590.
U 354 Hope Island.

Atlantic:

U 212, 309, 420, 426, 470, 586.

In port:

U 355 Hammerfest,
U 713 Harstad,
U 277, 737 Narvik,
U 302, 625, 636, 711, 960 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 601, 629, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0200 U 307 put out from Hammerfest for AC 1625.
0715 U 713 Harstad, put in to Narvik at 1615 from
the operational area.
0710 U 355 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.
1620 U 636 put out from Trondheim for Narvik.
2000 U 737 put out from Narvik for Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, Banak -
Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - 75° N, 5° E -

CONFIDENTIAL

Banak. Exhaustive reconnaissance of Bear Island and Ice Fjord, not of flying route.
2 BF 109 on meteorological reconnaissance in the direction of Vardø. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No reports of operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AB 6973 - AE 3199 - Vaernes without sighting enemy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

In AB 2549 one cruiser and one merchant ship of 5,000 G.R.T., course northwest, speed 15 knots, but later on considerably increased. Superstructure of cruiser similar to the "Leander" class, but funnel terminations of equal height and straight. Shadowed until 1230. From 1200 radio traffic jammed by ship's radio. Defenses: heavy well-placed anti-aircraft defenses on the cruiser and merchant vessel went into action when the aircraft approached within about 1,500 m.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. Submarine "M 174" mentioned by name.

2. Belushya/Kara Sea area: destroyer "H", guardships Nos. 30, 72, 75.
Dikson area: minelayer No. 90, minesweepers Nos. 31, 37, guardship No. 19.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats in Bear Island passage,
2 boats off Ice Fjord.

1407

Radio message 1407/703 sent after receipt of report from Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

"1. One cruiser, one freighter of 5,000 G.R.T. sighted by the German Air Force at 1159

CONFIDENTIAL

in AB 2549.

2. "Mohs" to occupy AG 7590, "Büchler" AG 7580, 7820 upper half."

1421 Radio message 1421/704 sent:

"Becker" to proceed to AG 7820 at maximum speed."

1437 Radio message 1437/705 sent:

1. "Herrle" to occupy AC 1625 at high speed. Depth of sweep 30 miles.

2. "Herbschleb" to speed up execution of task."

2228 Radio message 2228/710 sent:

1. "Becker" to report arrival in attack area AG 7820 by time short signal.

2. "Büchler" then to occupy only AG 7580."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Herbschleb) at Hope Island with meteorological party "Svartisen".

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 737 (Brasack):

1. Put out from Narvik at 2000 on 27 October via Westfjord.

2. Proceed via inner leads with escort at 1200 on 28 October from Bodø to Trondheim.

3. Observe declared mined areas according to Standing War Order No.426. No hydrophone approach.

4. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 713 (Gosejakob), second operation (see Appendix II/3).

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re 27 October, paras.III.b) and IV.b):-

It is possible that the enemy formation is making for Ice Fjord to supply Barentsberg or that it will pass through the Spitsbergen - Bear Island passage in an easterly direction. It is not possible to patrol both positions adequately. It will there-

CONFIDENTIAL

fore be necessary to concentrate our forces at a point which corresponds to the most probable intentions of the enemy. Group North/Fleet releases the boats in Bear Island passage. U 956, U 387 and U 360 are receiving orders to occupy the entrance to Ice Fjord. U 307, which has put out from Hammerfest, has been ordered to make for a point east of Bear Island passage, so that at dawn he will be level with one of the possible enemy positions. If necessary, U 354 (Herbschleb), who at present is carrying out a special operation at Hope Island, can be drawn on to reinforce this easterly position.

(Signed) Peters.

28 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

U 387 AG 7580.
U 956 AG 7590.
U 360 AG 7820.
U 307 AC 1625.
U 354 Hope Island.

Atlantic:

U 212, 309, 420, 426, 470, 586.

In port:

U 277, 713 Narvik,
U 302, 625, 711, 960 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 601, 629, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1520 U 355 put in to Narvik from Hammerfest.
U 737 proceeding from Narvik to Trondheim.
U 636 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Reconnaissance of Bear Island and Ice Fjord, nothing to report. Aerial photograph of radio

station on Bear Island taken.
8 FW 190, in 3 waves, on armed shipping and air-
field reconnaissance, Fisher Peninsula - Kola
inlet.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance,
Vaernes - Jan Mayen - AA 9347 - Vaernes without
sighting enemy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Enemy formation in AC 6785. As far as can
be seen from aerial photographs, it consists
of 8 torpedoboats, 1 destroyer and 6 smaller
units (gunboats or M.T.B.s).

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. Norwegian polar coast: little radio
traffic to submarines in the operational
area. Submarine "S 101" mentioned by name.
2. Belushya/Kara Sea area: guardship No.10,
minesweeper No.39, probably eastbound
(Kara Sea), was in Archangel area on
23 October.
Dikson area: guardship No.19, minelayer
No.90, minesweepers Nos.31, 37.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats off Ice Fjord,
1 boat east of Bear Island passage.

U 360 (Becker) reported his arrival in attack
area off Ice Fjord in short signal 0133/713
at 0115.

1117 Radio message 1117/715 sent:

"Herrle" to proceed towards attack area
AB 3523 at cruising speed, depth of sweep
30 miles."

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In view of the air report about the enemy destroyer formation in the Barents Sea and since no ships have appeared off Ice Fjord so far, it again seems more urgent to re-occupy the Bear Island passage.

1843 Radio message 1843/719 sent:

- "1. At 0000 on 29 October, make for the following attack areas, depth of sweep 30 miles: "Herrle" AB 3973, "Becker" 3914, "Büchler" 3568, "Mohs" 3523, all group "Eisenbart".
2. "Mohs" to send short signal "No" if cipher material has not yet been taken over."

U 956 (Mohs) reported in short signal 2007/720:
"No."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Herbschleb) on meteorological operation "Svartisen" at Hope Island.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. (a) U-boat reports:

Short report from U 355 (La Baume), seventh operation (see Appendix II/2).

(b) Plans:

U 277 (Lübsen), who has been scheduled to lay the meteorological buoys Nos. 124 and 125, is to transfer to Hammerfest, in order to reduce the delays over this operation to a minimum. The meteorological buoys, which are expected in Narvik on 3 November, will then have to be taken on in Hammerfest.

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re 28 October, paras. III.b) and IV.b):-

1. It is possible that the small units intercepted are being used to prepare the way for convoys or landing operations. With the return of bad visibility conditions, and the inadequate air patrol of the Northern area, the patrol of Bear Island passage has again become the most important task of the U-boats.
2. On account of the bad visibility and strong southeast winds which have been reported, U 956 (Mohs) and U 387 (Büchler) are to attempt to meet off Hornsund in the shelter of the coast.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

29 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

U 387 proceeding from AG 7580 to AB 3568
via AB 3216.
U 956 proceeding from AG 7590 to AB 3523
via AB 3216.
U 360 proceeding from AG 7820 to AB 3914.
U 307 proceeding from AC 1625 to AB 3973.
U 354 Hope Island.

Atlantic:

U 212, 309, 420, 426, 470, 586.

In port:

U 277, 355, 713 Narvik,
U 302, 625, 711, 960 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 601, 629, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1920

U 636 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.
U 737 put in to Trondheim from Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75° N, 5° E - Banak, nothing to report. Exhaustive reconnaissance of Bear Island, not of flying route, nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 on shipping reconnaissance off Kola Peninsula - West Fairway - Kanin Nos. Exhaustive reconnaissance of flying route with radar.

8 FW 190 on armed meteorological and shipping reconnaissance, Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet. No shipping traffic observed because of thick sea fog.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - AA 9615 - Vaernes without sighting enemy.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

In AW 2533 off Iokanka 4 torpedoboats, course 120°, speed 15 knots, in line ahead; in AW 2235 2 torpedoboats, course 220°, speed 15 knots; in AC 8985 formation of warships consisting of 1 major, 5 medium and 6 small vessels, course 330°, speed 15 knots. Units not identified because of weather and falling darkness.

1 merchant vessel of 150 G.R.T. at Eina Bay jetty. Merchant vessel attacked by aircraft's armament, men unloading cargo and harbor effectively shot up.

Defenses at View Navolok consisting of light anti-aircraft and machine-gunfire. No losses.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. Cape Greben (AT 8819) reported, at 0752 on 28 October, 4 minesweepers, 1 lighter on bearing 235° 12 miles away, lost to sight on course 260°, and at 1005 5 minesweepers to the west 4 miles away on course 260°.

2. 4 minesweepers, 1 guardship and 3 freighters passed Yugorski Straits (AT 8823) at 1145, on course 20°, and at 1245 altered course to 70°.

3. At 1315 Chirachi (AT 8464) reported 3 minesweepers, trawler type, 7 miles away to the south, lost to sight on course 110°.

4. Guardship No.45 anchored in Belushya at 1215 on 28 October.

5. Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "S 101" mentioned by name.

6. Dikson area: minesweepers Nos.31, 37, guardship No.19, minelayer No.90. Belushya/Kara Sea area: guardboat "MO 111".

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

CONFIDENTIAL

0910 Radio message 0910/724 sent:

"Mohs" and "Büchler" to meet at 1000 on 29 October in AB 3216 for transfer of cipher material. "Mohs" then to report endurance in days."

1330 Short signal 1318/728 received from U 387 (Büchler):

"Am at rendezvous as ordered, have not contacted U-boat. Weather unfavorable at rendezvous."

Shortly afterwards came short signal 1329/729 from U 956 (Mohs):

"My position is AB 3212."

1420 Radio message 1420/730 was therefore sent:

"Büchler" to send D/F signal "F" according to "Bestimmungen für den Nachrichtendienst bei Zusammenarbeit zwischen Luftwaffe und Kriegsmarine" (Communication Regulations for use in combined operations between Army and Navy). Proceed onwards at 1500."

1755 Radio message 1600/735 received from "Mohs":

"Transference postponed till 30 October because of weather, until then shall accompany "Büchler". Weather, sea 6, visibility 2 miles, 36 cbm., endurance 5 days."

The reason why U 956 (Mohs) has to be supplied with cipher material is that the boat could not be given the November cipher material before putting to sea, because it had not yet arrived. Steps have been taken to prevent the recurrence of such a situation.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Herbschleb) with meteorological party "Svartisen" at Hope Island.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 277 (Lübsen):

1. Put out from Narvik at 2000 on 29 October. Proceed through Tjeldsund-Finnsnesrennen, from Lødingen to Tromsø with district pilot. From Tromsø to Hammerfest with convoy. Make fast alongside "Black Watch".
2. U-boats Northern Waters wave. Departure report on wavelength "MC".
3. 5-hours' readiness in Hammerfest. Ensure receipt of U-boat radio messages.

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4. Announce hydrophone run-in 6 hours off "Luchs 2" by time short signal for passage with addition "two". Hoist periscope flag. "Luchs 3" only on special instructions from Al Admiral Polar Coast. In that case alter signal accordingly."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re 29 October, paras. III.b) and IV.c):-

1. The transferred light enemy forces seem to have been divided between the ports of Murmansk, Iokanka and Archangel. Operations against the Norwegian coastal route might be undertaken with their aid, but they may also be intended as escorts for a convoy returning to Britain.
2. Henceforth the constant occupation of Bear Island passage by 4 boats will be necessary to ensure adequate patrol of this main traffic route. The German Air Force is not in a position, with the small forces at its disposal, to carry out regular reconnaissance flights on a sufficiently large scale in the area in question.

After concluding his meteorological operation U 354 (Herbschleb) can probably relieve U 956 (Mohs). Further, it may be hoped that U 277 (Lübsen) will have finished laying the meteorological buoys in time to take the place of U 360 (Becker) by the middle of November at the latest.

(Signed) Peters.

30 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

- U 956) proceeding together from AB 3216 to
- U 387) AB 2523 for the purpose of transferring cipher material.
- U 360 AB 3914)
- U 307 AB 3973) depth of sweep 30 miles.
- U 354 Hope Island.

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Atlantic:

U 212, 309, 420, 426, 470, 586.

In port:

U 277, 355, 713 Narvik,
U 302, 625, 711, 737, 960 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 601, 629, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0800 U 277 put out from Narvik for Hammerfest.
1700 U 636 put in to Narvik from Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance and reconnaissance on route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75° N, 5° E - Banak, nothing to report. Exhaustive reconnaissance of Bear Island but not of flying route.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, Vaernes - AE 1530 - Vaernes, broken off. No enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
2. Belushya/Kara Sea area: minelayer No.93, guardships Nos.72, 84, 1 probable submarine depot ship (6403).
At 0310 on 30 October 2 minesweepers, one of them No.38, anchored at Belushya.
Yugorski Straits area: minesweepers Nos. 103, 106.
Shoina area: guardboat No.503.
3. Britain: at night, one radio message from British unit or naval vessel to Archangel.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

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IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

2256

Radio message 2256/746 sent:

"Herbschleb" to relieve "Mohs" in AB 3523, depth of sweep 30 miles, after execution of task. Report probable day of arrival by short signal."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Herbschleb) disembarking meteorological party "Svartisen" at Hope Island.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re 30 October, para.IV.b):-

1. In order to occupy the Bear Island passage, if possible, continuously with 4 boats from now on, U 956 (Mohs) is to remain there until U 354 (Herbschleb) can relieve him after completing his task.
2. The first reappearance of British units in Archangel radio traffic may be a sign of preparations for convoys to England.

(Signed) Peters.

31 October, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

U 956 AB 3523)

U 387 AB 3568)

U 360 AB 3914)

U 307 AB 3973)

U 354 Hope Island and proceeding to AB 3523.

Atlantic:

U 212, 309, 420, 426, 470, 586.

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In port:

U 355, 636, 713 Narvik,
U 302, 625, 711, 737, 960 Trondheim,
U 255, 269, 601, 629, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1855 U 277 put in to Hammerfest from Narvik.
1200 U 636 put out from Narvik for Tromsø.
1150 U 355 put out from Narvik for Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance,
route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - AB 5710 -
AB 6467 - Banak. Not exhaustive, nothing to
report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, Vaernes -
AA 9680 - Vaernes, without sighting enemy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. The survey vessel "Polyarnik" is to winter
in Belushya.
2. Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic
to submarines in the operational area.
3. Belushya/Kara Sea area: guardships Nos.
30, 72, minesweepers Nos. 31, 59, 61, 106,
1 probable submarine depot ship.
Dikson area: guardship No. 19, minelayer
No. 90, minesweeper No. 37.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

CONFIDENTIAL

U 354 (Herbschleb) reported in short signal 1129/750, that he could relieve U 956 (Mohs) on 1 November.

Radio message 1235/751 was therefore sent:

- "1. "Mohs" to commence return journey at 0000 on 1 November via AB 3490.
2. "Herbschleb" to join group "Eisenbart"."

After being requested to do so in radio message 1439/752, "Mohs" reported his time of arrival in Andfjord.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Herbschleb) reported in short signal 1129/750 that he has landed the German Air Force meteorological party "Svartisen" on Hope Island according to plan.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1. Transfer order for U 636 (Hildebrandt):

- "1. Put out from Narvik at noon on 31 October.
2. Proceed via Tjeldsund-Finnsnesrennen, from Lodingen to Tromsø with district pilot.
3. Approach "Luchs 1" and "Luchs 2" by hydrophone (surfaced only!). Announce time of passing of "Luchs 2" 6 hours in advance by time short signal. Announce beginning of run-in with "L" 3 times by sonic telegraphy. Hoist periscope flag while submerged in inner leads.
4. Proceed according to Operational Order No.14. U-boats Northern Waters wave. Arrange trimming experiment at "Luchs 3" with Al Admiral Polar Coast."

2. Transfer order for U 355 (La Baume):

- "1. Put out from Narvik at noon on 31 October.
2. Proceed via Westfjord and at a distance of 50 miles from the coast to HA 1 - Trondheim.
3. As soon as possible proceed further at a distance of 50 miles from the coast via Fejeosen to Bergen.
4. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave."

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V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

The 4th Destroyer Flotilla has requested a U-boat from Admiral Northern Waters for the special operation "Katharina", to act as a navigational approach point by means of D/F signals in the operational area.

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re 31 October, para.VI:-

There is great danger that the D/F signals of a U-boat will be intercepted by the very efficient Russian radio intercept service. Also, if the boat is seen and attracts anti-submarine forces into the area in question, it will seriously endanger the planned operation, which is dependent on surprise. The request made by the 4th Destroyer Flotilla therefore seems inexpedient from the point of view of maintaining secrecy, and moreover, as there are so few U-boats available, only a minelaying boat which happens to be operating in the vicinity could be considered for this task.

(Signed) - Peters.

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APPENDIX II.

Short reports.

- No.1. Short report U 737 (Brasack),
third operation.
 - No.2. Short report U 355 (La Baume),
seventh operation.
 - No.3. Short report U 713 (Gosejakob),
second operation.
-

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APPENDIX II/1.

COPY.

Teleprinter message, cleared as multiple address message, addressed to:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency. For information, 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 737 (Brasack), third operation.

- 4 October, 1943. Put out from Hammerfest, 24 October put in to Narvik.
- 7 October Relieved U 277 (Lübsen) off Ice Fjord.
- 9 October Forenoon reconnaissance of Barentsberg. One gun manned. Machine-gunfire.
- 10-12 October Standing on and off Ice Fjord.
- 13 October Approached Hjorthamm and Longyearby. Effective destruction and burning coal stacks confirmed.
- 14 October Approached Grumantby in the evening. Attack periscope out of order. Blew up loading jetty at Hjorthamm.
- 15 October Afternoon approached Barentsberg for the second time.
- 16 October In Ice Fjord.
- 17 October In the evening sighted submarine of the "Taku" class off Advent Bay.
- 18 October Off Ice Fjord. Starboard Diesel out of order.
- 19 October Put in to Barentsberg and Coal Bay. At 1145 flying boat "Walross" in the Fjord. Recognition signal: twice 2 green. At 1155 3 destroyers (2 D class) put in, one depot ship (warship type)

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with flying boat, one escort vessel "Aukland". 1610 attacked 3 destroyers off Advent Bay, which were on patrol at the entrance. Attack did not succeed because of enemy's high speed and continually changing course. At 1655 rammed by destroyer ("Jervis") returning from Barentsberg, which ran over the boat as a result of a sudden change of course while we ourselves were attempting a close-range attack. 22 depth charges. Moderate damage. Able to submerge.

20 October 4 vessels put to sea. Withdrew westwards. Commenced return to Narvik.

23 October Put in to Harstad.

Footnote by Captain U-boats Norway:

It is assumed from U 956 (Mohs)'s observations on 20 October as well as from the personal report and impressions of U 737 (Brasack), that the enemy formation took off the remaining garrison of Ice Fjord.

Captain U-boats, Norway,
Most Secret 3528 A Ops.

APPENDIX II/2.

COPY.

Teleprinter message, cleared as multiple address message, addressed to:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C. U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 355 (La Baume),
seventh operation.

- 2 October, 1943. Put out of Hammerfest, 25 October put in to Hammerfest. Escorted weather ship 3 (the "Busch") for meteorological operation "Kreuzritter" via AB 2249.
- 6-8 October Landed meteorological party and equipment on north coast of Spitsbergen at Liefde Bay, Red Bay and Cape Arla.
- 9-19 October Reconnaissance of north coast from Trurenberg Bay (Sorgfjord) to Cross Bay with simultaneous protective patrol during unloading. Operation proceeded without interference.
- 20-21 October Attack area AG 7580 and 7590, against destroyer formation in Ice Fjord, no enemy sighted.
- 22 October Commenced return passage via Magdalena Bay with the "Busch". No enemy air activity.

Captain U-boats, Norway,
Most Secret 3574 A Ops.

APPENDIX II/3.

MOST SECRET.

COPY.

Teleprinter message, cleared as multiple address message, addressed to:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Div. C-in-C U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency. For information, 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 713 (Gosejakob),
second operation.

8 September, 1943	Put out from Narvik, 27 October put in to Narvik.
10 September	Relieved U 956 (Mohs) in AB 2936, depth of sweep 30 miles.
13 September	Attack area AB 3568.
From 14 September	Attack area AB 3523, depth of sweep 30 miles.
12 October	While proceeding submerged heard hammering noise in AB 3377. Suspected enemy submarine.
From 13 October	Mobile patrol between AB 3523 and AB 3917.
19 October	Proceeded to AG 7570 towards a reported enemy formation.
20 October	Operated on enemy destroyer formation reported by U 956 (Mohs), no enemy sighted.
22 October	Again patrol between AB 3523 and AB 3917.
25 October	Relieved by U 387 (Büchler). Commenced return passage to Andfjord. No enemy air activity.

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Drifting mines: 17 October in AB 3569,
18 October in AB 3941,
both sunk by gunfire.

Captain U-boats, Norway,
Most Secret 3553 A Ops.

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APPENDIX III.

COPY.

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 21 October, 1943.

MOST SECRET.

Sailing order for U 387 (Büchler).

1. Put out from Narvik at 1200 on 22 October via Tjeldsund for Harstad, from Lodingen with district pilot.
2. When passing Army (H) Coastal Artillery at Barøy, about 30 minutes hydrophone approach according to special order (radio messages, series numbers 738-741 of 18 October).
3. At 0700 on 23 October proceed from Harstad via Andfjord into operational area. Bear in mind U 737 (Brasack) putting in to Andfjord.
4. At 1000 on 25 October hand over reconnaissance and fighter table to U 360 in AB 3917.
5. Relieve U 713 (Gosejakob) at 1800 on 25 October in AB 3523, depth of sweep 30 miles.
6. Own forces: Group "Eisenbart": U 360 AB 3973 to 3568, U 713 (Gosejakob) AB 3917 to 3523. Move attack areas proceeding on irregular courses and at a uniform rate of advance, starting from the northern end at 0000 on 23 October, arriving at the southern end at 0000 on 24 October, departing northwards at 0000 on 25 October, and so on, every 4 days. U 956 (Mohs) patrolling Ice Fjord. U 355 (La Baume) returning to Hammerfest via AB 2249 with steam trawler (operation "Kreuzritter"). U 737 (Brasack) about to put in to Andfjord on 23 October. Daily meteorological reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88 as far as Spitsbergen.
7. Operational Order for Northern Waters U-boats No.1, U-boat Northern Waters wave.

(Signed) Peters.

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APPENDIX IV.

COPY.

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 21 October 1943.

MOST SECRET.

Operational Order for U 354 (Herbschleb).

1. Put out from Narvik at 1000 on 22 October for D/F calibration at Rotvaer. Then proceed from Lødingen to Harstad with district pilot and onwards to Tromsø at 0700 on 23 October.
2. When passing Army (H) Coastal Artillery at Tromsø-South, about 30 minutes hydrophone run-in according to special order (radio messages, series numbers 738-41, of 18 October).
3. Report to Al Admiral Polar Coast in Tromsø and arrange further escort. No leave to be granted. Take on meteorological radio station "Svartisen" from German Air Force station Tromsø.
4. Report departure from Tromsø by time short signal plus endurance at sea in days. With escort to SR 1, then to Hope Island.
5. Task: Transportation of meteorological radio station "Svartisen" to Hope Island and, if necessary, assistance in erection and installation of gear in a hut on the east coast. Remain at Hope Island until the radio station has been completed and is ready to transmit and receive. Send reports only if necessary for execution of task.
6. Short signal "Task executed" from AC 17; then relieve U 360 (Becker) in attack area AB 3973, depth of sweep 30 miles.
7. Own forces: Group "Eisenbart": U 360 AB 3973 to 3568, U 713 (Gosejakob) AB 3917 to 3523. Move attack areas proceeding on irregular courses and at a uniform rate of advance, starting from the northern end at 0000 on 23 October, arriving at the southern end at 0000 on 24 October, departing northwards at 0000 on 25 October, and so on, every 4 days. U 956 (Mohs) patrolling Ice Fjord. U 355 (La Baume) returning to Hammerfest via AB 2249 with steam trawler (operation "Kreuzritter"). U 737 (Brasack) about to put in to Andfjord on 23 October. Daily meteorological reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88 as far as Spitsbergen.
8. Operational Order for Northern Waters U-boats No. 1, U-boat Northern Waters wave.

(Signed) Peters.

APPENDIX V.

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 29 October, 1943.

Most Secret. S.O.s only. By hand of officer only.

Operational Order No.14.

Minelaying operation Pechora Sea (third part of operations).

I. Task: Laying minefields in the following sea areas:

1. East of Matveev (Eistorte I) or Kostin Straits outer entrance (Eistorte II) with T.M.B. mines.
2. North of Matveev (Eiszapfen I) or north of Pakhtusov Bay (Eiszapfen II) with T.M.C. mines.
3. Northwest of Russki Zavorot (Eisschrank I) or northwest of western exit of Pechora Bay (Eisschrank II) with T.M.C. mines.
4. Southwest of Sengeiski Island (Eisfuchs I) or north of Kolguev (Eisfuchs II) with T.M.C. mines.
5. Off Kanin Nos (Eisente I) or north of Senovaya river (Eisente II) with T.M.C. mines.
6. East of Kanin Nos (Eiswagen I) or west of Kolguev (Eiswagen II) with T.M.C. mines.

Every endeavor should be made to carry out each of the tasks assigned. If ice conditions should prevent the execution of any one task proceed to the next in turn. The above order (from east to west) should be adhered to.

For further details see minelaying orders and minefield charts (Appendices 1 and 2).

II. Enemy situation:

1. General: During the summer of 1943 lively traffic was observed between Kanin Nos, Belushya and Yugorski Straits, this consisted of coastal shipping to the Ob and Yenisei, of fishing vessels, and supply ships for the extension of bases. With the retreat of the ice several large ice-breakers went eastwards during July. On the West Siberian Sea route our own U-boats intercepted small convoys in both directions and

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sank 3 steamers totaling 12,000 G.R.T. at the end of August, and 4 steamers totaling 18,200 G.R.T. and one patrol vessel (trawler) at the beginning of October. Since then none of our own U-boats have remained east of Novaya Zemlya. Ice conditions in the Wilkitzki Straits were so favorable this year, that the passage from the east of merchant ships - specially with the aid of ice-breakers - may be expected for some time yet. They will have to proceed via Dikson-Yugorski Straits to Archangel.

The Kara Straits are little used, owing to the current, the drift-ice and the absence of harbors. As they are more difficult to patrol, minefields in their neighborhood must be expected. One of our own U-boats was probably lost there through unknown causes.

The Yugorski Straits are generally preferred by traffic. The bases at Khabarova and Amderma have been further improved; the entrances to the Straits are well guarded and covered by batteries. With the help of ice-breakers, shipping goes through the Yugorski Straits until about February. Judging by observations of traffic, there are probably no Russian minefields at the northwestern approaches.

In Pechora Bay small coastal vessels were chiefly observed. Off Kanin Nos and Kolguev there is lively fishing activity. The shipping route passes close under Kanin Nos via Bugrino to the east and north, but traffic has also been reported northwest of Kolguev.

The command station for the whole area is the important base of Belushya, which has also been of importance for the large Archangel convoys and is now being considerably extended.

2. Sea patrol: After our first eight minelaying operations in this area in July and August of this year, intensified minesweeping and patrol activity commenced. During October, about 15 minesweepers, 4 destroyers ("Uritski", "Gremyashchi", "B" and "H") and a considerable number of guard vessels were intercepted in the Belushya area. The S.O. Destroyer Flotilla was on board the "Baku" in the Archangel/Gorlo Straits area.

At sea surface radar of the British type need hardly be feared, but submarine location is apparently used. As a rule the patrols are inexperienced and not very persevering. The strong density layers of the water also afford good protection against listening instruments, and the dull river water protection against

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sighting from the air when the boat is submerged.

Naval forces seem to be based primarily on Belushya, Khabarova and Bugrino.

3. Air situation: Special attention should be paid to the Belushya seaplane base and the airfield which are occupied by one Staffel of MBR 2, single MBR 4 and single-engined biplanes (DB 3). "Catalinas" have also appeared. Flying boats fly directly between the air bases Archangel, Naryan Mar, Amderma, and from Bugrino to Belushya as transports and couriers. They were sighted between Belushya and Bugrino regularly at about 0800 and 1600. After the appearance of our boats this summer we must count on increased air reconnaissance of the sea routes, especially off harbors and entrances and in front of approaching convoys.

See also Appendix 4 of this Operational Order.

4. Mine situation: For the present, enemy minefields in the Pechora Sea should be assumed only at the approaches to the Kara Straits. However, shipping routes may have been protected by flanking minefields. For the position of our own mines see Appendix 2 to Operational Order for Northern Waters U-boats No.1. Special attention is drawn to the minefields north and south of Kolguev. The individual minelaying orders contain detailed instructions for avoiding the areas mined by U-boats during the summer (flower code names).

5. Radio and signal stations, batteries: See Appendix 3 of this Operational Order.

Bases and signal stations were repeatedly ordered to intensify their vigilance. After the shooting up of several radio stations by our U-boats, the Russians have apparently become extremely careful, believe that they have sighted U-boats everywhere and even expect landings. In order to insure the success of all minelaying operations, the greatest care should be taken to avoid being actually sighted in the operational area.

6. Ice, weather, and current conditions: See Appendix 5 of this Operational Order.

The coast will probably not freeze up until the end of November. Large quantities of ice from the Kara Sea may be drifting westwards through the Kara Straits.

III. Our own forces:

1. U-boats: Group "Eisenbart" (2-4 boats) between Bear Island and Spitsbergen: at present U 307 (Herrle), U 360 (Becker), U 960 (Mohs). Off

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Ice Fjord, Spitsbergen: U 387 (Büchler).
Hope Island-Bear Island passage: U 354
(Herbschleb) on special operation.

2. Own naval forces: Will be announced by radio; While they are in the area in question U-boats are prohibited from attack on all naval vessels from destroyer upwards unless definitely recognized as enemy units.
3. Our own air reconnaissance will be reported on the wave to be used; transmissions according to reconnaissance and bomber Staffel schedules.

IV. Execution:

1. Proceed from Narvik to Tromsø, when ordered by Captain U-boats. Report to Al Admiral Polar Coast to arrange further escort. Radio to remain manned. No leave to be granted.
2. Your arrival for taking on mines at Mining and Barrage Command, Tromsø has been reported. Report completion of loading by Emergency teleprinter message "Am ready to put to sea".
3. Put to sea for the operation on receipt of keyword (according to minelaying order) plus day. (E.g. "Eisfuchs" 20 November = put to sea on 20 November.) After taking on mines, arrange escort directly with Admiral Polar Coast.
4. Proceed with escort as far as point SR 1. From there to the operational area at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.
5. In order that the laying of the minefield may proceed smoothly, and to observe shipping traffic and patrols and mine-free enemy routes, it may be necessary to observe the area concerned unobtrusively for a time before carrying out the operation.
6. Report execution of task by a 2 figure short signal, where the first figure is the number of the operation according to the minelaying orders, and the second the number of the task actually chosen for execution. Do not send short signal until reaching a position to the northwest of 70° N, 44° E.
7. Commence return passage to Andfjord - Narvik immediately after the execution of the operation. Opportunities of making torpedo attacks are to be exploited.
8. Insofar as it is possible to approach the coast unseen while surfaced, take photographs

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of the coast (panoramic views), preferably with telephotographic lens.

V. Equipment:

- 1) Apart from mines, only 3 torpedoes.
- 2) Shallow water equipment. All superfluous confidential books, printed matter and documents are to be left behind at the base. Make preparations for scuttling and effective destruction of all secret material as long as the boat is in shallow water. Crew to wear lifejackets. Comply with para.263 and following of Handbook for U-boat Commanders.

VI. Communication arrangements:

Maintain radio silence until operation has been completed, otherwise in accordance with Communication Regulations of Captain U-boats, Norway.

VII. Appendices:

1. Minelaying orders 1 to 6.
2. Minefield charts 1 to 6 (for U-boats only).
3. Radio and signal stations, batteries.
4. Enemy air activity in the Eastern Barents Sea.
5. Ice, weather, and current conditions.

VIII. Printed matter:

1. Handbook for U-boat Commanders (p.73).
2. Torpedo Trials Command leaflet on firing of torpedo mines.
3. Instructions for use of types TMB I, TMB II and TMC aboard U-boats (Most Secret).
4. Book of photographs of the Barents Sea.
5. Natural conditions along the Siberian Sea route (Secret).
6. Charts: Russian 1374, D 976 center and eastern sheet.

- IX. The Operational Order is to be destroyed immediately upon return from the operation. Report destruction to Captain U-boats.

(Signed) Peters.

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APPENDIX 1 TO OPERATIONAL ORDER NO.14.

MOST SECRET.

Minelaying Orders.

1. Operation "Eistorte".
2. Operation "Eiszapfen".
3. Operation "Eisschrank".
4. Operation "Eisfuchs".
5. Operation "Eisente".
6. Operation "Eiswagen".

Minelaying Orders for U....

First operation ("Eistorte").

1. Task: Laying of minefield.

I. East of Matveev (Eistorte I):

69° 30.00' N	59° 25.00' E.
69° 30.00' N	58° 50.00' E.
69° 38.00' N	58° 50.00' E.
69° 38.00' N	59° 25.00' E.

Mines are to be laid from east to west on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 200 to 400 m.

- or II. Off the approaches to Kostin Straits (Eistorte II):

Alternative area to I.

70° 54.00' N	52° 52.00' E.
70° 57.50' N	53° 02.00' E.
70° 57.00' N	53° 11.00' E.
70° 55.00' N	53° 29.00' E.
70° 50.50' N	53° 18.00' E.

Mines are to be laid from north to south on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 300 to 500 m.

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2. Mining material:

24 TMB mines, 12 blue X (M 1) $\frac{10}{4-8}$
6 red X (M 1) $\frac{10}{4-8}$
6 green (A 2).

Clockwork arming switch II = varying from 2 to 6 days.
Period delay mechanism = varying from 1 to 8
actuations.
Time setting = 80 days.
Safety distance (type TMB) 30 meters.

The mines have a special mechanism and become active after 2 to 6 days. Lay the various colors mixed and load accordingly.

3. Execution:

In "Eistorte I" avoid crossing the eastern limit of the area given; the minefield "Nelke I", laid on 20 July, which became inactive about 20 October, extends to 59° 30' E, 60° 42.5' N.

The laying course marked on the minefield chart is that considered to be most favorable, but need not be strictly adhered to. The main thing is that the whole area should be mined irregularly, while maintaining the safety distance. Preparations must be made for laying the mines while submerged, in case enemy patrols or shore observation do not permit minelaying while surfaced.

Second operation ("Eiszapfen").

1. Task: Laying of minefield.

I. North of Matveev (Eiszapfen I):

69° 30.00' N 58° 45.00' E.
69° 30.00' N 58° 11.00' E.
69° 38.00' N 58° 11.00' E.
69° 38.00' N 58° 45.00' E.

Mines are to be laid from east to west on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 300 to 500 m. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 m. in depth.

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or II. North of Pakhtusov Bank (Eiszapfen II):

Alternative area to I.

69° 36'00" N	57° 15'00" E.
69° 36'00" N	56° 41'00" E.
69° 30'00" N	56° 41'00" E.
69° 30'00" N	57° 15'00" E.

Mines are to be laid from east to west on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 300 to 500 m. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 m. in depth.

2. Mining material:

16 TMC mines, 6 blue	X (M 1)	$\frac{10}{4-8}$
2 red	X (M 1)	$\frac{10}{4-8}$
8 green	(A 2).	

Clockwork arming switch II = varying from 1 to 6 days.
Period delay mechanism = varying from 1 to 8 actuations.
Time setting = 80 days.
Safety distance (type TMC) 170 meters.

The mines have a special mechanism and become active after 1 to 6 days. Lay the various colors mixed and load accordingly.

3. Execution:

In "Eiszapfen I" avoid crossing the eastern limit of the area given. Bear in mind the limits of "Eistorte I". The laying course marked on the minefield chart is that considered to be most favorable, but need not be strictly adhered to. The main thing is that the whole area should be mined irregularly, while maintaining the safety distance. Preparations must be made for laying the mines while submerged in case enemy patrols or shore observation do not permit minelaying while surfaced.

Third operation ("Eisschrank").

1. Task: Laying of minefield.

I. Northwest of Russki Zavorot (Eisschrank I):

69° 00'00" N	53° 40'00" E.
69° 00'00" N	53° 17'00" E.
69° 11'00" N	53° 17'00" E.
69° 11'00" N	53° 40'00" E.

Mines are to be laid from south to north on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 400 to 600 m. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 m. in depth. Attention should be paid to the positions of minefields "Lilie I" and "Narzisse I".

or II. Northwest of western exit of Pechora Bay (Eisschrank II):

Alternative area to I.

69° 17'00" N	55° 16'00" E.
69° 17'00" N	54° 57'00" E.
69° 29'00" N	54° 57'00" E.
69° 29'00" N	55° 16'00" E.

Mines are to be laid from north to south on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 300 to 500 m. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 m. in depth.

2. Mining material:

16 TMC mines, 6 blue X (M 1) $\frac{10}{4-8}$

3 red X (M 1) $\frac{10}{4-8}$

7 green (A 2).

Clockwork arming switch II = varying from 3 to 6 days.
Period delay mechanism = varying from 1 to 8
actuations.

Time setting = 30 days.

Safety distance (type TMC) 170 meters.

The mines have a special mechanism and become active after 3 to 6 days. Lay the various colors mixed and load accordingly.

3. Execution:

South of 69° 11' N there are:-

a) Minefield "Narzisse I" west of 53° E, which will cease to be active on 1 November.

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- b) Minefield "Lilie I" east of 54° E and extending to 54° 32' E, which will cease to be active approximately 10 November.
- c) Minefield "Tulpe IV" east of 55° 30' E, active until 28 October.

The limits of "Eiszapfen II" should also be borne in mind.

The laying course marked on the minefield chart is that considered to be most favorable, but need not be strictly adhered to. The main thing is that the whole area should be mined irregularly, while maintaining the safety distance. Preparations must be made for laying the mines while submerged in case enemy patrols or shore observation do not permit minelaying while surfaced.

Fourth operation ("Eisfuchs").

1. Task: Laying of minefield.

I. Southwest of Sengeiski Island (Eisfuchs I):

68° 23.00' N	49° 45.00' E.
68° 28.00' N	49° 57.00' E.
68° 16.00' N	50° 32.00' E.
68° 12.00' N	50° 18.00' E.

Mines are to be laid from the shore seawards on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 300 to 500 m. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 m. in depth.

or II. North of Kolguev (Eisfuchs II):

Alternative area to I.

69° 32.00' N	49° 05.00' E.
69° 32.00' N	48° 52.00' E.
69° 42.00' N	48° 52.00' E.
69° 42.00' N	49° 05.00' E.

Mines are to be laid from south to north on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 300 to 500 m. Bear in mind minefield "Romanov".

2. Mining material:

16 TMC mines, 6 blue	X (M 1)	$\frac{10}{4-8}$
3 red	X (M 1)	$\frac{10}{4-8}$
7 green	(A 2).	

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Clockwork arming switch II = varying from 2 to 6 days.
 Period delay mechanism = varying from 1 to 8
 actuations.
 Time setting = 30 days.
 Safety distance (type TMC) 170 meters.

The mines have a special mechanism and become active after 2 to 6 days. Lay the various colors mixed and load accordingly.

3. Execution:

When approaching, do not cross a line from 52° 30' E, 69° 08' N to 50° 40' E, 68° 35' N and its extension to northeast, as other minefields of ours lie between it and the coast. The most southerly one touches Sengeiski Island at 50° 55' E and is active until about 31 October. In "Eisfuchs II" attention should be paid to last year's minefield "Romanov", which may still be active in parts; approach from the northeast and do not cross the western limit.

The laying course marked on the minefield chart is that considered to be most favorable, but need not be strictly adhered to. The main thing is that the whole area should be mined irregularly, while maintaining the safety distance. Preparations must be made for laying the mines while submerged in case enemy patrols or shore observation do not permit minelaying while surfaced.

Fifth operation ("Eisente").

1. Task: Laying of minefield.

I. Kanin Nos (Eisente I):

68° 39·00' N	43° 17·00' E.
68° 39·00' N	43° 09·00' E.
68° 44·00' N	43° 11·00' E.
68° 43·00' N	43° 23·00' E.
68° 40·00' N	43° 48·00' E.
68° 37·00' N	43° 45·00' E.

Mines are to be laid on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 300 to 500 m. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 m. in depth.

or II. North of Senovaya River (Eisente II):

Alternative area to I.

68° 42·00' N	44° 57·00' E.
68° 42·00' N	45° 24·00' E.
68° 30·50' N	45° 24·00' E.
68° 32·00' N	44° 57·00' E.

Mines are to be laid on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 300 to 500 m. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 m. in depth. Bear in mind minefield "Zarevich".

2. Mining material:

16 TMC mines, 8 blue X (M 1) $\frac{10}{3-6}$
3 red X (M 1) $\frac{10}{3-6}$
5 green (A 2).

Clockwork arming switch II = varying from 3 to 6 days.
Period delay mechanism = varying from 1 to 8 actuations.
Time setting = 80 days.
Safety distance (type TMC) 170 meters.

The mines have a special mechanism and become active after 3 to 6 days. Lay the various colors mixed and load accordingly.

3. Execution:

The limits of "Eiswagen I" and last year's minefield "Zarevich" (east of $45^{\circ} 30'$ E, south of 69° N), which may still be active in parts, are to be borne in mind.

The laying course marked on the minefield chart is that considered to be most favorable but need not be strictly adhered to. The main thing is that the whole area should be mined irregularly, while maintaining the safety distance. Preparations must be made for laying the mines while submerged in case enemy patrols or shore observation do not permit minelaying while surfaced.

Sixth operation ("Eiswagen").

1. Task: Laying of minefield.

I. East of Kanin Nos (Eiswagen I):

$68^{\circ} 35' 00''$ N $43^{\circ} 52' 00''$ E.
 $68^{\circ} 41' 00''$ N $43^{\circ} 52' 00''$ E.
 $68^{\circ} 41' 00''$ N $44^{\circ} 20' 00''$ E.
 $68^{\circ} 33' 00''$ N $44^{\circ} 20' 00''$ E.

Mines are to be laid from south to north on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups

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to vary from 300 to 500 m. No mines are to be laid in water exceeding 300 m. in depth.

or II. West of Kolguev (Eiswagen II):

Alternative area to I.

69° 24.00' N	47° 41.00' E.
69° 28.00' N	47° 49.00' E.
69° 22.00' N	48° 30.00' E.
69° 18.00' N	48° 24.00' E.

Mines are to be laid from the shore seawards on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 300 to 500 m. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 m. in depth.

2. Mining material:

16 TMC mines, 9 blue	X (M 1)	$\frac{10}{3-6}$
4 red	X (M 1)	$\frac{10}{3-6}$
3 green	(A 2).	

Clockwork arming switch II = varying from 3 to 6 days.
Period delay mechanism = varying from 1 to 6 actuations.
Time setting = 80 days.
Safety distance (type TMC) 170 meters.

The mines have a special mechanism and become active after 3 to 6 days. Lay the various colors mixed and load accordingly.

3. Execution:

Last year's minefields "Romanov" and "Zarevich" may still be active in parts. Therefore avoid area south of 69° N and east of 45° 30' E. Approach "Eiswagen II" from the west and do not cross the northern limit northwards. Also bear in mind the limits of "Eisente".

The laying course marked on the minefield chart is that considered to be most favorable but need not be strictly adhered to. The main thing is that the whole area should be mined irregularly, while maintaining the safety distance. Preparations must be made for laying the mines while submerged in case enemy patrols or shore observation do not permit minelaying while surfaced.

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APPENDIX 3 TO OPERATIONAL ORDER NO.14.

Radio and signal stations on the
Barents Sea.

I. Murman coast:

Grid square	AC	8812	signal and radio station Mai Navolok.
"	"	AC	8816 signal and radio station Tsip Navolok.
"	"	AC	8864 signal and radio station Kildin.
"	"	AC	8973 signal and radio station Cape Voronya.
"	"	AC	8971 signal and radio station Teriberka.
"	"	AC	8884 signal and radio station Voronya Bay.
"	"	AC	8888 signal and radio station Bolshoi Oleni.
"	"	AC	8888 light battery Bolshoi Oleni.
"	"	AW	2112 signal and radio station Rinda.
"	"	AW	2127 signal and radio station Kharlov.
"	"	AW	2127 light battery Kharlov.
"	"	AW	2193 signal and radio station Cape Cherni.
"	"	AW	2278 light battery Klyatni Point.
"	"	AW	2513 light battery Iokanka.
"	"	AW	2513 signal and radio station Iokanka.
"	"	AW	2288 signal and radio station Svyatoi Nos.
"	"	AW	2563 signal and radio station Cape Bolshoi Gorodetski.
"	"	AW	2912 signal and radio station Ponoi.
"	"	AW	2915 light battery Ponoi.
"	"	AW	2914 light battery Ponoi.
"	"	AW	3141 signal and radio station Kanin Nos.
"	"	AW	3141 light battery Kanin Nos.
"	"	AC	8857 coastal radio station Toros Island.
"	"	AW	2647 coastal radio station Ostraya Ludka.

II. Pechora Bay to Yugorski Straits and Kara Straits:

Grid square	AW	3321	signal and radio station.
"	"	AW	3325 battery Bugrino.
"	"	AW	3326 signal and radio station Bugrino.
"	"	AT	7753 signal and radio station.
"	"	AT	8816 signal and radio station Cape Greben.

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Grid square AT 8824 light battery Cape Greben.
" " AT 8827 light battery Khabarova.
" " AT 8851 signal and radio station
Khabarova.
" " AT 8823 signal and radio station
Khabarova.
" " AT 8465 signal station Chirachi Islet.
" " AT 8422 signal and radio station
Cape Menshikov.
" " AT 8823 signal and radio station.
" " AT 8465 signal station Voronov Nos.
" " AT 8541 signal station Bolvanski Nos.

III. Novaya Zemlya, east and west coasts:

Grid square AT 7237 signal and radio station
Lile Point.
" " AT 7232 signal and radio station
Rogacheva Bay.
" " AT 7388 signal and radio station
Chernaya Bay.
" " AT 4839 radio station Malie Karmakuli.
" " AT 4599 radio station name unknown
(Sukhoi Nos).
" " AT 4624 radio station Matochkin Straits,
western outlet Lagerni.
" " AT 4618 radio station Matochkin Straits,
western outlet Stolbovoi.
" " AT 2612 radio station Russkaya.
" " AT 2659 radio station Blagopoluchiya Bay.
" " AT 5415) radio stations Matochkin Straits,
" " AT 5416) eastern outlet.
" " AT 4679 radio station name unknown.
" " AT 3216 radio station Cape Jelaniya.
" " AT 7231 anti-aircraft battery Samoed
Bay at approach point.
" " AT 7232 2 light batteries Rogacheva Bay.
" " AT 7238 heavy battery Belushya Bay,
southeast point.

Two radio huts are being erected in Belushya.

Grid square AT 7263 signal station Shadrovski.
" " AT 7314 signal station Sakhanin.

Four heavy anti-aircraft batteries are manned at
Belushe.

Grid square AT 4836 1 heavy anti-aircraft battery
Malie Karmakuli.
" " AT 7637 signal station Sakhanin.

IV. West Siberian Sea route:

Grid square AT 8823 coastal radio station Yugorski
Straits.
" " AT 8589 coastal radio station Yarossel.
" " AT 8833 coastal radio station Amderma.
" " AT 8833 light battery Anderma.

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Grid square	AT 9461	coastal radio station Se-Yago.
"	" AT 9761	coastal radio station Marrasale.
"	" AT 9557	coastal radio station Tomboi.
"	" AT 6534	coastal radio station Byeli Island.
"	" AS 4378	coastal radio station Dikson.
"	" AS 4379	3 heavy batteries Dikson.
"	" AS 4838	coastal radio station Cape Leskina.
"	" XA 7571	coastal radio station Cape Sterlegova.
"	" AF 9948	coastal radio station Uedineniya Island (Einsamkeit Island).
"	" XA 5286	coastal radio station Cape Olovianiya (Shokalskogo Straits).
"	" XA 7393	coastal radio station "Pravdi".
"	" XA 5945	coastal radio station on the easterly Heiberga Islet.
"	" XA 8974	coastal radio station and battery on the eastern point of Nansen Island.

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APPENDIX 4 TO OPERATIONAL ORDER NO.14.

Enemy air activity in the Eastern Barents Sea.

I. Airfields and seaplane bases:

Airfield	Shoina	AW 3425.
Airfield and seaplane base	Bugrino	AW 3325.
	Belushya	AT 7232.
	Kildin	AC 8891.
	Iokanka	AW 2524.
	Naryan Mar	AU 1532.
Seaplane base	Amderma	AT 8836.
	Kara Estuary	AT 8990.

It may be assumed that there are seaplane bases at all the larger anchorages.

II. Enemy air activity according to radio intercept service (so far as intercepted):

5 August	2 MBR 2 Amderma area as convoy escort.
10 August	1 Douglas from Amderma to Moscow via Archangel. Otherwise flying boat traffic on routes between Murmansk-Archangel-Belushya-Amderma and Dikson as usual.
11 August	5 MBR 2 Amderma-Dikson.
19 August	flying boat at Belushya.
9 September	2 R 5 and 1 DB 3 from Belushya over Barents Sea.
10 September	2 aircraft noon Belushya area.
14 September	1 aircraft noon reconnaissance of north Barents Sea in AC 5538.
21 September	1 aircraft afternoon in Belushya area. 1 aircraft at 1250 in 65° 23' N, 39° 28' E. 1 aircraft flying to Naryan Mar.
24 September	1 flying boat forenoon in Dikson area.
25 September	1 flying boat RA 1 afternoon over Gorlo Straits.
9 October	1 flying boat afternoon flying to Archangel, was over Gorlo Straits at 1500.
12 October	1 flying boat forenoon in Dikson area.
9 October	1 aircraft afternoon probably in Novaya Zemlya area.
10 October	1 flying boat at 0705 in position 67° 00' N, 46° 40' E (AW 3828).
11 October	2 aircraft forenoon in Dikson area.
16 October	2 aircraft forenoon in Dikson area.
21 October	1 DB 3 afternoon reconnaissance of Kara Sea area.

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III. Aircraft on airfields according to air reconnaissance:

Photographic reconnaissance:

22 June Naryan Mar	1 Consolidated 28, (MBR 2)
	1 flying boat (type not recognized).
8 July Visual reconnaissance	1 He 111 reported: "2 flying boats taking off from Belushya."

Photographic reconnaissance:

11 July Belushya	6 flying boats, 3 MBR 2, 2 MBR 4.
15 July Belushya	5 flying boats.
16 July Belushya	1 MBR 2, 1 KOR 2, 3 more, 4 RZ (single-engined land planes).
26 July Belushya	I 153 and I 53.
28 July Belushya	2 flying boats.

IV. Aircraft reported by U-boats:

23 July	U 586 in AC 5490 was attacked by 2 Russian PB 100, making 5 runs. (Only gunfire, no bombs.)
25 July	U 629 reported air activity only on routes linking airfields, at about 0800 and between 1600 and 1800.
31 July	U 703 off Belushya encountered strong enemy air patrols of MBR 2 and single- engined bi-planes.
20 August	U 302 reported air patrols along the west Siberian Sea route.
25 August	U 354 encountered slight stationary patrols off Dikson.

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APPENDIX 5 TO OPERATIONAL ORDER NO.14.

SECRET

Ice, weather and current conditions in the
Barents Sea during November.

I. General

Ice:

Ice conditions this year may be described as normal. Apart from the current, the movement of the ice depends mainly on the direction of the wind. This may cause rapid changes in the position of the ice limit and often considerable deviations from the mean.

Where ocean currents from different directions meet to form eddies, there is a strong tendency for cracks to appear in the ice. In such areas ice-free water may exist quite irrespective of the general covering of ice.

Experience has shown that there are many signs which indicate the presence of ice in the immediate neighborhood. They are dealt with in almost every handbook of the polar regions.

Weather:

During November south, southwest and northwest winds prevail in the southeastern Barents Sea, together with frequent rain or snow showers. The sky is generally overcast. Conditions of visibility vary greatly owing to the frequency of showers. Fog is less frequent than during the summer.

Ocean currents:

The regularity of the tides and tidal currents is adversely affected by the freezing of the sea. In general a cover of ice on the sea causes the range of the tide to decrease and the ebb-tide to be delayed.

The range of the tide may be increased by wind pressure; and similarly, the direction and velocity of flow are dependent upon the wind. This applies especially to the approaches of the Kara Sea and Wilkitzki Straits.

II. The Barents Sea

Ice:

According to the latest reports, newly formed ice has been observed on the south and southwest coasts of Spitsbergen. There have been no observations of ice conditions in the whole of the rest of the Barents Sea for some considerable period of time. In November the

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drift-ice limit will run east from South Cape to about 77° N, and there will be very loose drift-ice around the northern coast of Novaya Zemlya. The coast of Novaya Zemlya will be enclosed by a slush strip from then onwards.

At this time of year new ice will also begin to appear in the Pechora Sea, but near the coast it will have a very loose coverage of 2-5/10. It should be remembered that all these formations of new ice in the coastal areas mentioned will consist partly of very thin ice (pancake ice), which, if the wind changes, may be partially driven off again. If the weather changes, the greater part of the new ice may melt again. There is however a danger that with continuing cold winds the large quantities of pancake ice may close up into one continuous sheet of ice. As the new ice is relatively thin and may be quickly broken up by wind, it is not as dangerous as drift-ice of the same closeness in springtime.

Ocean currents:

Apart from small deviations, the prevailing currents of the Barents Sea are the North Cape Current flowing eastwards between Finmark and Bear Island and dividing into several branches north of the White Sea, and the cold southwest current east of Spitsbergen which carries ice and icebergs with it. The current flows round the two islands of Novaya Zemlya in a clockwise direction. Its velocity is approximately 0.3 knots. There are two tides a day. The range of the spring tide at Kanin Nos is more than 2.5 m., but rapidly decreases further north. The 1 meter line runs from near Kolguev almost in a straight line as far as 72° N, north of North Cape. The 0.5 meter line runs along the latitude of 75° N through the center of the eastern Barents Sea and then veers north as far as north of Spitsbergen. (For further details see "Natural conditions along the Siberian Sea route".)

The variations in the water level caused by wind are often greater than the tides.

III. The Yugorski Straits

At their narrowest point the Yugorski Straits are only 1.5 miles wide. The minimum depth in the navigable channel is 14.5 m.

Ice:

In general, the relatively warm current flowing eastward through the Yugorski Straits prevents the early accumulation of drift-ice. It is only when the adjoining sea areas carry considerable quantities of drift-ice that the Yugorski Straits will become blocked up. Normally the eastern part of Yugorski Straits becomes filled with ice first.

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Weather:

During November winds from south to southwest prevail in the Yugorski and Kara Straits areas; these frequently produce bad visibility conditions. With northerly winds visibility is better. Here too, fog is less frequent than in summer.

Ocean currents:

There are two tides a day. The range of the spring tide is 0.6 m. on the average. The velocity of the tidal stream in the Yugorski Straits may be as much as 3.5 knots.

IV. The Kara Straits

The Kara Straits are 27 miles wide from the extreme ends of Novaya Zemlya to Vaigach, but belts of skerries on either side reduce its useful width to about 17 miles. Depths in the navigable channel vary between 40 and 150 m.

Ice:

As long as there is ice present in the Kara Sea, it is carried westwards from there by the westerly current which flows along the north side of the Kara Straits. On the southern side of the Kara Straits there is an easterly current, which counteracts the accumulation of drift-ice. But with prolonged easterly or north-easterly winds, drift-ice can occur throughout the entire straits. On the whole, conditions are less favorable than in the Yugorski Straits.

Ocean currents:

There are two tides a day. The range of the spring tide is approximately 0.6 m. The velocity of the tidal stream may be as much as 2.5 knots.

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APPENDIX VI.

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 22 October 1943.

S.O.s only. By hand of officer only.

MOST SECRET.

To:

Naval Group Command North and Fleet Command Copy No.1
Admiral Northern Waters " " 2

For information:

German Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, " " 3
1st Div.
" " " " Naval War Staff, " " 4
2nd Div. C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
Naval Chief Command Norway " " 5
Luftflotte Command 5 " " 6
Battle Group " " 7
War Diary " " 8-12

Subject: Second part of operations of U-boat mine-laying operations in Northern Waters.

Reference: Group North/Fleet Secret S.O.s only 715/43
A3 of 24 July, 1943.

Of the minelaying operations indicated in the above reference the following have been carried out according to plan:

1. "Seehund I" on 21 August 1943 by U 639 (Wichmann).
2. "Seekuh I" on 23 August 1943 by U 636 (Hildebrandt).
3. "Seebär I" on 13 August 1943 by U 625 (Benker)
4. "Seevogel I" on 28 August 1943 by U 960 (Heinrich).
5. "Seeschlange I" on 23 September 1943 by U 960 (Heinrich).
6. "Seemöve I" on 23 September 1943 by U 601 (Grau).
7. "Seeadler I" on 5 September 1943 by U 629 (Bugs).

The other 6 operations were abandoned in favor of the third part of the operations, in accordance with Group North/Fleet Secret S.O.s only 873/43 A3 of 14 September.

Re 1. The exact position of the mines is not known, as the boat has been posted missing since reporting execution.

Re 2. Accurate to $\frac{1}{2}$ mile.

Re 5. Laid according to traffic observed.

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Re 6. Inner mines accurate to 200 m., last 5 shifted by current up to 2000 m. westward.

Re 7. Position of mines inaccurate because of bad visibility, possible dislocation because of heavy surf.

Otherwise position of mines exact, corresponding in detail to attached minefield chart (for Group North/Fleet and Admiral Northern Waters only).

(Signed) Peters.

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APPENDIX XVII.

S.O.s only. By hand of officer only.

Most Secret.

Comments
by Admiral Northern Waters on War Diary of
Captain U-boats, Norway of 16-31 October, 1943.

Page 673, 20 October:

The survey of the situation for 19 October should have left both possibilities - supply or evacuation - open. There are no clues to indicate the intention of the British formation. I consider the conclusion that they were merely evacuating Ice Fjord as going beyond what the facts warrant. (The same applies to page 683, para. VII.2.)

Page 686/7:

According to the report from "Mohs" (U 956) Advent Bay is, after all, still occupied. We may thus assume that the operation was one to supply the base, but it is possible that the garrison was relieved at the same time.

What is important now is the knowledge that the enemy is still in Ice Fjord.

(Signed) Klüber.

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Operation "Kreuzritter".

Experience report of U 355.

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 4 November 1943.

Most Secret.

To:

German Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
Naval Group Command North and Fleet Command.
Naval Chief Command, Norway.
Admiral Northern Waters.

Attached are submitted:

1. Special experiences gained during operation "Kreuzritter" (taking a meteorological observation station to the north coast of Spitsbergen) October 1943.
2. Navigational observations and experiences during operation "Kreuzritter".

Captain U-boats, Norway concurs with all points of the report of Lt.Cdr. La Baume, the commander of the U 355.

The U-boat carried out its task with navigational skill and commendable seamanship, and afforded considerable support in the setting-up of the station. Special attention is drawn to the commander's account of the entirely unsatisfactory condition of the trawler and the obvious unsuitability of its crew for such an operation.

(Signed) Peters.

Copy.

Most Secret.

Commanding Officer, U 355. On board, 30 October 1943.

Experience report on operation "Kreuzritter",
the erection of a meteorological observation
point on the northeast coast of Spitsbergen.

Departure and approach to the operational area.

The following circumstances caused delays:

1. While loading in Hammerfest on 1 October those parts of the equipment to be conveyed on board U 355, it was found that these were scattered at random among the rest of the cargo and could only be collected by means of protracted searching and restowing. As the "Busch" also had to replenish fuel and water, the time of sailing, which had been fixed for the forenoon of 2 October, had to be postponed by 12 hours.
2. While proceeding towards the north coast of Spitsbergen, we had to leave the ordered route twice for periods of approximately four hours and heave to and turn towards the seas, because the badly secured deck cargo on the "Busch" threatened to be lost with the lurching of the ship and the waves washing the decks. Moreover, on the evening of 4 October the "Busch" reported leaks both fore and aft, which again forced us to heave to for a time.
3. As the ship was only equipped with a magnetic compass, which is especially unreliable because of the indeterminable interferences arising in those regions, she was unable to maintain an ordered course with the necessary precision. I was therefore forced, in the interests of accurate navigation, to let the U-boat go ahead at night and let the "Busch" follow in my wake. As a U-boat is very difficult to see at night, there was frequent danger of losing touch, especially during poor visibility conditions (snow squalls). These difficulties, caused by the insufficient equipment and the not entirely seaworthy condition of the ship, involved an unnecessarily long presence in dangerous sea areas. The signal traffic necessary at night to maintain communications and to transmit orders and reports inevitably assumed an almost intolerable volume and severely endangered our unobserved approach.

Finally, it seems doubtful whether, if the weather had been any worse - a definite possibility at this time of year - we would have succeeded at all in taking the cargo to its destination intact.

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Approach to place of disembarkation.

The approach to Woodfjord from the north at noon on 6 October was accomplished without difficulties. The weather favored an unobserved approach to the coast; visibility in the open sea was good, making the high mountains and off-shore islands of the north coast clearly recognizable even at a distance of 30 miles, but low-lying clouds from which snow was falling covered the fjords. At the beacon on Grey Hook the "Busch" was released, in order to put in to Liefdefjord by herself and to steer for the previously decided place of disembarkation on the southern shore of Reindeer Peninsula (Reinsdyrflya).

A reconnaissance of the east coast of Woodfjord as far as the entrance to Bockfjord (south of Kap Roos) produced nothing of interest. One hut each was sighted on Grey Hook, at Mushaven and near Kap Roos; they were in good condition but obviously empty. There are three more small huts on the south shore of Reindeer Peninsula. Inside Woodfjord, Bockfjord and Liefdefjord there is a great deal of glacier ice, including fair-sized icebergs, especially on the inside of the islands in Liefdefjord.

Putting in to Liefdefjord offers no navigational difficulties, as long as visibility is clear and one gives the shore and islands a sufficient berth. Woodfjord and Liefdefjord have not been accurately surveyed and only slightly sounded. Both groups of islands south of Reindeer Peninsula are not marked accurately even on the best chart available, the Norwegian chart 507. The "Pilot" does not give any details at all. It was established during repeated putting in and out, by means of frequent soundings, that the center of the fairway is clear and deep; the soundings contained in the chart were found to be accurate, caution is advised near the group of islands lying north of Kap Roos; one must keep at least 1 mile away from them. A passage between the islands and Kap Roos is not possible. The depths increase towards the northern group of islands, which may be approached to within $\frac{1}{2}$ mile. Covered as they are by snow, both groups of islands stand out very little from the mainland behind them and their shapes are frequently obscured by stranded icebergs. West of the island there is a slowly and steadily rising sandy beach with stones; the depth of the water decreases uniformly from 15 m.

The most favorable approach route has been entered on the appended sketch map. The Grey Hook beacon and the 98 m. high hill (Landsort Hill, 321 feet) on Welcome Point (Velkomstpynt) are the only useful landmarks for taking bearings; other points are not sufficiently accurately marked on the chart. In case of doubt, it is best to keep closer to the northerly group of islands, the depths there are greater and the fairway clear. Extreme caution is advised at night or in poor visibility, as icebergs or drift-ice fields can easily be confused with the shallow islands.

Erection of main station.

The site for unloading and erecting the main station (winter hut) was necessarily determined by the fact that the "Busch" ran aground about 500 m. from land in misty weather. After exploring the terrain, a suitable position for building the hut was selected behind a small hillock, which prevented its being seen from Liefdefjord. The distance from the landing place, which was near a small lagoon on the bank, to the site for the hut was about 400 m. (see sketch).

The unloading was begun on the morning of 7 October. The conveyance of the building materials and the other equipment to the shore was made more difficult by the fact that the motorboat brought on board the "Busch" could not be made to work during the whole period. The traffic to and from the shore was therefore confined almost exclusively to rubber dinghies, for the "Busch"'s other boat was also out of order. I received the impression that the crew of the trawler did not devote sufficient attention to the care of their boats. A motorboat in running order would have appreciably reduced the time required for unloading and would have helped to overcome transport difficulties due to wind, current and ice. Even a reliable and powerful outboard motor for one of the rubber dinghies would have considerably facilitated and speeded up the transference of the items of equipment.

Unloading was completed on 17 October. On 18 and 19 October the entire U-boat crew was also landed in order to help carry the heavier objects like hydrogen flasks, sacks of coal, crates of provisions and fuel tanks from the landing place to the hut, and to stack them up tidily. The meteorological party was thus saved several weeks of heavy and wearisome work, and these conspicuous objects were quickly removed from the beach. The erection of the hut was completed according to plan; on 21 October its construction had reached a stage where the meteorological party could inhabit it, and U 355 and the "Busch" could commence their return passage.

Alternative stations and depots.

On 7 and 8 October 2 men of the meteorological party and their equipment were landed respectively in Broad Bay (Breidbogen) about 1 mile east of Kap Arla, and in Red Bay (Raudfjord) at the end of Klinckowströmbukt (eastern edge of Raudfjord glacier).

Kap Arla should be approached from the north. The depth of the water varies from 10 to 30 meters, and does not decrease uniformly towards the coast until the southern point of Broad Bay. The bottom consists of reddish clay interspersed with coarse gravel and stones.

Map G in Chart D 978 is a useful guide for putting in to Red Bay. Nevertheless, great caution is indicated in the sea area north of Red Bay, as the depths are very irregular and the soundings entered on the chart are not reliable.

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Yermackpynt is very low and can only be made out from close by; dangerous rocks lie off it. In the center of Red Bay the fairway is clear and deep except for Princess Alice rock southwest of Bruce Point.

We succeeded in approaching the shore to within about 50 m. at both landing places at very low speed on the incoming tide, so that a shuttle service could be set up with ropes and two rubber dinghies coupled to one another. The ice at the end of Klinckowströmbukt formed no substantial obstacle.

On 14 October a provision and fuel store was set up at the inner end of Magdalena Bay on the northern edge of the Waggonway glacier (marked "landing place" on map H of chart D 978).

Reconnaissance of surrounding fjords.

After we had reached the unloading place without being discovered by the enemy, a detailed reconnaissance of the surrounding fjords and bays was carried out by U 355, with the scientific officer-in-charge on board. The following were reconnoitered exhaustively: Trurenberg Bay (Sorgfjord), Mosselbukt, Wijdefjord, Fair Haven, Smeerenburgfjord, Sørgat, Magdalena Bay (Magdalenefjord), Kongsfjord and Nye Alesund, Krossfjord and Lilliehøkkfjord. Any huts found which might serve as bases for enemy operations, were investigated and partly destroyed; the huts still standing are indicated in the attached plan. Our own former station "Nussbaum" at Signehamn (Krossfjord) was found to be completely destroyed.

The main result of the reconnaissance was that the whole area is entirely free of the enemy; records found indicated that the last to be there were a few Norwegians in the summer of 1941. Moreover, since no vehicles or store huts were found, there is an assurance that the enemy will not be able to carry out a land operation against the meteorological party in the near future, as this would require detailed and protracted preparations in the opinion of the scientific officer-in-charge.

The scientific officer-in-charge of the meteorological party intends to take the following defense measures against attack from the sea, which could take place, at the earliest, when the ice breaks up next summer.

The main station will be fully manned only during the winter; after the ice breaks up only the radiosonde ascents will still be carried out from there. During the course of the winter several subsidiary stations will be set up west of Liefdefjord in the shelter of the high hills and glaciers there; this will make it possible, if the main station is threatened by superior enemy forces, to take evasive action in good time and to continue the meteorological observations. A permanent look-out and patrol service against surprise attack has been arranged, the huts on the southern shore of Reindeer Peninsula have been mined. The terrain is on the whole well suited for effective defense, so that it may be assumed with some confidence that the meteorological party will be able to carry out its task successfully over a period of one year, even in the case of enemy intervention.

Personnel.

I gained the impression that the individual members of the meteorological party are well suited to their task both as regards technical ability and temperament, and that they will be equal to all demands made on them. The scientific officer-in-charge, Inspector Knoespel, is, in my opinion, exceptionally suitable to lead such an operation. He possesses extensive practical experience of the Arctic regions and shows exceptional skill in leading and directing his men whom he selected himself and had already welded into a firm and harmonious community before the beginning of the operation. His strong personality, his courage and his soldierly attitude towards his task offer a guarantee that the undertaking will be successfully concluded even under the most difficult conditions.

Whereas the U-boat's crew and the members of the meteorological party worked together smoothly and successfully, on the basis of mutual understanding and genuine comradeship, the crew of the trawler "Busch", which consisted of reservists, did not prove themselves to be particularly suitable for such an operation. They lacked a responsible attitude of mind and devotion towards the matter in hand. Instead, the feeling prevailed that this special operation was rather a nuisance, whose only justification was to be found in any personal gains that might accrue from it. Thus, there was an isolated attempt to steal parts of the meteorological party's equipment. On the basis of our experiences as well as in the interests of the strict secrecy required in the case of such an operation, I consider it of the utmost importance to provide for these special assignments disciplined crews of the greatest possible initiative and reliability, who will take an active interest in the purpose as well as the execution of their task.

(Signed) La Baume.

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Commanding Officer U 355. On board, 30 October 1943.

Most Secret.

Report
on navigational observations made off the north
coast of West Spitsbergen from 6-21 October 1943.

Only a part of the north coast of West Spitsbergen is adequately surveyed; the data available are incomplete and leave many gaps. The utmost caution is therefore advised when approaching the coast and putting in to the fjords for the first time.

The Norwegian chart No.507 is the best of all the charts available. It gives a fairly accurate picture of the coastline as a whole, but contains too little detail and provides inadequate data about depths especially inside the fjords. The maps of the German chart No.978 proved serviceable for single sectors and were as a rule reliable. The Navigational Handbook (Pilot) contains mainly out-of-date descriptions of a general kind, which even contradict each other in part. It provides useful and detailed particulars of the more frequently traversed northwest corner with Smeerenburgfjord and Magdalena Bay.

There are only a few suitable and conspicuous points from which to take bearings, and these are mostly not marked on the chart.

Particular caution is always indicated near islands, whose position and size are not generally shown very accurately on the chart, and which are almost always surrounded by dangerous submarine reefs. When they are covered with snow, low-lying islands scarcely stand out against the mainland behind; their outlines are frequently obscured by stranded icebergs.

No ice was met on the whole north coast up to and including the northern entrance to Hinlopen Straits. Inside the fjords there was only a little ice in the immediate vicinity of the foot of glaciers except in Woodfjord and Liefdefjord, where a fair amount of drift-ice and numerous icebergs were encountered.

The following detailed observations were made:

Magdalena Bay as far as Reindeer Peninsula.

The approach to Magdalena Bay is simple and possible even in poor visibility. The rocks west of Fugleøya on the north side, and Ziethen rocks off Grafnes (Grave Point) can be easily made out; otherwise the fairway is clear. When passing through Sørgat it was established that the beacon on the spit extending southeastward from Danes Island (Danskøya) is no longer there. The depths given in chart D 978 at the entrance to Sørgat south of Danes Island are not reliable; we sounded depths of less than 20 m. outside the 20 m. limit indicated.

For Smeerenburgfjord and Fair Haven the details given in the chart proved to be correct. The least depth sounded while passing exactly through the center of the passage between Klovningen and Andreebaya was 16 m.

The depths north of Red Bay (Raudfjord) as far as 79° 57' N are very irregular; caution is advised in this whole area. Map G of chart D 978 is useful when approaching Red Bay. The northern tip of Klovningen and Biskayerhuk are useful landmarks for taking bearings. Yermackpynt is very shallow and can only be made out from close by; the rocks in front of it should be given a clear berth. The middle of the fairway in Red Bay is apparently clear apart from Princess Alice rock southwest of Bruce Point.

The chart contains no particulars of depths in Broad Bay eastwards from Biskayerhuk. The depths are very irregular and vary very abruptly right up to the coast, where they then decrease uniformly from 10 m. The bottom there consists of reddish clay.

Woodfjord and Liefdefjord.

Suitable points from which to take bearings for the approach to Woodfjord are the beacon on Mofsen Island, which can be seen even in clear weather only when approaching within 6 miles because of its small height, the beacon on Greyhuk, and the 98 meter high hill (Landsort Hill, 321 feet) on Welcome Point. Two little stone beacons on Welcome Point are not marked on the map.

The soundings in the chart for the middle of Woodfjord were found to be correct. About 1 mile below Greyhuk beacon, depths of less than 5 m. were found 1,000 m. from the shore in the vicinity of the hut standing there. The two groups of islands in Liefdefjord between Kap Roos and Reindeer Peninsula vary both in size and position from the details given in the chart. Greater depths are found off the northerly group, which can be approached up to 0.5 miles. One must keep at least 1 mile off the southerly group of islands, the depths are less there (10-30 m.), and the fairway east of the islands and further south to Kap Roos is fouled by rocks. The islands are shallow, difficult to make out and in poor visibility easily confused with icebergs or drift-ice fields. The western part of Liefdefjord is very shallow; the bottom is sandy and rises uniformly from a depth of 15 m. The whole south coast is foul and strewn with rocks and stones.

Grey Hook to Cape Foster.

The fairway in the middle of Wijdefjord and Austfjord (Ostfjord) is clear and deep, only the 3 m. position marked on the chart off the west coast opposite the second glacier is to be avoided.

The two groups of islands in Austfjord are not accurately entered on the chart. Apparently there is deep water all around them; the passage between the islands and the east coast is possible.

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Vestfjord is navigable only on the east side close under Cape Petermann; even in the entrance there are depths of less than 5 m. at the center. The head of the fjord, beyond the low spit, is too shallow for navigation.

Mosselbukt is sufficiently deep in the middle. Several small islands surrounded by reefs lie along the eastern shore.

The beacon on Verlegenhuk resembles a hut and is difficult to make out from due north. The approach to Sorgfjord (Trurenberg Bay) offers no difficulties in good visibility; the beacon on Cape Foster cannot be seen until about 5 miles off. Some crosses are still extant on Graves Point (Eolusnes); a small stone beacon stands on the opposite easterly entrance point. Only ruins of the beacon on Point Crozier remain.

La Baume.

Explanation of Sketch

First Map.

Ost	"	East.
Vogelsang	"	Fuglesangen Island.
Imsterdam Insel	"	Amsterdamöya.
Dänen Insel	"	Danes Island (Dansköya).
Vogel Insel	"	Fugleöya.
Vogelfd	"	Fuglefjord (Fowl Bay).
Magdalenen Bucht	"	Magdalena Bay (Magdalenefjord).
Smeraburgfd.	"	Smeerenburgfjord.
Albert I Land	"	Albert I Land.
Lillihuk Bucht	"	Lilliehöökfjord.
Kreuzbucht	"	Krossfjord (Cross Bay).
Mitra Halbinsel	"	Mitra Peninsula.
Kap Mitra	"	Cape Mitra.
Kapp	"	Cape.
Bake Neu Alesund	"	Beacon, Ny Alesund.
Königsbucht	"	Kongsfjord.
Haakon VII Land	"	Haakon VII Land (Kong Hakon VII Land).
Biskarbucht	"	Biskayerhuk.
Belkommt	"	Welcome Point (Velkomstpynt).
Renntier Halbinsel	"	Reindeer Peninsula (Reinsdyrflya).
Raudfd	"	Red Bay (Raudfjord).
Kap Arla	"	Cape Arla.
Klingenström Bucht	"	Klinckowströmbukt.
Liefdefd	"	Liefde Bay (Liefdefjord).
Kap Rosz	"	Kap Roos.
Grähukenbucht	"	Grey Hook (Grahuk).
Wood Fjord	"	Woodfjord.
Wijder Fjord	"	Wijdefjord.
Moszbucht	"	Mosselbukt.
Treurenburg Bucht	"	Sorgfjord (Trurenberg Bay).
Ostfd	"	Austfjord (Ostfjord).
Westfd	"	Vestfjord.
gut erhaltene Übernachtungshütte m. Einr.	"	transit hut with equipment in good condition.
gut erhaltene Schutzhütte m. Einrichtg.	"	shelter hut with equipment in good condition.
Schutzhütte ohne Einr.	"	shelter hut without equipment.
alte, z.T. zerstörte Hütte.	"	old, partly destroyed hut.
Aufzulegen auf Karte No.507.	"	to be placed over Norwegian chart No.507.

Second Map.

Renntierhalbinsel	=	Reindeer Peninsula (Reinsdyrflya).
Hauptstation	=	main station.
Hügel	=	hill.
Steilufer	=	steep bank.
Lagune	=	lagoon.
Landeplatz	=	landing place.
Hütte	=	hut.
Liefde-Bucht	=	Liefde Bay (Liefdefjord).

Third Map.

Rote Bucht	=	Red Bay (Raudfjord).
Biscayerhuk	=	Biskayerhuk.
Kap Arla	=	Cape Arla.
Willkommenhuk	=	Welcome Point (Velkomstpynt).
Renntier Halbinsel	=	Reindeer Peninsula (Reinsdyrflya).
Graue Huk	=	Grey Hook (Grahuk).
Wood Fjord	=	Woodfjord.
Station I	=	First station.
Liefde Bucht	=	Liefde Bay (Liefdefjord).
Kap Roos	=	Kap Roos.

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WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

1 - 15 NOVEMBER, 1943

PG/31846

CONFIDENTIAL

1 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Northern Waters:

U 354 AB 3523)
U 387 AB 3568) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 360 AB 3914)
U 307 AB 3973)

In port:

U 277 Hammerfest,
U 636 Tromsø,
U 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 355 proceeding from Narvik to Trondheim.
U 956 proceeding from AB 3523 to Narvik
via AB 3490.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance,
flying route Banak - Bear Island - South
Cape - AB 8130 - Banak. Bear Island and
South Cape only partially covered.
Otherwise nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance,
route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - AE 3270 -
Vaernes without sighting enemy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. Guardship No. 30 passed Cape Greben
on course 80° at 1655 on 31 October.

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2. Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
3. Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: 1 probable submarine depot ship.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
4 boats in Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) taking on mines in Tromsø for operation "Eistorte".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

2 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 354 AB 3523)
U 387 AB 3568) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 360 AB 3914)
U 307 AB 3973)

In port:

U 277 Hammerfest,
U 636 Tromsø,
U 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0800 U 956 proceeding from AB 3490 to Narvik.
U 636 put out of Tromsø, put in to Hammerfest at 2030.
2045 U 355 put in to Trondheim from Narvik.

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II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, flying route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Hope Island, nothing to report. Flying route and islands not exhaustively covered.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - AB 7713 - Vaernes, nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance of Faeroe Islands area, nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. Norwegian polarcoast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
2. Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweeper No. 38.
Dikson area: minelayer No. 90, minesweepers Nos. 31, 37, guardship No. 19.
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: Flotilla leader "Baku" (with S.O. Destroyer Flotilla), Destroyers "B", "C" and "H", guardship No. 22, 1 icebreaker.
3. Belushya area: forenoon 1 aircraft.
4. Frequent transmissions from Archangel to Kola and from Belushya to Archangel.
5. Staff of Russian Northern Waters Fleet transmitted at 1356 to a Russian submarine the position of a German U-boat in 73° 33' N (22° - 30° E).

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

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(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) reported readiness by radio message, and received his sailing orders for minelaying operation "Eistorte" for 2 November in radio message 1132/776.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

It is apparent from the special report made by U 355 (La Baume) on meteorological operation "Kreuzritter", that meteorological ship 3 (the "Busch"), which was manned by reservists, was in a bad condition, and also that the crew was ill-suited for such an assignment, and that these circumstances delayed and endangered the execution of the operation.

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re 2 November, para. III, 4, 5:-

1. The increased volume of radio traffic between Archangel, Kola and Belushya may be an indication that preparations are being made for a convoy.
2. Our own U-boat of which the Russian submarine was informed, may - with inaccurate longitude - be U 956 (Mohs) returning from the Bear Island passage. "Mohs" has been warned to look out for the Russian submarine especially before entering Andfjord.

(Signed) Peters.

3 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 354 AB 3523)
U 387 AB 3568) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 360 AB 3914)
U 370 AB 3973)

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In port:

U 277, 636 Hammerfest,
U 713 Narvik,
U 355, 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1120 U 956 put in to Harstad from the operational area.
U 636 put out of Hammerfest for the operational area.
1700 U 636 put in to Hammerfest because of weather conditions.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance and reconnaissance of Hope Island, flying route Banak - Bear Island - Hope Island - South Cape - 07 East 3700* - Banak by 1 Ju 88, nothing to report, only partially covered.
Armed shipping reconnaissance Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet by 4 FW 190, no shipping movements observed.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Russia: guardship "K 75" from Belushya to Archangel on 30 October.
Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Amderma area: minelayer No. 93.
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: destroyer "B", guardship No. 84, minesweeper No. 104, guardboat No. 519, survey vessel "Mgla", 1 possible submarine depot ship.
Britain: At 0438 on 3 November bearing of 74° in direction of Kara Straits obtained on one unit or naval vessel while transmitting radio message to Murmansk.

* Translator's note: 07 East is the large square on the German Air Force chart, 3700 the usual naval grid.

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(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) had to return with his escort to Hammerfest because of bad weather, and had to postpone his departure for minelaying operation "Eistorte".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

4 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 354 AB 3523)
U 387 AB 3568)
U 360 AB 3914) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 307 AB 3973)

In port:

U 277, 636 Hammerfest,
U 956 Harstad,
U 713 Narvik,
U 355, 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0830 U 956 put out from Harstad.
1510 U 956 put in to Narvik.
1000 U 355 put out from Trondheim for Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, flying route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - O7 East O720 - Banak, nothing to report. Exhaustive from

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Bear Island to South Cape, but not along flying route.

Special operation "Schatzgräber":

Reconnaissance by 1 FW 200, from 0517 until 1445, could not be completed on account of weather conditions.

2 FW 190 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet, no shipping movements observed, Eina Bay empty. Motka Bay and Pummanki Bay not investigated on account of weather conditions. Meteorological reconnaissance Murmansk area.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 He 111 Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes without report of enemy sighted, visibility 20 km.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 1328 enemy submarine in Skagerrak, AN 3628.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Kanin Nos area: guardboat No. 519.

Dikson area: minesweepers Nos. 21, 37.

Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweepers Nos. 61, 106, guardships Nos. 30, 60, 84.

Anderma area: minelayer No. 93.

Khabarova area: minesweeper No. 59, guardship No. 72.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: destroyers "B", "H", survey vessel "Ost", 1 probable submarine depot ship.

Belushya announced at 1650 on 3 November that a "DB 3" aircraft would be making a reconnaissance flight, run-in from Yugorski Straits (AT 8823) for 0600 - 1230 and 0200 - 0900 (probably 4 and 5 November).

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 has not yet put to sea for operation "Eistorte".

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs):

- "1. Put out from Narvik at noon on 5 November, report time by short signal on wave "MC".
2. Proceed via Westfjord to Fejeosen - Bergen at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.
3. Radio service "A" and Northern Waters very long wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 956 (Mohs), see Appendix II.

VII. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

5 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 354. AB 3523)
U 387. AB 3568)
U 360 AB 3914) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 307 AB 3973)

In port:

U 277, 636 Hammerfest,
U 713, 956 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1100 U 355 proceeding from Trondheim to Bergen.
U 956 put out from Narvik for Bergen.

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II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance and reconnaissance of Hope Island, flying route - Banak - Bear Island - Hope Island - South Cape - Banak, nothing to report, not exhaustive.
4 FW 190 on shipping and meteorological reconnaissance, Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance flying route Vaernes - AB 9640 - AF 1170 - Vaernes, broken off. No enemy sighting report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 1950 on 4 November mincsweeper No. 107 and an unknown vessel were lost to sight on a northwesterly course north of Cape Cherni.

Kolguev North reported on forenoon of 3 November that the signal station is working continuously as a radio beacon. Norwegian polarcoast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "S 103" mentioned by name.

Belushya/Kara Sea area: minelayer No. 93.

Khabarova area: minesweeper No. 106.

Kanin Nos area: guardboats Nos. 501, 519.

Dikson area: minelayer No. 90, guardship No. 19, minesweeper No. 31.

Radio traffic from Archangel to Belushya and Kola somewhat brisker.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Agent from Hvalfjord reported that 2 large transports, 1 aircraft carrier, 1 cruiser and 4 destroyers put in to the fjord on 29 October. On the morning of 31 October the transports and destroyers put to sea again.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) has not yet put to sea for operation "Eistorte" on account of weather conditions, as escort cannot yet be provided.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

6 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 354 AB 3523)
U 387 AB 3568) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 360 AB 3914)
U 307 AB 3973)

In port:

U 277, 636 Hammerfest,
U 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1530 U 636 put out from Hammerfest for the operational area.
U 956 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen.
U 355 proceeding from Trondheim to Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, flying route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75° N, 5° E - Banak, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, flying route Vaernes - 17 West 8270 - Vaernes without sighting enemy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: guardships Nos. 30, 72, minelayer No. 93.
Dikson area: guardship No. 819, minelayer No. 90, minesweepers Nos. 31, 37.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations:

Reliable source reported to G.I.S. sub-station Bergen, that between 0700 and 0900 on 4 November an enemy formation was sighted at sea 5 - 6 miles away, abreast of Sandøy beacon and 20 miles from Farøygrunn. The following types were recognized: First class cruiser (observer compares it to the salvaged cruiser "Königsberg") 2 destroyers, 4 or 5 M.T.B.s, 2 freighters - possibly 3 more at a greater distance. Observer compares construction of these ships with freighters of 2,500 to 4,000 tons capacity. Further out to sea were 2 more ships which could not be made out clearly. One of these lay low in the water, and looked like a lighter or tanker. Formation was proceeding in a northnortheasterly direction. Speed about 12 - 16 knots. The same agent heard late on the afternoon of 4 November from inhabitants of the skerries in the Sogne area, that an operation was to take place on 5 November against unnamed targets in the Sogne- or Sunnfjord area (Askevold near Bremanger).

Footnote by Admiral West Coast:

1. Possibility of confusion with own destroyer formation excluded as area in question was not traversed until night of 4 to 5 November.
2. Rumours that a British operation against the west coast of Norway is intended are widespread among fishermen south of Korsfjord and also in the Sognefjord area.

3. A British diversion to help a breakthrough of blockade runners is also possible.
4. Reinforced air reconnaissance and its extension to the area from Stadtlandet to Utsira seems to be urgently necessary.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
4 boats in Bear Island passage.

U 387 (Büchler) and U 360 (Becker) received orders in radio message 1209/714 to meet each other on 7 November in AB 3598 to transfer an interpole.

- (c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) put to sea for minelaying operation "Eistorte".

- (d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 277 (Lübsen):

- "1. Put out from Hammerfest on 7 November with escort as far as Tromsø and then to Harstad with pilot.
Take on meteorological radio buoys there from steamer "Feodosia".
2. Further details by radio message.
3. U-boats Northern Waters wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re 6 November para. III. e):

The evidence for the reported enemy formation seems thoroughly unreliable.

(Signed) Peters.

7 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 354 AB 3523)
U 387 AB 3568)
U 360 AB 3914) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 307 AB 3973)

In port:

U 277 Hammerfest,
U 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 636 proceeding from Hammerfest to the
operational area.
U 956 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen.
1400 U 355 put in to Bergen from Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, Vaernes -
17 west 8220 - Vaernes. No enemy sighting report.
1 Ju 88 on photographic reconnaissance of east
coast of Iceland. Assignment not carried out
because of bad weather at target.
1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of sea area around Faeroes.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

The steamer "Vitregra" (1,398 G.R.T.) in Amderma
on 6 November. Norwegian polar coast: little
radio traffic to submarines in the operational
area.

Dikson area: minesweepers Nos. 31, 37, guardship
No. 19, minelayer No. 90.

Khabarova (Yugorski Straits) area: minesweeper
No. 61.

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Belushya/Kara Sea area: minelayer No. 93,
guardship No. 30.
Russian radio traffic: all day on 6 November
and during the night of 7 November numerous
transmissions from Archangel to Iokanka.
Otherwise moderate to slight radio traffic.
Britain: Murmansk and Archangel broadcasts,
1 radio message each.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

Radio message 1419/734 sent:

"Exceptionally heavy radio traffic from Archangel
and presence of British light forces in the
eastern Barents Sea make the approach of a
westbound convoy appear possible."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) on minelaying operation
"Eistorte".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

U 713 (Gosejakob), which will be ready on 23 November,
is scheduled to take out the meteorological shore
transmitter "Christian" to Bear Island. The
transmitter is to be unloaded with the 2 meteorological
buoys "124" and "125" from the steamer "Feodosia" in
Narvik, where U 277 (Lübsen) is to fetch the buoys.

VII. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 354 AB 3523)
U 387 AB 3568) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 360 AB 3914)
U 307 AB 3973)

In port:

U 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U-636 proceeding from Hammerfest to the
operational area.
1200 U 956 put in to Bergen from Narvik.
0600 U 277 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes -
17 west 6150 - Vaernes, broken off.
1 Ju 88 of meteorological reconnaissance Staffel 1
on route Sola 06 east 0210 - 16 west 8340 - 26
west 3030 - 34 south - 16 west 7360 - 1370 - Sola.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to
submarines in the operational area.
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardship No. 82,
ice-breakers "Lenin", No. 8, 1 probable submarine
depot ship.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: minelayer No. 93,
minesweepers Nos. 31, 38, 53, guardship No. 84.

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(e) By G.I.S. stations:

The presence of a small number of landing craft of unknown type, was reported again from Iceland. The reported approach to Hvalfjord of 2 troop transports will have to be confirmed by the appearance of new troops. Total garrison of Iceland so far consists of 75-80,000 American troops. The freighter fleet which according to trustworthy reports is lying ready in western English ports is being increased monthly by about 90-100,000 G.R.T., according to the same sources. For what purpose they are to be used has not yet been established.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) on minelaying operation "Eistorte".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

U 255 (Harms), the only boat in Northern Waters with MAN-Diesel engines (MAN: Engineering Works Augsburg - Nürnberg) whose overhaul presents difficulties in the Northern area, is to be exchanged for another boat. U 960 (Heinrich) or U 956 (Mohs) are suggested.

VII. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

9 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 354 AB 3523)
U 387 AB 3568) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 360 AB 3914)
U 307 AB 3973)

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In port:

U 277, 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0550 U 636 proceeding from Hammerfest to AT 87.
U 277 put in to Narvik from Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance, flying route Banak - Bear Island - Hope Island - South Cape - Banak, by 1 Ju 88. Nothing to report. Not exhaustive. Armed shipping reconnaissance Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet by 4 FW 190. No shipping movements observed.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88, flying route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - 27 west 5320 - Vaernes without sighting enemy. 1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of sea area around Faeroes.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 1605 on 8 November 4 minesweepers and 1 tug passed west of Cape Terski-Orlov (AW 2678) on a northerly course, at 2022 one more tug came into sight on bearing 140° on northerly course.

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Belushya/Kara Sea area: guardships Nos. 30, 84, minelayer No. 93.

Anderma area: minesweeper No. 59.

Dikson area: guardship No. 19, minelayer No. 90, minesweepers Nos. 31, 37.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: destroyers "Gremyashchi", "Uritski", minesweepers Nos. 33, 53, 64, one probable submarine depot ship (6403) and 1 ice-breaker (0432) were mentioned together in a radio message. Guardships Nos. 77, 82, minesweeper No. 38.

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(c) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) on minelaying operation "Eistorte".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

10 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 354 AB 3523)
U 387 AB 3568) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 360 AB 3914)
U 307 AB 3973)
U 636 AT 87.

In port:

U 277, 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, flying route Banak - Bear Island - Hornsund - AB 2869 - Banak, nothing to report. Not exhaustive.

4 BF 109 on meteorological reconnaissance of Murmansk area; nothing to report.

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Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - AA 9389 - AE 3275 - Vaernes, no enemy sighting report.

1 Ju 88, meteorological reconnaissance Staffel 1 on reconnaissance of sea area around Faeroes, no enemy sighting report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Kanin Nos area: guardboat No. 503.

Dikson area: minesweepers Nos. 31, 37.

Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweepers Nos. 39, 52, guardships Nos. 72, 84, minelayer No. 93.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

On 2 November, 12 British and American vessels including 2 tankers of 5,000 tons each, totaling 86,000 tons, put to sea from Northern Ireland in the direction of the North Atlantic; escort from Scapa Flow is expected in northern England about 15 November. Destination presumably Russia.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) on minelaying operation "Eistorte".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

11 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 354 AB 3523)
U 387 AB 3568) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 360 AB 3914)
U 307 AB 3973)
U 636 AT 87.

In port:

U 277, 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, flying route Vaernes - AA 9366 - Vaernes without sighting enemy.

1 FW 200 on sea reconnaissance in the area between 55° N and 64° N, and the Norwegian and Jutland coast to 1° W, as well as east of the Faeroes and Orkneys and Shetlands.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance of the sea area around the Faeroes without sighting the enemy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Off Thorshavn at 1410 1 cruiser, type not recognized, 3 destroyers, 12 small merchant vessels or patrol vessels, hove to.

At 1420 in AE 9912 one merchant vessel (1,500 G.R.T.) on course 150°, moderate speed.

Evacuation of enemy forces from aerial photos of Tunheim (Bear Island) on 28 October (oblique photos with hand camera): transmission hut, 2 transmission aerials destroyed. Several pylons lead to a second transmitter (in working order) with transmission hut and 2 transmission aerials. Several destroyed huts

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nearby. Several undamaged billets and one hut apparently in the course of construction.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Iokanka area: guardship No. 84, minesweepers Nos. 38, 104.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: destroyer "Gremyashchi", guardships Nos. 77, 82, minesweeper No. 106.

No British units or warships intercepted.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Leading Danish freemason predicts allied invasion of Northern Norway, Lofoten Islands area, within the next few days.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

2046

Radio message 2046/744 sent:

"1. New attack areas after 0400 on 12 November: "Büchler" AB 3523, "Herbschleb" AB 3568.

2. At 0900 on 12 November "Becker" and "Herbschleb" to transfer reporter in AB 3598.

3. "Becker" to report maximum endurance in days by short signal."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) on minelaying operation "Eistorte".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops. has ordered Atlantic boat U 355 to be exchanged for Northern Waters boat U 255 to save the unnecessary provision of spare parts for MAN engines.

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re para. III. b):-

The results of the photographic reconnaissance of

Tunheim correspond in essentials with the old aerial photographs and U 212 (Vogler)'s description of 20 June, 1943. After setting up the meteorological shore transmitter "Christian", U 713 (Gosejakob) is to investigate the station at Tunheim once more.

(Signed) Peters.

12 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 354 AB 3523 and proceeding towards AB 3598.
U 387 AB 3568 and proceeding towards AB 3523.
U 360 AB 3914 and proceeding towards AB 3598.
U 307 AB 3973.
U 636 AT 87.

In port:

U 277, 713 Narvik,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen,
U 711, 737 Trondheim.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2000 U 277 put out from Narvik for Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N 5° E - Banak. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Meteorological reconnaissance in the direction of Jan Mayen by 1 Ju 88 broken off in AF 5263. No enemy sighted.

1 FW 200, 7 Ju 88 and 2 BV 138 on sea reconnaissance between 55° N and 62° N and westwards as far as the east coast of Scotland, west coast of Shetlands and the Faeroes. No enemy sighting reports.

2 FW 200 on night reconnaissance off east coast of Scotland and Shetland Islands.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in area around Faeroe Islands.

1 FW 200 took off at 0710 on 13 November for reconnaissance for "Bassgeiger".

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III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: Flotilla leader "Baku" and minesweeper No. 114 (named in same radio message), guardship "S 84", minelayer No. 93, minesweepers Nos. 39, 59, 61.
Northern Waters radio traffic (Britain - Murmansk - Archangel) considerably increased.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
4 boats in Bear Island passage.

U 360 (Becker) reported in short signal 0847/784 that he can endure until 17 November.
Boats U 354 (Herbschleb) and U 360 reported by short signal, that in spite of direction-finder signals they have not succeeded in meeting.
In short signal 1550/753 U 354 suggested a new rendezvous tomorrow at 0900.
U 387 (Büchler) reported in radio message 1340/752:

"Cylinder liner 3 starboard engine slipped, piston jammed."

- (c) Special operations by single boats:

Still no report from U 636 (Hildebrandt) on minelaying operation "Eistorte".
U 277 (Lübsen) put out for Hammerfest with meteorological buoys Nos. 124 and 125.

- (d) Miscellaneous:

Operational order for U 277 (Lübsen), see Appendix III.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re III d) and IV c):-

1. The intensified Archangel radio traffic confirms the suspicion of approaching traffic.

2. U 277's putting to sea has been delayed 14 days in all. The arrival of the meteorological buoys in Narvik had originally been announced for 25 November by the head of the Naval Meteorological Service.

U 277, which was at operational readiness on 29 October, was then set aside and specially equipped for this purpose by the installation of upper deck containers, which were previously dismantled on all boats in accordance with German Naval High Command's directive. After the head of the Naval Meteorological Service had informed us on 20 October that the arrival of the meteorological buoys on board the "Feodosia" at Narvik would be delayed until 3 November, U 277 had to be transferred to Hammerfest to be ready to operate against suspected enemy traffic. It had to be recalled from there, when it transpired after the arrival of the buoys that the steamer "Feodosia" could itself not proceed onwards to Hammerfest and there was no other quick means of connection. The boat arrived in Narvik again on 9 November, but could not take on the buoys from the "Feodosia" at once, as the meteorologist accompanying them, Counsellor Dr. Wilken, had to regulate them on board the auxiliary warship "Kamerun". In addition, the upper deck containers had to be altered again, and a practice laying of the buoys with the aid of the ramps meanwhile constructed had to be carried out. This showed that further work and instruments were still required. Finally, Counsellor Wilken established during test transmissions from the buoys that the identification signals did not agree with the tables belonging to them. Although he was of the opinion, that the simple servicing of the buoys made the presence of a meteorologist unnecessary, he now accompanied the boat in order to get the operation under way at last. (Pencilled marginal note: Head of Naval Meteorological Service has taken necessary measures. Signed: 1st Staff Officer, Meteorological Service.) The boat is urgently required as a relief after laying the buoys because of the scarcity of U-boats. The question of the incorrect identification signals is to be clarified by Head of the Naval Meteorological Service while the boat is on its way to Hammerfest. The meteorologist on the staff of Admiral Northern Waters believes that the error was produced only by the horizontal position of the buoys during the test transmissions. In view of the small number of boats available to Captain U-boats, Norway, such long delays before the commencement of operations cannot be allowed to occur again. As the earlier operations "Schatzgräber" and "Kreuzritter" also involved the escorting U-boats in 12 days of waiting in each case, U-boats for meteorological assignments will in future not be reserved in advance, but will only be chosen and prepared after the arrival of the apparatus and personnel.

(Signed) Peters.

Pencilled marginal note: Naval Meteorological Service.

The delays always arise from the fact that the apparatus

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has to be transported to North Norway by sea, and unexpected alterations in time very often occur because of convoy conditions. This operation was very unlucky both as regards transport and apparatus technicalities.
IWB. 7 January.

13 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AB 3523.
U 354 AB 3598.
U 360 AB 3598.
U 307 AB 3973.
U 636 AT 87.

In port:

U 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1330 U 277 put in to Tromsø from Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Bear Island - Banak. Not exhaustive. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 FW 200 took off at 0710 on 13 November for reconnaissance for "Bassgeiger".
1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance.
1 FW 200, 6 Ju 88, and 2 BV 138 on sea reconnaissance of the area between 55° N and 64° N., the Norway and Jutland coasts and 1° W, as well as east of the Faeroes and west of the Orkneys and Shetlands.
2 FW 200 between 55° and 63° N westwards to 9°, operation in progress. Night operation.
1 FW 200 special assignment "Bassgeiger". Flying route Vaernes - 75° 20' N, 17° 30' W - Vaernes.
1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of sea area around Faeroes.

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

4 merchant vessels of up to 5,000 G.R.T. in AN 5518. Course 330°, speed 14 knots with balloon barrage.

In AE 9837 1 merchant vessel of 3,000 G.R.T., in AE 9591 1 patrol vessel on varying courses, 3 merchant vessels of up to 3,000 G.R.T., in AE 9592 2 trawlers on varying courses.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Kolguev-North light in operation day and night. Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Kanin Nos area: minesweeper No. 104, guardboat No. 503.

Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweepers Nos. 39, 63. Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardship No. 71, 1 guardboat.

From 0700 - 1100 on 13 November a "DB 3" aircraft carried out a reconnaissance flight from Belushya via Kara Straits to Yugorski Straits, a second aircraft of the same type on reconnaissance from Belushya to Krestovaya Bay (AT 4437) and back.

Great Britain: on the afternoon of 12 November a bearing was obtained on a unit or naval vessel during traffic with Archangel at 1425, in the direction of northern exit of Gorlo Straits.

Very lively radio traffic between Britain and Murmansk - Archangel, which decreased towards evening.

Signal station 381 at Chirachi (AT 8464) reported at 1101 on 13 November with 2nd priority (German KR = Most Immediate) to Khabarova: 4 unidentified destroyers sighted on bearing 240°, course 315°, 7 miles away.

At 1145 Chirachi to Belushya: ships have ceased firing; at 1201 4 destroyers lost to sight on bearing 290°, course 315°, 7 miles away; at 1420: Belushya to Chirachi requesting exact confirmation of the type of ships and exact observation of their movements; at 1440: Chirachi to Belushya, type of ships is "destroyers". Note: judging by all the details this was no practice radio traffic, the differences between times of receipt and times of origin were, however, remarkable.

1 radio message intercepted 1410 (Central European time), time of origin 1301 (German time 1101).

The destroyers bombarded Chirachi (AT 8464) with more than 30 salvos, and then proceeded onwards towards the Kara Sea. Loginova Shoal (AT 8427) was asked to report whether the silhouettes of 4 ships had been observed between 1300 and 1500.

At 1737 Archangel sent a 5 figure cipher message (as fourth priority) to the destroyer "Uritski" and minesweeper No. 62.

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(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

U 354 (Herbschleb) and U 360 (Becker) renewed their attempt to meet to transfer the war correspondent. "Herbschleb" reported in radio message 1441/762 ^{AP} that he did not meet U 360.

Radio message 1839/768 was therefore sent to "Herbschleb" and "Becker".

"Attempt meeting daily at 0900."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1. U 636 (Hildebrandt) was informed in radio message 2208/774 about the aircraft observed and the 4 destroyers in his operational area, and also about the working of Kolguev North light.

2. As it seems probable that the incorrect results from the meteorological buoys were merely due to their horizontal position during the test transmission, U 277 (Lübsen) received radio message 1358/761:

"Do not unload at Hammerfest. Lay buoys according to operational order. Test correct working after laying by comparative methods."

3. While proceeding eastwards to lay the meteorological buoys, U 277 (Lübsen) was to be used - with my consent - for a special assignment for Admiral Polar Coast. (Destruction of an enemy submarine north of Murmansk, which is said to be making for a definite navigational point to pick up an agent.) After it emerged, however, that the time for the execution of this operation was completely uncertain and that it would probably divert the boat too long from its own task, radio message 2139/56/59 was dispatched to Admiral Polar Coast, Sea Defense Commandant Kirkenes, U-boat base Hammerfest, for "Lübsen":

"Admiral Polar Coast's special assignment for U 277 cancelled. Put to sea according to operational order via SR 1."

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V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re para. III. d):-

The bombardment of Chirachi by the destroyers was probably an exercise. It is also possible that a presumed enemy, perhaps U 636 (Hildebrandt), was being bombarded.

(Signed) Peters.

14 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AB 3523.
U 354 AB 3598 and AB 3568.
U 360 AB 3598 and AB 3914.
U 307 AB 3973.
U 636 AT 87.

In port:

U 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0015 U 277 put in to Hammerfest from Tromsø.
0900 U 277 put out from Hammerfest for the operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 FW 200, 2 BV 138 and 6 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of the sea area between 55° N and 61° 30' N and westwards, along the east coast of England, Scottish isles as far as the Faeroes, and eastwards as far as Jutland and the west coast of Norway up to Namsos.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

In AN 4471 6 merchant ships of up to 5,000 G.R.T., 2 possible destroyers of the "A" to "J" class, 1 gunboat, 1 light-vessel, course 360°.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Minesweeper No. 59 at 1300 on 13 November in signal traffic with Chirachi.

Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku" (with S.O. Destroyer Flotilla), destroyer "Uritski", guardship No. 81, minesweepers Nos. 33, 59, 103, 1 probable submarine depot ship.

Amderma area: minesweepers Nos. 31, 35, 39, 57.

Belushya area: flight of MP-1 on evening of 12 November from Belushya to signal station 346 (Northern Novaya Zemlya) broken off to wait for improvement in weather.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

1100 In short signal 1046/779 U 354 (Herbschlob) reported that the war correspondent has been transferred to U 360 (Becker).

(c) Special operations by single boats:

0750 Radio message 0607/777 received from U 277 (Lübsen), according to which the meteorological buoys also send incorrect identification signals when vertical, and have been reported as out of order to German Naval High Command. "Lübsen" was ordered by telephone to put to sea with the buoys in spite of this, especially as the meteorologist here has found that the control barometer was incorrectly set. U 636 (Hildebrandt) on minelaying operation "Eistorte".

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V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re para. IV. c):-

U 277 (Lübsen) is to be informed on his outward route of the German Naval High Command's decision as to whether the meteorological buoys are to be laid. This fresh muddle is very regrettable.

(Signed) Peters.

15 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AB 3523)
U 354 AB 3568)
U 360 AB 3914) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 307 AB 3973)
U 636 AT 87.

In port:

U 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 277 proceeding from Hammerfest to AB 3914 via AC 5569.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

4 FW 190 on shipping and meteorological reconnaissance of area Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet. No shipping movements observed.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes without sighting enemy.

8 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance of the area between 55° N and 64° N and coasts of Norway and Jutland and 1° W, as well as east of the Faeroes and west of the Orkneys and Shetlands. (1 FW 200).

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1 Ju 88 of Meteorological Reconnaissance
Staffel 1 on reconnaissance of sea area
around the Faeroes without sighting enemy.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

In AE 9591 3 small freighters of 3,000 G.R.T.
each, hove to.

In Thorshavn 3 freighters of 3,000 G.R.T.
each, 2 hove to, one with steam up.

50 km. east of Thorshavn 2 patrol vessels,
course towards Thorshavn.

In AE 9564 4 merchant vessels each of
2-3,000 G.R.T., about 20 small boats, type
not recognizable, hove to.

In AE 9565 2 merchant vessels of 2,000 G.R.T.,
hove to.

In AE 9675 2 patrol vessels on westerly course.

In AE 9891 1 merchant vessel of 2,000 G.R.T.,
1 corvette as escort, course towards Thorshavn.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic
to submarines in the operational area.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: flotilla leader
"Baku", destroyer "K", guardships Nos. 71, 81,
minesweepers Nos. 33, 39, 53, 59, 61, 62, 81,
survey vessel "Migalka".

On 15 November from 0600 to 1300 a "DB 3"
carried out a reconnaissance flight from
Belushya to Yugorski Straits, Kara Straits,
Krestovaya Bay (AT 4337) and back.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1657 Radio message 1657/794 sent to U 277 (Lübsen):

"According to information from Head of Naval
Meteorological Service, buoys unserviceable,

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as one of the instruments in each case is out of order. Proceed directly to attack area. Report estimated time of arrival by short signal."

2005 Short signal 1958/795 received from "Lübsen":
"0000 on 17 November."

2021 Radio message 2021/796 sent:
""Lübsen" to relieve "Becker" at 0000 on 17 November. "Becker" to return to Narvik, Harstad optional."

Still no report from U 636 (Hildebrandt) on minelaying operation "Eistorte".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

As a result of the report made by Dr. Wilken, on 14 November, on the meteorological buoys the head of the Naval Meteorological Service has replied as follows:-

"Buoys unserviceable because of breakdown of one of the measuring instruments in each buoy. Dispatch of substitutes by return."

U 277 (Lübsen), which at present is the only boat equipped for laying the meteorological buoys, is to return to Narvik in due course to take on the substitute buoys and give up the two old ones. Incidents such as this have a particularly adverse effect in view of the small number of boats available.

VII. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

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APPENDIX II

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division C-in-C
U-boats, Operations.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (by postagram).

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 956 (Mohs), second operation

- 23 September Put out from Narvik, 3 November put in to Harstad, 4 November put in to Narvik.
- 27 September - Attack area AG 78 north of 77° 45' N.
19 October
- 19 October At 0937 mastheads of two destroyers and one light cruiser in AG 7579, easterly course, high speed. When hauling ahead, both Diesels broke down because of breaking of tappet lever block. Unable to carry out underwater attack because enemy turned sharply away. At 1239 in grid square 7831 warning of approaching shipborne aircraft type "Walrus".
Attack area AG 7830.
At 2232 in AG 7596 4 vessels, sighted putting out from Ice Fjord, 6 miles off, high speed. No attack as distance too great.
- 20 October At 0026 in AG 7816 contact severed.
- 20 October - Reconnaissance of Ice Fjord, no vessels.
27 October
- 25 October At 1050 bombarded Barentsberg with quadruple mounting guns, no defenses, no garrison discovered. Numerous houses still standing at Longyearby, and 2 radio masts. Only a few houses still standing at Fjordhamn. At 1243 in AG 7681 2 cm. gunfire from the shore. Apparently only a small remainder of the garrison at Advent Bay.

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27 October Attack area $\bar{A}G$ 7590.

30 - 31 Attack area AB 3523, depth of sweep 30
October miles.

2 1 November Return passage.

2 Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret 3650 A. Ops.

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APPENDIX III.

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway

On board, 12 November, 1943.

Most Secret

Operational order for U 277 (Lübsen)

1. Put out from Narvik at 2000 on 12 November with meteorological buoys Nos. 124 and 125 and meteorologist and proceed via Tjeldsund - Finnsnesrennen, from Lødingen to Tromsø with district pilot. Escort from Tromsø to Hammerfest; put out from Hammerfest via SR 1, as soon as possible.
2. Proceed at a distance of 50 miles from the coast to lay meteorological buoy No. 125 (4215 kc/s) at 73° N, 35° E in 200m. of water.
3. Then relieve U 360 (Becker) in attack area AB 3914, depth of sweep 30 miles. Report arrival by short signal of day and time.
4. After being relieved by U 713 (Gosejakob) proceed to laying of meteorological buoy No. 124 (5155 kc/s) at 70.5° N, 8.5° W in 200m. of water. Report laying of buoys by short signal of buoy number.
5. Then return to Hammerfest via AC 7120.
6. Own forces: Group "Eisenbart": U 387 (Büchler) in AB 3523, U 354 (Herbschleb) in AB 3568, U 360 (Becker) in AB 3914, U 307 (Herrle) in AB 3973, all depth of sweep 30 miles. U 636 (Hildebrandt) on special operation in AT 87. Daily meteorological flights by Ju 88.
7. Procedure according to Operational Order No. 1, U-boats Northern Waters Service. Report ice hindrance in attack area, avoid damage by ice. Lively Archangel radio traffic and the appearance of light British forces in the southern Barents Sea lead us to expect the approach of east-west traffic.

(Signed) Peters.

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WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

16 - 30 NOVEMBER, 1943

PG/31847

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16 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AB 3523)
U 354 AB 3568)
U 360 AB 3914) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 307 AB 3973)

In port:

U 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 277 proceeding from AC 5569 to AB 3914.
U 636 proceeding from AT 87 to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak. Not exhaustive. No enemy sighting report.

2 Ju 88 on shipping, harbor and airfield reconnaissance in the area Petsamo - Kola coast - Kanin Nos - Yugorski Straits - Kara Straits - Belushya - Kirkenes.

No minesweeping activity was observed during the entire flight. Flying route only partially covered.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Trondheim - Jan Mayen - Trondheim, nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and sea reconnaissance west of Faerce Islands and the north coast of Scotland. Apart from 3 patrol vessels in AN 1821, 1825 and 1864, no enemy sighting report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0815 in AT 7728, 3 destroyers, 6 probable

minesweepers and 2 patrol vessels, course southwest, low speed. Destroyers moving away on either side of minesweepers. At 0830 a large patch of oil about 30 X 30m. was observed in AC 9727. In Belushya harbor 1 merchant vessel of about 1,000 tons, hove to. Separate ice report.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 0900 on 15 November, 3 minesweepers, 2 ice-breakers, 1 freighter, 8 miles west of Chirachi (AT 8564), course southeast. Off Pulonga (AW 5223) 1 lighter with a leak amidships, no crew aboard. Guardship No. 75 standing by.

Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Belushya/Kara Sea area: guardships Nos. 19, 20, 25, minesweepers Nos. 33, 38, 53, 59.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "K", minesweepers Nos. 61, 64, guardship No. 10, guardboat No. 514, survey vessel "Migalka", 1 probable submarine depot ship, 1 unidentified vessel.

At 0600 on 16 November a Douglas took off for a flight from Naryan Mar to Belushya.

Flotilla leader "Baku", 5 destroyers, 2 guardships and 8 minesweepers at sea according to radio traffic.

At 0830, at 0836 and at 1355 Polyarno sent an undeciphered radio message (5Z), third priority (Emergency) to each of the patrol vessels. The radio messages were later repeated to the above-named vessels on different wave lengths.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

From Reykjavik: on the afternoon of 11 November, 4 heavily loaded freighters of average tonnage (5,000 - 6,000 tons) put in to port.

From Reykjavik: this afternoon a convoy consisting of 11 ships put to sea in ballast, including 2 tankers of 10,000 and 12,000 tons respectively. All the other ships were of average tonnage. Escort 2 destroyers and 2 trawlers.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) reported in short signal 0809/708

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the execution of minelaying operation
"Eistorte". Boat is proceeding homeward
to Hammerfest.

V. Reports of successes:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) has carried out minelaying
operation "Eistorte I".

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re paragraph III. d):-

The freezing of the Kara Sea and the West
Siberian Sea route has apparently proceeded
so far that shipping cannot now proceed even
with help from ice-breakers. Apparently the
ice-breakers are now being withdrawn in order
to be used in the White Sea.

(Signed) Peters.

17 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AB 3523)
U 354 AB 3568) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 277 AB 3914)
U 307 AB 3973)

In port:

U 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1300 U 360 proceeding from AB 3914 to Narvik.
U 636 put in to Hammerfest from the operational
area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak -
Bear Island - AB 3617 - Banak. Not exhaustive.
Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes -
Jan Mayen - AE 3277 - Vaernes without sighting

enemy. Photographic reconnaissance of Scapa Flow by 1 Ju 88. 6 Ju 88 and 2 BV 138 on sea reconnaissance of the area between 55° N and 64° N and the coasts of Norway and Jutland and 1° W, as well as east of the Faeroes and west of the Orkneys and Shetlands.

Flieger Fuchrer Lofoten:

At 0609 1 BV 222 took off with supplies for "Bassgeiger", landed in Tromsø at 1822. Target not recognized because of weather. No supplies dropped. "Bassgeiger" reported that aircraft was heard over target at 1254.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

2 patrol boats east of Thorshavn. 2 destroyers in AN 1137, type not recognized, course 330°. In AN 1297 1 patrol boat at anchor. In AN 5531 one convoy of 8 - 10 ships, size and types not identified. 2 - 3 aircraft with convoy. Course 360°.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. Position unknown: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyers "B", "C", "E", "H", "J". Guardships Nos. 18, 19, minesweepers Nos. 31, 33, 35, 37, "Subatka" (39), 53, 59, 62. Murmansk area: destroyer "Gremyashchi". At 1017 on 17 November Cape Terski-Orlov signal station (AW 2678) sighted 6 destroyers, 3 minesweepers, 3 ice-breakers on bearing 120°, 12 miles away on southerly course. Same formation was reported by Bolshoi Gorodetski (AW 2563) at 0925 on 17 November on bearing 60°, 5 miles away on course 120°, and by Terski-Orlov (AW 2678) at 1125 on bearing 90°, 3 miles away, on southerly course. At 1121 Terski-Orlov sighted 4 minesweepers to the north 12 miles away, on southerly course.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt), after putting in to Hammerfest, is to proceed to Tromsø as soon as possible to take on mines for the next operation.

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V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 636 (Hildebrandt) fourth operation, "Eistorte I", see Appendix II/1.

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re paragraph III d):-

The transference of the ice-breakers from the Kara Sea to the White Sea has been confirmed (see also War Diary for 16 November, 1943).

(Signed) Peters.

18 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AB 3523)
U 354 AB 3568)
U 277 AB 3914) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 307 AB 3973)

In port:

U 636 Hammerfest,
U 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1300 U 360 put in to Harstad from the operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak, nothing to report, not exhaustive.
2 FW 190 on shipping and meteorological reconnaissance Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet, nothing to report. Only partially covered.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes without sighting enemy.
1 FW 200 and 8 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance of the area between 55° and 64° N, and the coasts of Norway and Jutland and 1° W.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

The Russian formation sighted on 16 November off Kolguev North by our own air reconnaissance, consisting of 6 destroyers, 3 minesweepers and 3 ice-breakers, passed Cape Terski-Orlov (AW 2678) at 1125 on 17 November on a southerly course, probably on the way to Archangel. Minesweeper No. 59 at sea in Belushya area on 17 November.

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "Uritski", guardship No. 71, 1 probable submarine depot ship.

On 18 November, flight of 1 SJ 47 from Amderma to Archangel planned between 0600 and 1400.

Cape Cherni signal station (AW 2193) reported at 1135 on 18 November: 1 tanker and 2 destroyers disappeared from sight on bearing 330° 20 miles away, course northwest.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations:

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
4 boats in Bear Island passage.
- (c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) proceeding to Tromsø["] to take on mines for second operation, third part of the operations.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

Now that the planned minelaying operation by destroyers has been cancelled, the minefield round Kanin Nos included in the third part of the operations is to be the third to be laid on account of its importance.

VII. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

19 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AB 3523)
U 354 AB 3568) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 277 AB 3914)
U 307 AB 3973)

In port:

U 636 Tromsø,
U 360 Harstad,
U 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0845 U 360 put out from Harstad.
1415 U 360 put in to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Hope Island - Bear Island - Banak. Not exhaustive, nothing to report. No further operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 0653 on 18 November Cape Cherni reported 2 minesweepers and 1 tanker to the north-east, course north; at 1135 1 tanker and 2 destroyers on bearing 330°, course north-west.

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. From 0600 to 1200 on 19 November 1 Douglas flying from Naryan Mar to Belushya. At 1400 one DB 3 on reconnaissance along the west coast of Novaya Zemlya.

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(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) taking on mines at Tromsø.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 360 (Becker) second operation, see Appendix II/2.

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re paras. I b) and IV:-

As U 360 only requires a short overhaul, the patrol of Bear Island passage by 4 boats, and one boat for minelaying operations, can probably be maintained for the time being.

(Signed) Peters.

20 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AB 3523)
U 354 AB 3568) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 277 AB 3914)
U 307 AB 3973)

In port:

U 636 Tromsø,
U 360, 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - AB 2991 - Banak, nothing to

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report. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes. No enemy sighting report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "M 119" was mentioned by name. Four lengthy operational radio messages from Murmansk to Archangel in the afternoon. Inexact bearing of 20° obtained on Russian submarine "N 119" from Kirkenes at 1947 on 19 November.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
4 boats in Bear Island passage.
- (c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) taking on mines at Tromsø for operation "Eiszapfen".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. (a) U-boat reports:

An interim report from U 354 (Herbschleb) has been delivered by U 360 (Becker). It states that the rubber dinghies and one wooden boat were not found to be suitable for the disembarkation of the German Air Force meteorological party "Svartisen" on Hope Island from 27 - 31 October. With the stony coast the surf and sludge-ice strong sheet metal boats would have been more useful in the commander's opinion.

(b) Plans:

The auxiliary warship "Huascarán" will finish the repairs to the tanker "Schleswig" on 21 November. Since the repair ship is not being used to its full capacity in the Narvik and Hammerfest area because of the at present very small number of U-boats, it will, in accordance with orders, be made available for repairs to the "Tirpitz", and is being transferred to Alta. It remains administratively and operationally under the command of Captain U-boats, Norway.

VII. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

21 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AB 3523)
U 354 AB 3568) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 277 AB 3914)
U 307 AB 3973)

In port:

U 636 Tromsø,
U 360, 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2200 U 636 put out from Tromsø.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - AB 8570 - Banak, nothing to report, not exhaustive.
1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Hope Island - Banak, nothing to report. Not exhaustive.
4 BF 109 on photographic reconnaissance of Murmansk area.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

No operations on account of weather conditions.

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Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Murmansk area: destroyers "B" and "K".
Belushya/Kara Sea area: guardship No. 81.
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", minesweepers Nos. 35 and 39, probably at northern entrance to Gorlo Straits, one probable ice-breaker.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
4 boats in Bear Island passage.
- (c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Hildebrandt) is transferring, with mines, to Hammerfest for equipment and short overhaul.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

22 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

- (a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AB 3523)
U 354 AB 3568) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 277 AB 3914)
U 307 AB 3973)
U 636 proceeding from Tromsø to Hammerfest.

CONFIDENTIAL

In port:

U 360, 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0815 U 636 put in to Hammerfest.
2200 U 713 put out from Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak -
Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak, nothing to
report. Not exhaustive.
Shipping and airfield reconnaissance Fisher
Peninsula - Kola inlet by 4 FW 190, nothing to
report.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes -
AF 1527 - Vaernes, broken off.
Reconnaissance of east coast of Scotland between
55° N and northern tip of Shetlands by 2 Ju 88.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

On the morning of 21 November, a few minesweepers
with 1 or 2 freighters passed Kanin Nos on westerly
course.

At 0921 1 minesweeper arrived in Karmakuli (AT 4839).
Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to
submarines in the operational area.

Direct method radio traffic between British Home
area - Archangel increasing again. It is possible
that a PQ convoy is at present in the Bear Island
area.

At 2147 on 18 November the Admiralty sent a message
to an unknown possible PQ convoy: Alter straggler-
route as follows: From position (E) to (O) 70° 19' N,
28° 20' E (AC 4332).

Further points on straggler-route of probable PQ
convoy: AC 6451.

At 1400 an unknown American station (NBH) was
exchanging tuning messages with Green Harbor;
connection with convoy traffic possible.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage.

1517 The boats were informed in radio message 1413/755 about the possibility of a convoy in the Bear Island area. Since the further X-B-reports make a convoy course south of Bear Island seem possible, radio message 1517/757 was sent to group "Eisenbart":

"Transfer attack areas 2 positions southward immediately at increased speed. New attack areas: AB 6352 and 6397."

1900 Radio message received from Group North/Fleet:

"1. According to further radio intelligence, PQ convoy possible in Bear Island area.

2. Battle group at 3 hour's readiness. Prepare boats for putting to sea.

3. Equip U 636 for torpedo operations.

4. Air reconnaissance of Bear Island area and westwards requested from here.

5. As clues about position and route are lacking, and the present U-boat positions can only lead to an accidental meeting with the convoy, if at all, the boats should be concentrated at once on point AC 4332 named in the English radio message, as this will offer definite possibilities of successes provided the convoy or stragglers have not already passed by. Report plans."

2010 Radio message 2010/761 dispatched:

"Group "Eisenbart" to form patrol line at maximum speed from AC 1968 lower center to 4365 center. Boats in old sequence."

The boats were informed of the reported straggler route in radio message 2125/765.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

The minelaying operation for U 636 (Hildebrandt) lapses for the present because of operations on the expected convoy. The taking-out of the meteorological set to Bear Island and the reconnaissance of Tunheim by U 713 (Gosejakob) will be postponed if the result of the air reconnaissance should make the use of this boat necessary too.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Operational order for U 713 (Gosejakob),
see Appendix III/1.

In consequence of the convoy reports,
U 713 has been ordered to put to sea at
maximum continuous speed.

2025 Teleprinter message sent to U-boat base
Hammerfest:

"Sailing order for U 636:

1. Re-equip with torpedoes at top speed and
put to sea via SR 1, report passage by
time short signal.
2. Make for AC 43 at maximum speed.
3. Operational Order No. 1, U-boats Northern
Waters wave. Hand over Operational Order
No. 14 at base."

U 360 (Becker) which is lying in Narvik for
overhaul, is making ready for sea again quickly.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re III d) and IV b):-

1. I think it is possible that the suspected
eastbound convoy is only just approaching
and is still west of Bear Island. Similar
observations were made in the case of last
year's convoys while they were still off
Iceland.
2. There is at present no patrol south of Bear
Island as there are only 4 boats available.
In my opinion, it is quite possible that the
convoy may pass south of Bear Island, as it
must be presumed that the enemy knows the
weakness of our air forces in Northern Norway.
Also, the straggler positions mentioned lie
relatively far south. For these reasons, I
consider it right to transfer two of the
attack areas to the south of Bear Island and
to order a mobile patrol of only two boats to
the north of it. In my opinion, this disposition
is most likely to lead to the interception of
the convoy.
3. The order from Group North/Fleet alters the
present situation.
With the addition of U 636 (Hildebrandt) and
U 713 (Gosejakob) the Bear Island passage could
be occupied in adequate strength both north and
south of the island, because traffic must of
necessity converge here. Although the transfer
of the patrol line to eastward, in the direction

of the named approach point, as now ordered, has the advantage of concentrating a relatively strong force within a limited area, it also leaves considerable gaps both north and south of this area, which cannot be filled with the available boats. It is therefore my opinion that on the whole better conditions for intercepting the convoy could have been obtained by stationing the boats in the Bear Island passage; all the more so as with the arrival of U 636 and U 713 it will be possible to place four boats north and two boats south of Bear Island.

4. Teleprinter message to Group North/Fleet:

"With reference to your Most Secret message (see para. IV. b), the following has been ordered:

1. Group "Eisenbart" patrol line from AC 1968 lower center to 4365 center.
2. U 636 changing armament and re-equipping in Hammerfest at increased speed, probably putting out early on 23 November.
3. U 713 putting to sea on night of 22 November via Andfjord at maximum continuous speed, to reinforce patrol line, also at readiness for special assignment on Bear Island.
4. U 360 being made ready again at increased speed in Narvik. Putting to sea probably forenoon of 23 November."

Re IV. c):-

As U 636 (Hildebrandt) is to operate on the expected convoy the planned minelaying operation will have to be postponed. Owing to bad weather and the present special operation, only the first of the three mine-laying operations scheduled for November could be carried out.

(Signed) Peters.

23 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

- U 387 proceeding from AB 3523 via AB 3914 to AC 1968.
- U 354 proceeding from AB 3568 via AB 3973 to AC 1998.
- U 277 proceeding from AB 3914 via AB 6352 to AC 4338.
- U 307 proceeding from AB 3973 via AB 6397 to AC 4365.

CONFIDENTIALIn port:

U 636 Hammerfest,
 U 360 Narvik,
 U 711, 737 Trondheim,
 U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1500 U 713 proceeding from Narvik to AC 19.
 1630 U 636 put out from Hammerfest for AC 43.
 U 360 put out from Narvik via Andfjord.

II. Air reconnaissance:Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes -
 AT 8330 - Vaernes without enemy sighting report,
 sea reconnaissance of the area between 55° and 61°
 30' N, and the coasts of Norway and Jutland and
 1° W, also west of the Scottish Islands, by 5 Ju 88
 and 2 BV 138.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Reconnaissance against westbound convoy by
 5 BV 138 with radar. Area covered almost exhaustively.
 No enemy sighting report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
 (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
 (c) By naval forces: None.
 (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic
 to submarines in the operational area.
 Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: destroyer "J",
 guardships Nos. 10, 19, 20, 71, 75, 81, mine-
 sweepers Nos. 33, 35, 39, 110, 114, guardboat
 No. 625.
 Murmansk area: forenoon 1 aircraft, afternoon
 3 aircraft.
 Archangel area: forenoon 2 aircraft.
 Britain: no units or naval vessels appeared.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
 (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in patrol line east of Bear Island.

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As air reconnaissance is very incomplete and has produced no results so far, the meteorological boat U 713 has been included in the patrol line.

1135 Radio message 1135/767 sent:

"U 713 (Gosejakob) to put out from Andfjord at 0700 on 23 November for AC 19 via AC 2430."

With the re-equipped minelaying boat U 636 (Hildebrandt), there are now 6 boats available, which will be further supplemented tomorrow by U 360 (Becker). By stationing these boats in the Bear Island passage, as already suggested in War Diary for 22 November, a far more exhaustive patrol against the suspected traffic would be ensured. The boats would be able to occupy their attack areas by 0800 on 24 November, and will form an expanding reconnaissance line while still en route. Therefore,

1753 radio message 1753/777 was sent:

"Gosejakob" and "Hildebrandt" to make for AB 63 at maximum continuous speed."

1758 "Hildebrandt" reported passing SR 1 at 1730, by short signal.

In response to a telephone inquiry via Admiral Northern Waters, the transference of the patrol line into attack areas in Bear Island passage is not sanctioned by Group North/Flect. Teleprinter message received from there:

"Reference your inquiry by telephone:

1. Group "Eisenbart" to remain in position for the present.
2. Same air reconnaissance as on 23 November has been requested from Luftflotte 5 for 24 November."

1905 Radio message 1905/778 then sent:

"Radio message 1753/777 cancelled. Approach points for "Gosejakob" and "Hildebrandt" as previously."

It is intended to extend the patrol line by placing the two new boats in attack areas at the north and south ends, but retaining the concentration at the center of the line in the following manner:-
the two boats in the center to be spaced 15 miles apart, the next boat on either side to be placed 20 miles further north and south

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respectively, with depth of sweep 30 miles, and of the last two boats each to have its attack area 30 miles further out at either end of the patrol line.

2107

Radio message 2107/779:

20

- "1. New attack areas after 0800 on 24 November: "Büchler" AC 1968, "Herrle" AC 4368, depth of sweep 30 miles, point of concentration towards the center of the line.
2. "Herbschleb", "Lübsen" remain in patrol line AC 1998 center to 4338 upper center.
3. "Hildebrandt" to approach AC 4635 from Hammerfest, "Gosejakob" AC 1932, depth of sweep 30 miles."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

Meteorological party "Christian" embarked on U 713.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Operational order for U 360 (Becker),
see Appendix III/2.

V

V:

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

The interference of Group North/Fleet with the planned dispositions (para. IV. b) and with the instructions given yesterday with regard to the U-boat positions (see War Diary, 22 November), considerably limits the freedom of action of Captain U-boats, Norway.

It is my opinion that in the present case the decision of where to concentrate our forces and draw up the patrol line, should have been made by Captain U-boats, Norway in consultation with Admiral Northern Waters.

(Signed) Peters.

24 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

- U 387 AC 1968 depth of sweep 30 miles.
- U 354 AC 1998 center.
- U 277 AC 4338 upper center.
- U 307 AC 4368) depth of sweep 30 miles.
- U 636 AC 4635)

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In port:

U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 360 proceeding from Narvik to AC 1665.
U 713 proceeding from Narvik to AC 1932.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Sea reconnaissance against suspected convoy from Britain to Russia in area west of Bear Island by 3 Ju 88, broken off prematurely because of deterioration of landing conditions. No observations. Flying route: Kirkenes - Vardo - AC 8219 - 6144 - 2978 - 8124 - Vardo - Kirkenes, not exhaustive.
1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - AB 6140 - Banak, nothing to report. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - AE 8310 - Vaernes, no enemy sighting report.
1 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance between Norwegian coast and sea area around Faeroes.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

4 BV 138 on sea reconnaissance against suspected PQ convoy carried out only as far as AB 5287 on account of weather and darkness, without sighting enemy. No interceptions by radar.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Thorshavn harbor occupied by 8 ships, type and size not made out.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardship No. 20.
Britain: no units or naval vessels intercepted.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in patrol line east of Bear Island,

2 boats en route.

1157

Radio message 1157/790 sent:

"1. U 360 (Becker) to proceed from Andfjord via AC 1670 to attack area AC 1665, depth of sweep 30 miles. Report ice hindrance.

2. Following boats to form group "Eisenbart" from AC 1665 to 4635:

"Becker", "Gosejakob", "Büchler", "Herbschleb", "Lübsen", "Herrle" and "Hildebrandt", with point of concentration AC 4332."

1934

Teleprinter message received from Group North/Fleet:

"1. Today's air reconnaissance against suspected PQ convoy again without sighting enemy.

2. Transfer U-boats westwards to Bear Island position.

3. No air reconnaissance over convoy route on 25 November.

Instead reconnaissance of Murmansk and Archangel is intended to search for indications of convoy."

Radio message 2037/794 was therefore sent to Group "Eisenbart":

"At 0000 on 25 November proceed at 10 knots to attack areas, depth of sweep 30 miles:-
"Gosejakob" AB 3523, "Becker" 3568, "Büchler" 3914, "Herbschleb" 3973, "Lübsen" 6352, "Herrle" 6397, "Hildebrandt" 6666."

U 360 (Becker) which is still en route, is to continue on his way until the departure of the patrol line, and to attach himself to the reconnaissance line so formed.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

2324

Radio message 2229/795 received from U 713 (Gosejakob):

"Request exchange with "Herbschleb" in order to execute operation 1."

He received in answer radio message 2333/797:

"Execution of special operation ordered."

This concerns the taking out of the meteorological shore transmitter "Christian" to Bear Island.

V. Reports of successes: None.

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VI. Survey of the situation:

Re II):-

The air reconnaissance is very incomplete. Reconnaissance of the occupation of Russian harbors can only determine whether a convoy has already arrived or is still expected.

Re IV. b):-

The new line of attack areas stretches from Spitsbergen to almost 100 miles south of Bear Island, each with depth of sweep 30 miles.

Two of the 7 boats (U 387, U 360) must, however, be withdrawn again shortly, while a third, U 713, must carry out its special assignment. In the long run, therefore the patrol of Bear Island passage can be maintained by only four boats.

(Signed) Peters.

25 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 713 proceeding from AC 1665 to AB 3523.
U 387 proceeding from AC 1932 to AB 3914.
U 354 proceeding from AC 1968 to AB 3973.
U 277 proceeding from AC 4332 to AB 6352.
U 307 proceeding from AC 4365 to AB 6397.
U 636 proceeding from AC 4635 to AB 6666.
U 360 proceeding to AB 3568.

In port:

U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak, nothing to report. Not exhaustive.
Shipping and airfield reconnaissance of Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet by 4 FW 190.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance
Vaernes - AA 9619 - Vaernes without sighting
enemy.

3 Ju 88 and 1 FW 200 on sea reconnaissance
of central North Sea, Scottish inshore waters
between 55° N and northern tip of the Shetlands
and between Faeroes and central Norwegian
coast without sighting enemy.

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of sea area around
Faeroes without sighting enemy.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Loginova Shoal (AT 8427) sighted the conning
tower and guns of a U-boat at 1130 on 24
November.

From 0500 to 1400 on 25 November flight by
1 Douglas and 2 "DB 3" from Amdurma to
Belushya intended.

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to
submarines in the operational area. Transmission
from "L 15" intercepted.

Britain: no units or naval vessels appeared.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

7 boats in reconnaissance line east of Bear Island.
Proceeding to attack areas from South Cape of
Spitsbergen to Bear Island.

0350 Radio message 0241/701 received from U 387
(Buchler):

"No plug connection from today until Monday."

CONFIDENTIAL

1047 Radio message 1047/706 sent to "Büchler":

- "1. Assume that outer setting is lost.
2. Rendezvous with "Becker" in AB 3932, both report meeting by time short signal. After taking over settings short signal "Yes".
3. Until then, important radio messages also by emergency hand-operated procedure."

U 387 (Büchler) in short signal 1236/707
and U 360 (Becker) in short signal 1356/709
both reported their rendezvous for 1630.
In short signal 1520/710 U 387 reported the
successful transference.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re III d):

The signal stations on the Pechora Sea are still suspecting the presence of German U-boats there, perhaps as a result of the last mine-laying operation.

(Signed) Peters.

26 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 713 AB 3523)
U 360 AB 3568)
U 387 AB 3914)
U 354 AB 3973) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 277 AB 6352)
U 307 AB 6397)
U 636 AB 6666)

In port:

U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

1 Ju 88 on shipping reconnaissance, route Kirkenes - Vardø - AW 2260 - 2080 - 2330 - 2130 - Vardø - Kirkenes, exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - AF 1210 - Vaernes, broken off because radio broke down. No enemy sighted.

Reconnaissance of sea area between 55° and 63° N along the west coasts of Jutland and Norway as far as Namsos, westwards to east coasts of England and Scotland and the Faeroes by 1 FW 200, 2 BV 138 and 5 Ju 88.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Reconnaissance of inshore waters against enemy M.T.B. in sea area between Andenes and Westfjord (inclusive) as far as 100 km. off the coast carried out by 1 He 115 without sighting enemy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

In AC 8910 1 freighter (1,000 G.R.T.), 2 patrol boats each in AW 2130, AW 2280, AW 2530, AW 2250, hove to. In AW 3170 one patrol boat, hove to. In AC 8980 1 tanker (2,000 - 2,500 G.R.T.), 1 merchant vessel of over 3,000 G.R.T., 2 merchant vessels of about 3,000 G.R.T., 1 torpedo boat, 1 guard vessel, course 100°. Southwest of the Faeroes (AM 1250) 3 destroyers, course 120°.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

"L 15" named.

Murmansk area: destroyers "E" and "J" both named with submarine "L 15" in a radio message from Polyarno; minesweeper No. 61.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: destroyer "C", minesweeper No. 114.

Britain: no units or naval vessels appeared. At 1717 on 26 November radio traffic between Russian M.T.B. and Pummanki, and at 1755 with Lazar Point (AC 8816).

CONFIDENTIAL

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

7 boats in Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

Meteorological party "Christian" embarked on U 713 (Gosejakob).

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

27 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 713 AB 3523)
U 360 AB 3568)
U 387 AB 3914)
U 354 AB 3973) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 277 AB 6352)
U 307 AB 6397)
U 636 AB 6666)

In port:

U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - AB 3880 - Banak. Nothing to report. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes without sighting enemy. Sea reconnaissance of area between 55° and 63° N and coasts of Norway and Jutland and 1° W, as well as east of the Faeroes and west of the Scottish Islands, by 1 FW 200, 2 BV 138, and 6 Ju 88.
2 FW 200 on reconnaissance of sea area off west coast of Norway as far as 0° between 55° N and 63° N. Nothing to report.
1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of sea area around the Faeroes without sighting enemy.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Radio traffic intercepted at sea at 1717 on 26 November between Russian M.T.B. "12" and Pummanki (AC 8733), and at 1755 Lazar Point (AC 8816).

From 0600 to 1400 on 27 November 2 Douglas and 6 "DB 3" from Belushya to Naryan Mar (AU 1540). Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweeper No. 59. Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardship No. 75, minesweepers Nos. 33, 53, 61, 114, guardboat No. 625, ice-breaker "Lenin" and one other. Britain: 4 radio messages on Murmansk broadcast. Radio traffic intercepted at sea at 2350 on 27 November between Russian M.T.B.s 12, 13 and 14 and Pummanki.

- (c) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
7 boats in Bear Island passage.

Radio message 1157/724 sent to group "Eisenbart":

"Departure at 2000 on 27 November:

- 1. "Becker" via AB 3840 to Andfjord - Narvik.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. "Gosejakob" via AB 3650 for special operation on north coast of Bear Island and Tunheim.
3. "Büchler", "Herbschleb" and "Lübsen" on mobile patrol: at 0300 on 28 November proceed from attack areas AB 3568, 3914, and 3973 to AB 3523, 3568 and 3914. Arrive there at 0900. Return to first position at 1200, and so on, every 9 hours.
4. "Herrle" to AB 6352, "Hildebrandt" to AB 6397. All depth of sweep 30 miles, irregular courses."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 713 (Gosejakob) taking out meteorological shore transmitter "Christian" to north coast of Bear Island.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

The following report of the U-boat situation was sent to Group North/Fleet in Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 3873 A Ops.; position as of 27 November 1943:-

1. Following boats at present in Bear Island passage: U 713, 360, 387, 354, 277, 307 and 636.
2. Withdrawal from attack areas on evening of 27 November intended as follows:
U 360 (Becker) to Narvik to continue dockyard overhaul,
U 713 (Gosejakob) to carry out operation on Bear Island, then to act as relief in Bear Island passage.
3. Withdrawal of further boats after completion of operational period at sea (40 days) will become necessary as follows:
U 387 on 2 December, U 354 on 4 December,
U 307 on 6 December, U 277 on 25 December,
U 713 on 1 January, U 636 on 2 January, 1944.
4. The following will be at operational readiness:
U 601 on 11 December, U 711 on 12 December,
U 360 probably on 22 December, U 703 on 23 December, U 737 on 2 January, 1944,
U 355 longer dockyard period till about 20 January owing to replacement of engines.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Patrol of Bear Island passage can be carried out by five boats up to 2 December, by three only from 6 to 15 December, and by four boats from then onwards. Use of U 636 for minelaying operation not possible until 17 December.
6. The small number of boats available is due to long dockyard periods as a result of the long summer operations, to changes in armament, to the breakdown of U 255 (Harms) and the long dockyard period of U 355 (La Baume), and in some measure also to the turning out of seven boats for the present operation. On 15 December there will probably be 5 boats available, on 1 January 5 boats, on 15 January 5 boats. Admiral Northern Waters concurs with these plans.

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re III. d):-

The ice-breaker activity in the Archangel area is seasonal, but could also be connected with preparations for a British convoy.

Re IV. b):-

Since, to judge by the reported approach points for stragglers, it may be assumed that the route of the planned convoy will lie relatively far south, the two most southerly boats should keep to fixed attack areas, while a mobile patrol of the area north of Bear Island can be kept up by the three northerly boats. As the distance to be covered by the boats in this patrol amounts to only 30 miles, a quick 9 hourly rhythm can be maintained. Bear Island passage will thus be patrolled from South Cape to about 60 miles south of Bear Island. As air reconnaissance of the sea area has so far produced no result - though there is no guarantee that a convoy has not already passed by - the withdrawal of U 360 (Becker) to proceed with his overhaul, and of U 713 (Gosejakob) to carry out his special assignment seems at present justifiable. It is regrettable that so far the German Air Force has been unable to investigate either Murmansk or Archangel. I consider it essential that this uncertainty about the situation be removed as soon as possible and am informing Admiral Northern Waters of my opinion.

(Signed) Peters.

28 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 from AB 3568 to AB 3523 on mobile patrol.
U 354 from AB 3914 to AB 3568 on mobile patrol.
U 277 from AB 3973 to AB 3914 on mobile patrol.
U 307 AB 6352) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 636 AB 6397)
U 713 on special operation north coast of
Bear Island.

In port:

U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 360 proceeding from AB 3568 to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance
Banak - Bear Island - Hope Island (special
operation) - Banak, nothing to report.
Not exhaustive.
Special operation not carried out because of
technical defects.
Meteorological reconnaissance Murmansk area
by 4 BF 109, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to
AA 9620, no enemy sighting report.
1 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of
sea area between 61° 30' N and 63° N and
westwards as far as the Faeroes. No enemy
sighting report.
1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of sea area around
the Faeroe Islands. No enemy sighting report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Pummanki/Lazar Point area: M.T.B.s Nos. 12, 13, 14 (at 2350).
Murmansk area: destroyers "B", "C".
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: minesweepers Nos. 32, 38, 53, 57, 59, 61, 62, 64, 170.
Guardships Nos. 71, 72, 75, 87, guardboat No. 625, ice-breaker "Krassin" and one more vessel.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Group North/Flect informs us:

"Allies intend invasion operation in North Norway shortly before Christmas. Source: tapped telephone conversation."

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in Bear Island passage.

0355

U 307 (Herrle) reported in radio message 0246/731 damage to the engines and requested permission to return to Hammerfest.

In radio message 1050/733 he was ordered to carry out the repairs at sea and report his maximum endurance. He reported this as 10 days in short signal 1327/736.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 713 (Gosejakob) off north coast of Bear Island taking out meteorological shore transmitter "Christian".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

In a teleprinter message Group North/Flect concurred with our plans as reported the previous day.

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re IV. b):-

U 307 (Herrle) will in any case have to be relieved on 6 December. An earlier withdrawal of the boat would mean that the Bear Island passage would be occupied by only 3 boats for about 3 days more than was originally scheduled. This would have an especially unfavorable effect on the necessary patrolling.

(Signed) Peters.

29 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 from AB 3568 to AB 3523 on mobile patrol.
U 354 from AB 3914 to AB 3568 on mobile patrol.
U 277 from AB 3973 to AB 3914 on mobile patrol.
U 307 AB 6352) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 636 AB 6397)
U 713 special operation north coast of Bear
Island.

In port:

U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 360 proceeding from AB 3568 to Narvik.
Put in to Harstad at 1130, put out from
Harstad again for operational area at 1250.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance,
route Banak - Bear Island - Hope Island -
Banak. Nothing to report. Exhaustive
except for inshore waters.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance,
route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Vaernes without
sighting enemy.
Reconnaissance off east coast of Scotland
between 55° N and northern tip of the
Shetlands, by 2 Ju 88.
1 Ju 88 of meteorological reconnaissance
Staffel 1 on reconnaissance of sea area
around the Faeroes.
2 FW 200 took off at 2309 for reconnaissance
of sea area between 55° N and 63° N, and
between the Norwegian coast and 0°. Operation
still in progress.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: considerable radio traffic (12 messages) to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: destroyers "B", "C", guardboat "Mo 114".

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: minesweepers Nos. 32, 52, guardboats Nos. 502, 625, ice-breaker "Lenin" and possibly one more.

Britain: Murmansk broadcast; no Archangel broadcast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in Bear Island passage.

1129

Short signal 1116/742 received from U 636 (Hildebrandt):

"Wheeled aircraft in AB 6397 course northwest".

Judging by the type and content of the radio message it must be assumed that this was an aircraft with its undercarriage down and visible, and therefore possibly a carrier-borne aircraft.

This fact together with the recent reports about convoy traffic makes the sailing of a convoy seem possible.

I therefore consider it necessary

1. that U 360 (Becker), who has just put in to Harstad, should return to the operational area at maximum speed;
2. that U 713 (Gosejakob) should break off his special operation for the present and take up a position off Bear Island;
3. that the passage north of Bear Island should again be occupied by 4 boats, by the addition of U 713.

As the report from U 636 (Hildebrandt) is not entirely clear, the boat was requested to give more accurate details about the sighting of the aircraft.

At the same time orders were dispatched for U 360, U 713 and group "Eisenbart".

CONFIDENTIAL

1213 1213/746 to U 636 (Hildebrandt):

"Report by multi-figure cipher short signal:

- 1 = undercarriage down,
- 2 = undercarriage up,
- 3 = monoplane,
- 4 = biplane,
- 5 = single engined,
- 6 = twin engined."

1219 1219/744 to U 360 (Becker):

"Make for AB 6666 at maximum continuous speed. Depth of sweep 30 miles."

1217 1217/745 to U 713 (Gosejakob):

"Possible that convoy in area. Move away from coast for the present."

1355 1355/747:

- "1. Group "Eisenbart" to occupy northern attack areas and to remain there.
2. "Gosejakob" AB 3973, depth of sweep 30 miles.
3. "Becker" is putting out from Andfjord for AB 6666."

At the same time the German Air Force was asked whether the reported aircraft could have been one of our own.

1720 U 636 (Hildebrandt) reported that it was a twin-engined monoplane without visible undercarriage that he saw at 1015. The German Air Force informs us that it was the Ju 88 of the meteorological reconnaissance Staffel, which also sighted the U-boat.

1745 Radio message 1745/749 was therefore sent to "Becker":

"Turn about. Put in to Andfjord for Narvik."

1829 Further, radio message 1829/751:

- "1. "Büchler", "Herbschleb", "Lübsen" to continue mobile patrol, southwards at 0000.
2. "Gosejakob" to continue special operation.
3. Reported aircraft one of our own meteorological Ju 88."

2125 Finally, in radio message 2125/756 attention is drawn to the ambiguity of the short signal group "Wheeled aircraft":

- "1. In short signals use group for "wheeled

aircraft" only when the undercarriage is down and visible. For preference use groups according to correction slip 92. Reports of carrier-borne aircraft generally necessitate major counter measures. If in doubt add number of engines by means of 3 figure cipher group, e.g. 222 = twin-engined. Details of type.

2. Bear in mind daily meteorological flights by Ju 88 to Spitsbergen."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

Apparently U 713 has not yet managed to set up the meteorological transmitter "Christian" because of the interruptions of the last few days.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III. d):-

The lively transmissions to Russian submarines may perhaps be connected with convoy preparations.

2. Re IV. b):-

Through the repeated concentration of 7 boats on the suspected convoy the overhaul of boats and consequently the relief of those at sea will be delayed, and so will the execution of meteorological tasks.

(Signed) Peters.

30 November, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 from AB 3568 to AB 3523 on mobile patrol.

U 354 from AB 3914 to AB 3568 on mobile patrol.

U 277 from AB 3973 to AB 3914 on mobile patrol.

U 307 AB 6352) depth of sweep 30 miles

U 636 AB 6397)

U 713 special operation on north coast of Bear Island.

In port:

U 711, 737 Trondheim,

U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 360 put in to Harstad at 0315,
put out from Harstad at 0630,
put in to Narvik at 1200.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance
route Banak - AC 4140 - Banak, nothing
to report. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance
in area between west coast of Norway and
the Faeroes.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance,
route Vaernes - AB 7810 - Vaernes without
sighting enemy.

2 FW 200 on reconnaissance with radar of
sea area between west coast of Norway and
0° and between 55° N and 63° N. Operation
in progress.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very little radio
traffic to submarines in the operational
area. "L 20" mentioned by name.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardships
Nos. 19, 72, 85, minesweepers Nos. 32, 37,
39, 45, 57, 104, 106, guardboats Nos. 502,
625, survey vessel "Ost".

Britain: no units or naval vessels
appeared.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in Bear Island passage.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 713 (Gosejakob) on meteorological operation
"Christian" on north coast of Bear Island.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 360 (Becker), see Appendix
II/3.

VII. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II

Most Secret

Short reports

1. Short report from U 636 (Hildebrandt), fourth operation.
2. Short report from U 360 (Becker), second operation.
3. Short report from U 360 (Becker) short operation.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/1

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Operations.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (postagram).

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 636 (Hildebrandt), fourth operation (Eistorte 1), minelaying off Yugorski Straits.

Put out from Hammerfest on 6 November, 1943, put in to Hammerfest on 17 November. Proceeded via SR 1 to AT 8844.

14 November From 1635 until 2224 laid T.M.B. mines unobserved in AT 8844/41.

15 November Distant depth charges heard from 0940 until 0955 in direction of area mined, probably deterrent depth charges in advance of eastbound convoy.

17 November At 0900 sighted aircraft, found to be a "Do 217" by exchange of recognition signals, before approaching Hammerfest.

Drifting mines in AC 4992 on 7 November and near SR 1 on 17 November.

Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 3783 A.Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/2

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Operations.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 360 (Becker), second operation

6 October Put out from Hammerfest, 18 November put in to Harstad, 19 November in to Narvik. Relieved U 307 (Herrle) in AB 3568, depth of sweep 30 miles.

8 - 19 October Mobile patrol of Bear Island passage.

19 October New attack area AG 7820 reached at 2225. No contact with enemy destroyer reported off Ice Fjord.

21 October Proceeded to old attack area AB 3568, there until 27 October. No enemy sighted.

28 October New attack area AG 7820 against reported cruiser.

29 October Attack area transferred to AB 3914. No enemy sighted.

17 November Return passage.

One drifting mine each on 17 and 19 November in AB 3831 sunk by gunfire. Similar to Mark XX, overgrown.

Captain U-boats Norway, Most Secret 3808 A. Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/3

COPY

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Operations.
3. Emergency. Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Yellow - Most Secret

Clear as multiple address message

Short report from U 360 (Becker), short operation

- | | |
|---------------------|---|
| 23 November | Put out from Narvik, put in to Narvik on 30 November. |
| 23 November | Proceeded to attack area AC 51 and AC 1665 against suspected PQ convoy. |
| 24 - 27
November | New attack area AB 3568, depth of sweep 30 miles. No enemy sighted. |
| 27 November | Return passage to Harstad. |
| 29 November | Proceeded to new attack area AB 6666, depth of sweep 30 miles, because of report of wheeled aircraft. |
| 30 November | Return passage to Narvik.
No incidents to report. |

Captain U-boats Norway, Most Secret 3918 A.Ops.

APPENDIX III

Most Secret

Operational Orders

1. Operational order for U 713 (Gosejakob).
 2. Operational order for U 360 (Becker).
-

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX III/1

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 22 November, 1943

Operational order
for U 713 (Gosejakob)

1. Put out from Narvik at 2200 on 22 November with meteorological shore transmitter "Christian", Counsellor Støve, Inspector Werner, Commissioned Ordnance Officer Hube, one engineer and war correspondent Jank. Outward passage through Tjeldsund - Andfjord, from Lodingen to Harstad with district pilot.
2. Proceed via AC 4430 to take out the meteorological set to the north coast of Bear Island at 74° 31' N, 19° E. Detailed instructions from the accompanying meteorologist. Test correct working of set, then report by short signal "Task 1 executed".
3. Investigate radio station at Tunheim. You are at liberty to proceed overland from the north coast, or to land near Tunheim as the circumstances permit. (See appendix for report from U 212 on Tunheim, with sketch.) Blow up the parts of the station still usable, specially the masts. Report execution by short signal "Task 2 executed".
4. Then proceed homeward to Hammerfest to land meteorological party and replenish supplies.
5. Put to sea as soon as possible after this via SR 1, report passage by time short signal.
6. Operational Order for Northern Waters U-boats No. 1, U-boats Northern Waters wave.
7. Proceed via AC 17 to relief of U 387 (Büchler) in AB 3523 to AB 3914, depth of sweep 30 miles, with group "Eisenbart". Report ice hindrance.
8. Own forces: Group "Eisenbart": U 387 (Büchler), U 354 (Herbschleb), AB 3568 to 3973, U 277 (Lübsen) AB 3914 to 6352, U 307 (Herrle) AB 3973 to 6397, all depth of sweep 30 miles.
The boats move up and down together, proceeding on irregular courses; commencement and duration of each passage will follow by radio message.
U 636 (Hildebrandt) on special operation in southeastern sector of the Barents Sea.
Daily meteorological flights by Ju 88 to Spitsbergen. You will be informed of further air reconnaissance.

CONFIDENTIAL

9. Enemy situation: The resumption of Murmansk convoys is suspected. AC 4332 and 6451 were given as approach points for stragglers.
10. See radio message 1137/788 of 20 November for last presumed ice limit.

Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX III/2

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway On board, 23 November, 1943

Operational Order for U 360 (Becker)

1. Put out from Narvik at 1600 on 23 November via Tjeldsund - Andfjord, from Lodingen to Harstad with district pilot.
2. Proceed at maximum speed to AC 51 at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.
3. Operational Order for Northern Waters boats No. 1, U-boats Northern Waters wave.
4. Own forces: Group "Eisenbart": U 387 (Büchler) U 354 (Herbschleb), U 277 (Lübsen) and U 307 (Herrle) in patrol line from AC 1968 lower center to 4365 center.
U 713 (Gosejakob) proceeding to AC 19.
U 636 (Hildebrandt) proceeding to AC 43.
Daily Ju 88 meteorological flights to Spitsbergen. You will be informed of our own air reconnaissance in the operational area whenever possible.
5. Enemy situation: The resumption of Murmansk convoys is suspected. AC 4332 and 6451 were given as approach points for stragglers.
6. See radio message 1137/788 of 20 November for last presumed ice limit.

Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

1 - 15 DECEMBER, 1943

PG/31848

CONFIDENTIAL

1 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 on mobile patrol from AB 3568
to AB 3523.

U 354 on mobile patrol from AB 3914
to AB 3568.

U 277 on mobile patrol from AB 3973
to AB 3914.

U 307 AB 6352)
U 636 AB 6397) depth of sweep 30 miles.

U 713 special operation off north coast
of Bear Island.

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 255, 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 387, 354, 277, 307, 713, and 636 proceeding
via AB 6180 to form patrol line from AB
5573 to AB 8319.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, Banak -
Bear Island - Hope Island - Banak, nothing to
report. Not exhaustive.

4 FW 190 on armed shipping reconnaissance
Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet. No shipping
traffic observed, partly because of weather
conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes -
Jan Mayen - Vaernes, without sighting the enemy.
Sea reconnaissance of the area between 55° and
63° N, and between the coasts of Norway and
Jutland, and west coast of Orkneys and east
coast of England as well as east of Faeroes and
west of the Scottish Islands carried out by 2
FW 200, 2 BV 138 and 5 Ju 88.

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of sea area around
Faeroes without sighting the enemy.

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Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

0755 Radio message 0500/766 received from U 636 (Hildebrandt):

"In 3691 gunfire after searchlight, no hydrophone bearings."

When ordered, he reported in radio message 1030/770:

"3 miles, 4 salvos, probably independently routed vessel."

1030 Radio message 0902/767 received from U 307 (Herrle):

"AB 6357 lost contact. Pursued with depth-charges. Last hydrophone bearing 270°. West to northwest (course)."

1130 Amplifying this, radio message 1029/769 received from "Herrle":

"In AB 6348 apparently westbound convoy. Depth-charges dropped for 4 hours by 3 escort vessels. Pressing on on westerly course."

(b) By air reconnaissance:

A submarine, nationality unknown, in AF 7510, zig-zagging, course north.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

From 0400 to 1300 on 1 December 1 SI 47 flew from Amderma to Archangel. From 0700 to 1200 1 DB 3 from Archangel to Naryan Mar. Norwegian polar coast: a few radio messages to submarines in the operational area. Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: minesweepers Nos. 32, 37, 45; guardships Nos. 16, 19, 72; guardboats Nos. 502, 625. Britain: no units or warships appeared. On 1 December steamer "Herzten" (1,336 G.R.T), minesweepers Nos. 32 and 37, guardships Nos. 19 and 72 were expected in Sosnovets (AW 2895) from Archangel. Minesweepers Nos. 39 and 45 and guardship No. 19 were to escort steamer "Herzten" from there.

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(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Group North/Fleet wires:

"Very reliable agent reported on 25 November: Reports of imminent large-scale invasion are a deliberate feint. Invasion not to be expected before spring 1944. Smaller operations on the lines of the Dieppe raid possible."

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

Though "Herrle"'s message did not make it clear by whom he was being attacked, "Herrle"'s report indicates the possibility of a westbound convoy. Also, it is apparent that there is a westward movement of traffic. Therefore, with the telephonic consent of Group North/Fleet, the boats are to be withdrawn from the Bear Island passage and concentrated southwest of it.

1143 Radio message 1143/772 sent:

"Büchler", "Herbschleb", "Lübsen", "Hildebrandt" to proceed at maximum speed to AB 6180."

1147 Radio message 1147/773 sent to "Gosejakob":

"Break off special operation. Proceed to AB 6180 at maximum speed." And radio message 1519/775:

"Report time of leaving Bear Island by short signal."

He then reported his position in short signal 1608/776 as AB 6348, which is the position of the enemy vessels reported by "Herrle" at 1030.

Since it appeared that none of the boats still has contact, and air reconnaissance cannot be carried out before morning, a patrol line was ordered for the six boats. Its position is 20 miles ahead of the enemy formation's presumed position tomorrow morning, assuming his speed to be 9 knots and that he will soon alter course to southwest.

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1810 Radio message 1810/777 sent to Group "Eisenbart":

"At 0700 on 2 December form patrol line from AB 5573 to AB 8319, "Büchler", "Herbschleb", "Lübsen", "Herrle", "Gosejakob" and "Hildebrandt", in that order. Be prepared for our air reconnaissance."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

No further measures.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

The meteorological party "Christian" is still on board U 713 (Gosejakob). The meteorological set could apparently not yet be set up.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re III (a) and IV (a):

The interception of the enemy patrol vessels off Bear Island is not enough to give a clear picture of the actual situation. Considering the course and progress of the patrol vessels, a westbound convoy seems possible. It is unfortunate that the German Air Force has not been able to carry out a reconnaissance of Murmansk, Molotovsk and Archangel before now, so that we might at least have obtained some information of possible shipping concentrations in these ports, from which a conclusion regarding the sailing of a westbound convoy might have been drawn.

At any rate the appearance of enemy forces in the Bear Island passage implies that the enemy intends to take action of one kind or another.

As it may be assumed that the enemy is well informed of the weakness of our air forces in northern Norway, I do not believe that he would lengthen his course unnecessarily by hauling off to the northwest, especially as the darkness and bad visibility prevailing at this time of year would deprive him of a great deal of reconnaissance. Consequently, it is to be expected that after the enemy forces have passed the Bear Island passage, their mean course will be approximately 240°.

With the chosen patrol line and assuming an enemy speed of only 7 knots, our boats would meet the enemy at about 1500. If an "enemy sighted" report has not been received by then, it is intended to move the U-boats further west.

(Signed) Peters.

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2 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387)
U 354)
U 277) patrol line from AB 5573 to
U 307) AB 8319.
U 713)
U 636)

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1200 Group "Eisenbart" moved patrol line 20
miles in the direction 330° , speed 7 knots.
1600 "Eisenbart" proceeded on course 80° , speed
7 knots.
2200 "Eisenbart" remains in patrol line AB
5538 - 5995.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak -
Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak. Almost
exhaustive.

4 FW 190 on armed shipping and meteorological
reconnaissance Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet.
No shipping movements observed.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes -
AB 7420 - Vaernes, without sighting the enemy.
Sea reconnaissance: a) Area between Namsos and
northern tip of Faeroes and southward as far as
 62° N, by 1 FW 200 with radar, enemy not sighted.
b) Off east coast of Scotland between 55° N and
the northern tip of the Shetlands, by 2 Ju 88.
Night reconnaissance with radar in sea area
between the west coast of Norway and 0° and
between 55° and 63° N, by 2 FW 200. The

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operation continues. 1 Ju 88 in Faeroes sea area; enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

6 BV 138 on convoy reconnaissance without sighting the enemy. Exhaustive reconnaissance apart from plane No. 2, whose instruments failed in grid square AC 6814 on the return flight. Reconnaissance area Tromsø - AB 3849 - 5254 - 4891 - Tromsø.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

1206 Radio message 0430/782 received from U 636 (Hildebrandt):

"AB 5965, infra-red location, bearing 0, 3 miles, hydrophone bearing around 300° until 1000."

As no mention is made in the radio message about the type of vessel and hydrophone bearing, "Hildebrandt" was asked in radio message 1427/785 for a more detailed report.

1646 Radio message 1530/789 received:

"Infra-red beam from dark horizon, mast and bow wave identified, moderately loud noise of pistons, stopped in turn, independently routed vessel."

(b) By air reconnaissance:

About 30 km. south-west of Bear Island an apparently artificial smoke screen, 2 km. long and 5 km. wide and 20-1800 meters high.

3 ships in AB 6570, class and type not identified because flying at too great a height. Probably warships, course 280°, high speed.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: some radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: destroyer "E", motor vessels "Ps 48" and "Ps 75".

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardship No. 16, guardboat No. 625, 1 ice-breaker (0453), motor vessel "Ps 49".

Belushya area: 1 probable crash boat.

Britain: on the evening of 1 December traffic between one unit or warship and Murmansk.

Northern Waters: unusual increase in radio traffic between home and Archangel, probably

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in connection with Russian convoy (PQ?).
North Sea: intense air activity in the morning with reconnaissance in the direction of the Norwegian coast.

2 December: during the day 6 radio messages from British units or warships ("A" units) to Murmansk. Addressees named were Special Service Communications Officer Murmansk and seven 3-figure call-signs of an unknown distributor. Murmansk radio received seven radio messages, Archangel radio one. At 0915 a British unit "AHG" was attacked by planes in "AQ 3Z" (AQ 37?). According to a radio message, a convoy bound for Russia is at sea and received a radio message from the British Admiralty for the first time at 1517 on 27 November.

14th German Air Force Signals Regiment reports:

"To judge by intercepted telephone traffic and available bearings, it seems likely that there is an enemy aircraft carrier in the sea area northeast of Jan Mayen."

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

1127 As the patrol line lies rather far south of the expected convoy route through the Bear Island passage, as assumed both intuitively and on the basis of past experience, radio message 1127/781 was sent:

"At 1200 on 2 December group "Eisenbart" to move patrol line 20 miles in the direction of 330°, 7 knots."

After the receipt of "Hildebrandt"'s message and the air report of the three ships (see III (b)), it was decided to move the patrol line to meet the enemy vessels so as to intercept them earlier and reduce the possibility of a lateral break-away.

1459 Radio message 1459/786 sent:

"Eisenbart" to proceed at 1600, course 80°, 7 knots."

2009 The boats were informed in radio message 2009/792 of the probable presence (Naval

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High Command radio reconnaissance) of an enemy aircraft carrier in the sea area northeast of Jan Mayen.

2028 Radio message 2028/793 sent to group "Eisenbart":

"If contact is not made, the patrol line is not to proceed further after 2200. At 0400 on 3 December proceed to patrol line from AB 5531 to 5967, same order of boats."

In the absence of further information, the patrol line is to stop at the time when it is estimated that it might meet the vessels reported by air reconnaissance, and with the beginning of full daylight it should once again be evenly distributed to north and south of the assumed mean course.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

No further measures taken.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

Meteorological party "Christian" on board U 713 (Gosejakob).

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

Teleprinter message from Admiral Northern Waters to Luftflotte 5:

"Today's reports of enemy sighted received from Meteorological Reconnaissance Staffel 6 and U 636, confirm the presence of enemy forces in the sea area between Bear Island and Jan Mayen, without, however, giving a very clear picture. It is possible that convoys are running.

The Command of Luftflotte 5 is therefore requested to repeat the air reconnaissance on 3 December. Reconnaissance of the following sea area is desired: north of 79° N between the Norwegian coast and Jan Mayen; eastward as far as 20° E; northwest as far as a line from Jan Mayen to South Cape, Spitsbergen. Position of the U-boat patrol line....." This air reconnaissance corresponds to the needs of Captain U-boats, Norway and was proposed to Admiral Northern Waters in this form.

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III (b):

The vessels sighted by the German Air Force might be the same as the three escort vessels sighted by

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"Herrle", considering that the ships were not seen clearly. The radar set of the BV 138 which was on reconnaissance in the same sea area broke down in the area in question, which was probably the reason why the vessels were not picked up by it.

2. Re III (d):

The radio intercept service report of a convoy bound for Russia is very vague. No conclusions regarding the area in which the convoy is at present can be drawn from it. It is not impossible that a convoy has by-passed our U-boat positions while a group of escort vessels was detached to operate against them. Similar tactics have recently been observed in the Atlantic on several occasions. The comparatively brisk radio traffic may also be an indication of this. The aircraft carrier might conceivably be intended as a protection against our battle group.

3. Re IV (a) and III (a):

It must be assumed that U 636 (Hildebrandt) too was located by the enemy, although Northern Waters U-boats have not yet the instruments to confirm this. The opportunity might also have been favorable for the use of the acoustic torpedo ("Zaunkönig"). Unfortunately, Northern Waters U-boats still do not possess it.

It will be necessary to wait for tomorrow morning's air reconnaissance to confirm and locate the enemy forces unless the U-boats obtain contact during the night.

(Signed) Peters.

3 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387)
U 354)
U 277)
U 307) patrol line from AB 5531 to AB 5967.
U 713)
U 636)

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2000 Group "Eisenbart" set off on course 70°, 7 knots.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Sea reconnaissance in the area between the Norwegian coast and Bear Island by 1 Ju 88, broken off shortly after take-off because of engine trouble. No further operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - AB 7880 - Oberlandet. No reports of enemy sighted.

Sea reconnaissance between 55° and 72° 30' N, and westwards as far as a line from 14° W to the east coast of Iceland, the Faeroes, the west coast of the Orkneys, and the east coast of Scotland, by 4 FW 200, 5 Ju 88 and 2 BV 138.

1 Ju 88 reconnaissance of the sea area around the Faeroes without sighting the enemy.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

1 BV 138 (L) with radar carried out reconnaissance from 0914 to 1343 of grid squares AB 9920 - 6724 - 6193 - 9920 without sighting the enemy, not exhaustive, radar broke down.

1 BV 138 (I) with radar carried out reconnaissance from 0938 to 1310 of grid squares AB 9920 - 9170 - 9140 - 9920 without sighting the enemy, broken off because of icing-up.

1 He 115 (AF) carried out reconnaissance from 0906 to 1313 of grid squares AB 9970 - AF 2350 - AB 9970, without sighting the enemy.

1 He 115 (DH) carried out reconnaissance from 0907 to 1326 of grid squares AB 9970 - 8820 - 9970, without sighting the enemy.

1 He 115 (NH) carried out reconnaissance from 0930 to 1330 of grid squares AB 9970 - 8897 - 9970 without sighting the enemy.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1 twin-engined aircraft, course southeast, in AF 1130. Type not identified.

A destroyer, similar to the United States "Somers" class, course 190°, speed 20 knots, spotted by visual reconnaissance in AE 3660.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

German Air Force listening station suspects that there is an enemy carrier in the sea area northeast of Jan Mayen, from British telephone traffic and bearings.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoys: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

6 boats in patrol line between Bear Island and Jan Mayen.

1430

U 354 (Herbschleb) reported in short signal 1412/710:

"I have provisions till 5 December."

Since air reconnaissance has revealed only a withdrawing destroyer far to the south and the patrol line has not contacted the enemy, and, moreover, three of the six boats are at the limit of their endurance, radio message 1836/718 was sent to Group "Eisenbart":

"1. At 2000 on 3 December, proceed on course 70°, speed 7 knots.

2. "Herbschleb" and "Büchler" to return at 2300 on 4 December to Hammerfest for replenishing supplies. "Büchler" round Bear Island.

3. New attack areas: "Lübsen" AC 1755, "Herrle" 4123, "Gosejakob" 2167, "Hildebrandt" 4435, all depth of sweep 30 miles. Report ice hindrance by short signal."

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2318 The boats were informed of the latest presumed ice limit in radio message 2318/726.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

The meteorological set "Christian" on board U 713 (Goscjakob) is to be set up on Bear Island as soon as it will be possible to relieve him in the attack area.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Organizational:

An addendum to the report on the U-boat situation of 26 November was sent in a teleprinter message to Group North/Fleet and for information of Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops., in which it was requested that the forces at the disposal of Captain U-boats, Norway should be increased by 4 U-boats. (See Appendix III.)

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. Re II and III (b):

Apart from one twin-engined aircraft in AF 1132 and one destroyer in AE 3665, today's air reconnaissance has resulted in no further observations. Even though this reconnaissance was incomplete, it may be concluded, in conjunction with the negative result of the U-boat reconnaissance, that there is at present no convoy in the Bear Island/Jan Mayen area. The purpose of the enemy patrol vessels in the operational area still remains unexplained. They might be returning escort vessels, or an advance guard of an approaching convoy, reconnoitering our own U-boat positions.

There is no longer any justification for retaining the present position of the patrol line; the Bear Island passage is far better for a continuous patrol of the area, as traffic must, of necessity, converge here. I therefore consider that the patrol line should be ordered to proceed towards the Bear Island passage this evening. Admiral Northern Waters concurs.

It has become necessary to recall two boats to Hammerfest for short replenishing of supplies as their endurance at sea has become exhausted. This reduces the number of boats available for patrol to four.

2. Re IV (b):

Since the ice limit is advancing south, the position of the new attack areas east of Bear Island is obviously more favorable. The two returning

U-boats (U 354 and U 387) will have to be used once more, after replenishing, without dockyard overhauls, so as to relieve U 307 (Herrle) and U 713 (Gosejakob), until U 711 (Lange) will come from Trondheim on 8 December and until more boats can be obtained from the south as a result of the request of Captain U-boats. Only then can a continuous patrol of at least 4 to 5 boats be maintained.

3. Re IV (c):

Owing to the advance of the ice the erection of the meteorological set on Bear Island has become a matter of urgency.

(Signed) Peters.

4 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387)
U 354)
U 277) proceeding from patrol line AB
U 307) 5531 to AB 5967 to new attack
U 713) areas, course 70°, speed 7 knots.
U 636)

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2300 U 354 and U 387 commenced return passage to Hammerfest. U 387 round Bear Island.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - AC 1240 - Banak. Separate ice report. Area not exhaustively reconnoitered.

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Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Trondheim - AB 7731 - Trondheim, nothing to report. 30% of flying route covered.

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of the sea area around the Faeroes.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

2 merchant ships of up to 3,000 G.R.T. in AE 9948. Course 140°.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: some radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: aircraft intercepted at noon on 3 December.

Britain: no units or warships appeared.

Radio traffic with Britain: none from Murmansk, 3 radio messages from Archangel radio.

British unit attacked by aircraft at 0915 on 2 December in an unknown position.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

6 boats in reconnaissance line southwest of Bear Island passage.

0455 Radio message 0402/733 received from U 387 (Buehler):

"Bow-cap of tube 1 jammed. Suspect damage by ice or sea."

(d) Special operations by single boats:

Meteorological party "Christian" on board U 713 (Gosejakob).

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1550 Radio message 0927/741 received from
U 713 (Gosejakob):

"Request permission to finish off special operation and then dock." He also reported damage caused by running aground and by weather.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Plans:

1. Teleprinter message received from Group North/Fleet:

"No further U-boat minelaying operations planned because of the freezing of the Arctic coast. Mining material is being withdrawn for overhaul at home."

2. Radio message to Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops., received from Group North/Fleet:

"The request of Captain U-boats, Norway, of 3 December, for an allocation of more U-boats is strongly supported. As recent events in Northern Waters have shown, during the period of darkness and reduced air reconnaissance a clear picture of the situation can only be obtained if a sufficiently large number of U-boats can be operated. Moreover, prospects of success in the course of the winter seem to exist in this area."

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b) and (c):

U 387 (Büchler) is in any case at the limit of his endurance. However, after a short period in Hammerfest for replenishing supplies, he will have to come out once more to relieve U 307 (Herrle) or U 713 (Gosejakob), so that the latter may erect the meteorological set without reducing the patrol in the Bear Island passage below 4 boats.

(Signed) Peters.

5 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 277 AC 17)
U 307 AC 4123)
U 713 AC 4167) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 636 AC 4435)

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 354)
U 387) returning to Hammerfest around Bear Island.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 of Meteorological Reconnaissance Staffel 1
on sea and weather reconnaissance in the area around
the Faeroes.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: some radio traffic to
submarines in the operational area.
Archangel/Gorlo Straits area: guardships Nos.
65, 72, 75; minesweepers Nos. 32, 36, 39, 59,
117.

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Murmansk area: 3 aircraft in the morning.
Britain: on the evening of 4 December
3 or 4 units at sea in the Archangel area.
Radio traffic with Britain: 4 radio
messages each on Murmansk and Archangel
radio.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in attack areas in Bear Island
passage.

1219

In order to obtain definite information
about the possibility of a passage north
of Bear Island, radio message 1219/756 was
sent to U 277 (Lübsen):

"Brief sweep northwards to make ice report
by short signal from 20° - 24° E. Only
report last three numbers of grid square."

1542

Radio message 1043/762 received from "Lübsen":

"Ice limit runs through AC 1771, 4122, 4134.
Request new attack area." Weather, stocks.

Air reconnaissance yesterday reported that
the ice limit was about 90 miles further
north. Apparently at least one large
icefield has very rapidly drifted south.
This endangers the taking out of the
meteorological transmitter to the north
coast of Bear Island. The operation must
now be speedily concluded.

1609

Radio message 1609/763 sent:

"1. "Gosejakob" to continue special operation.

2. New attack areas: "Herrle" AC 4167,
"Lübsen" 4123."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 713 (Gosejakob) to erect meteorological
shore transmitter "Christian" on the north
coast of Bear Island and to reconnoiter
Tunheim.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1215 Radio message 1215/757 sent to returning U-boats U 354 (Herbschleb) and U 387 (Büchler):

"1. After replenishing at Hammerfest put out again: U 387 to relieve U 713, U 354 to relieve U 307. Report by short signal passing Point SR 1.

2. Relief by new boats intended shortly, then return to Andfjord-Narvik."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

1. Re IV (b):

The ice report from U 277 (Lübsen) was dispatched before the order to carry out an ice reconnaissance was given. The boat had not yet reached his attack area. According to the ice report from the German Air Force and the experience of previous years, this must be a tongue of ice or a large drifting field which would allow a passage to the north of it.

2. Re IV (d):

U 354 and U 387 can probably be relieved between 15 and 17 December by U 711 (Lange) and U 601 (Hansen) putting out from Trondheim and Bergen.

(Signed) Peters.

6 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 277 ice reconnaissance north of Bear Island.
U 713 special operation on Bear Island.
U 307 AC 4167)
U 636 AC 4435) depth of sweep 30 miles.

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

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(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 354) put in to Hammerfest from the
U 387) operational area at 1130.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88, Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak. Flying route not exhaustively covered. Enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to AB 7840 and one in sea area around the Faeroes.

Apart from one flying boat in AN 2621, no enemy sighted. No more operations because of bad weather conditions.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardship No. 75, minesweepers Nos. 32, 59, 117.

Britain: no units or warships intercepted.

Radio traffic with Britain: Murmansk broadcast 3 radio messages, Archangel broadcast 4.

At 0531 on 6 December British home station Whitehall sent extremely urgent radio message to Archangel on 71.91 meters:

"O.U." 05 1645 C (time group) with 382 five-letter groups. First group "Stoic". Distributor Special Operations Communications Officer Murmansk and Special Operations Communications Officer Archangel. Note: Whether connected with PQ convoy is not apparent. Slightly increasing Archangel radio traffic, normal Murmansk radio traffic.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats east of Bear Island, 1 boat on ice reconnaissance north of Bear Island.

1123

Because of the contradictory ice reports from the German Air Force and U 277 (Lübsen), and in order to make certain whether a passage north of the ice reported by U 277 would be possible, radio message 1123/772 was sent to "Lübsen":

"Report ice limit to the northwest by short signals, only last three numbers of grid square. German Air Force on 4 December reported ice from AB 3520 to about AC 1270. Passage south of there possible. Standard: independently routed steamer."

2224

"Lübsen" reported in radio message 2132/777:

"At 1900 hydrophone bearing (Diesel) in AC 1770. Northerly course, high speed. Broke off pursuit because of ice. Query: German boat." Weather.

2253

In radio message 2253/779 he was reminded that U 713 (Gosejakob) is operating north and east of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

2340

U 713 (Gosejakob) reported in short signal 2325/780 that he has installed the meteorological shore transmitter "Christian" on the north coast of Bear Island, position "AC".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re IV b):-

The Diesel noise heard by U 277 (Lübsen) might have been due to U 713 (Gosejakob) who had moved away from the island to send his message.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 307 AC 4167) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 636 AC 4435)
U 277 ice reconnaissance north of Bear
Island.

In port:

U 354, 387 Hammerfest,
U 360 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 713 proceeding from Bear Island to
Narvik.
U 354, 387 put out from Hammerfest at
1500.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance
Trondheim - AB 7753 - Trondheim. Route
not exhaustively covered. Enemy not
sighted.
1 FW 200, 2 BV 138 and 6 Ju 88 with radar
carried out sea reconnaissance between 55°
and 63° N, and between the west coasts of
Norway and Jutland as far as the east coast
of England and Scotland and east of the
Faeroes.
Thorshavn reconnoitered, no ships there.
1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance
in sea area around the Faeroes.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 1125 in AE 9624 seven enemy destroyers in double line ahead, course 250°, speed 15-20 knots (northeast of Faeroes). Meteorological aircraft sighted what seemed to be the same destroyers in AE 9638.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: some radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Britain: no units or warships appeared.
At 0531 on 6 December "O.U." radio message from Whitehall (home station) to Archangel.
Radio traffic with Britain: some Murmansk broadcasts, very little Archangel broadcasts.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats east of Bear Island passage,
1 boat on ice reconnaissance north of Bear Island.

The following messages on the ice limit received from U 277 (Lübsen):

Short signal 0111/782:

"AC 1780".

Short signal 1328/791:

"AB 3937".

Short signal 1642/792:

"AB 3922".

After U 354 (Herbschleb) and U 387 (Büchler) had reported that they had passed SR 1 at 1730 on their outward passage, radio message 1905/795 was sent:

1905

"1. U 354 to put out from Hammerfest to relieve U 307 (Herrle) at 1700 on 8 December in AC 4167.
Then "Herrle" to return to Hammerfest.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. U 387 to proceed via AC 4280 to attack area AC 4123, depth of sweep 30 miles.
3. U 277 on ice reconnaissance northeast of Bear Island."

There are now again three boats in attack areas south of the reported ice limit, while the fourth is to report on the possibility of shipping traffic through the loose ice fields further north.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 713 (Gosejakob), who has already reported the installation of the meteorological shore transmitter "Christian", reported in short signal 0211/785 that he has carried out his second special task, the reconnaissance of Tunheim.

0247 In radio message 0247/786 he received orders to return to Narvik.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 387 (Büchler), third operation, (see Appendix II/1).

Short report from U 354 (Horbschleb), sixth operation, (see Appendix II/2).

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III b):-

The destroyers reported northeast of the Faeroes may have been engaged on escort duties for convoys, or may have been carrying out exercises.

2. Re IV b) and c):-

It would be impractical to let U 713 (Gosejakob) remain longer in the operational area, in view of the damage he has reported. The boat

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will therefore be recalled so that the damage to the hull may be examined in dock at Narvik. U 354 and U 387 are expected to put out from Hammerfest shortly.

The patrol of the Bear Island passage by only three boats is insufficient but cannot be avoided under present conditions.

(Signed) Peters.

8 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 307 AC 4167) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 636 AC 4435)
U 277 ice reconnaissance north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 354 proceeding from Hammerfest to AC 4167.
U 387 proceeding from Hammerfest to AC 4123 via AC 4280.
U 713 proceeding from Bear Island to Narvik, put in to Harstad at 1530.
1700 U 307 proceeding from AC 4167 to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

CONFIDENTIAL

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the direction of Jan Mayen, broken off. AF 1162 not exhaustively covered.

8 aircraft on sea reconnaissance between 55° and 63° N from the west coast of Norway to the east coast of England and Scotland and the east coast of the Faeroes.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area around the Faeroes, nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

0520 Radio message 0100/702 received from U 277 (Lübsen):

"Small enemy submarine in AB 3539. Type not identified, attacked it with machine guns. Have lost contact."

Weather, stocks.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By naval forces:

None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: some radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

"M 104" mentioned by name.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardships Nos. 25, 72.

Minesweeper No. 32, gunnery training vessel 625, one other vessel (6403).

Britain: on the night from 6 to 7 December and the next morning several units or warships at sea in the Archangel area.

CONFIDENTIAL

Radio traffic with Britain: one broadcast message from Archangel, 4 from Murmansk, at night. 2 operational radio messages from Murmansk to Whitehall for "Meteorological Office".

On the evening of 7 December a convoy from Russia (QP) was in position within radio range of Wick (North Scotland).

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats east of Bear Island passage,
1 boat on ice reconnaissance.

U 277 (Lübsen) reported in short signal 0836/703 that the ice limit for independently routed steamers is AB 3621.

1047 As his last ice report was 50 miles further south, radio message 1047/705 was sent to "Lübsen":

"Report by short signal "Yes" or "No", whether a passage to the east is possible through AB 36."

His next ice report, received in short signal 1602/707, of AB 3295, is close to South Cape, Spitsbergen.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 713 (Gosejakob) with meteorological party "Christian" returning from Bear Island.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III a):-

The presence of an enemy submarine in the vicinity of South Cape gives rise to a suspicion

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that further traffic, perhaps independently routed steamers, is intended to run through the northern passage which may possibly be covered with very little ice.

The Diesel noise on a northerly course reported east of Bear Island by U 277 (Lübsen) on 6 December may also be connected with this enemy submarine which was perhaps carrying out an ice patrol.

2. Re III d):-

If the Naval High Command radio reconnaissance report is assumed to be correct, then there must have been a QP convoy which was intercepted by neither the U-boat patrol line nor the German Air Force. As air reconnaissance on the two days in question was not exhaustive, and on the remaining days there was no air reconnaissance at all, and as our patrol line southwest of Bear Island could only cover a restricted area because of the limited number of U-boats (6), it is possible that a convoy hauling out northwest of Bear Island, might have evaded our U-boat formation and eluded the German Air Force. With the forces available the patrol of the sea area around Bear Island - as has been reported several times - must remain incomplete.

Possibly the enemy destroyers sighted by our air reconnaissance on 7 December northeast of the Faeroes were part of the convoy which had then already been disbanded.

In my opinion the report of the Naval High Command radio reconnaissance does not make it absolutely certain that a convoy was actually under way.

(Signed) Peters.

9 December, 1943

I. Positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AC 4123)
U 354 AC 4167) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 636 AC 4435)
U 277 ice reconnaissance north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 713 Ramsund,
U 360 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 307 put in to Hammerfest at 1250 from AC 4167.
U 713 put out from Harstad at 0330, Ramsund,
put in to Narvik at 1400.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak -
Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak. Flying route
not exhaustively covered. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes -
AB 7447 - Vaernes. Reconnaissance area partially
covered (50%). Enemy not sighted.
1 FW 200, 6 Ju 88 and 2 BV 138 on sea reconnaissance
between 55° and 63° N, from west coasts of Jutland
and Norway westwards as far as the English and Scottish
east coasts, and west of the Shetlands and east of
the Faeroes.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: some radio traffic to
all submarines in the operational area.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardship No. 75,
minesweepers Nos. 31, 61, 62, 64; minelayer No. 90,
guardboat No. 625.

Britain: on the morning of 8 December some
units or warships appeared in the Archangel area.

Radio traffic with Britain: 5 broadcast messages
from Archangel, 2 from Murmansk.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in attack areas in Bear Island passage,
1 boat on ice patrol.

0220 Radio message 0102/715 received from "Lübsen":

"Passage possible for independently routed
steamers, but not accurately determined
because of small depth of penetration.
Weather, very good visibility."

0302 Radio message 0302/717 sent to "Lübsen":

"Patrol gap in ice north of Bear Island
through which traffic might pass, center of
patrol area AB 36. Always avoid ice."

0424 "Lübsen" reported in short signal 0408/719
ice limit in AB 3667.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 713 (Gosejakob), third
operation, (see Appendix II/3).

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re IV b):-

In order not to endanger U 277 (Lübsen)
unnecessarily, it is not intended to send the
boat into the ice to search for a possible
gap where a passage for single steamers might be
possible. Further ice reports are expected from
air reconnaissance.

(Signed) Peters.

10 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AC 4123)

U 354 AC 4167) depth of sweep 30 miles.

U 636 AC 4435)

U 277 ice reconnaissance and patrol north of
Bear Island.

In port:

U 307 Hammerfest,
U 560, 713 Narvik,
U 711, 757 Trondheim,
U 355, 601, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 601 put out from Bergen at 0845, proceeding via inner leads to Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - AB 7542 - Vaernes, without sighting the enemy. 80% of reconnaissance area covered.
1 FW 200, 5 Ju 88 and BV 138 on sea reconnaissance between 55° and 63° N from coasts of Norway and Jutland as far as 1° W and east of the Faeroes.
2 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of sea area around the Faeroes.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 1129 one British M.T.B. and 2 Beaufighters in AF 7956, westerly course, high speed.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: some radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardship No. 75, minesweeper No. 32.

Britain: single units or warships appeared in the Archangel area.

Radio traffic with Britain: some Murmansk and Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in attack areas in Bear Island passage,
1 boat on ice reconnaissance north of Bear
Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U-boat base at Hammerfest reported that
U 307 (Herrle) will have to go into dock
because of depth charge damage. The boat
therefore received transfer orders:

- "1. Put out from Hammerfest via SR 1 at noon
on 11 December.
2. Proceed to Trondheim at a distance of
50 miles from the coast via HA 1.
3. U-boat Northern Waters wave, after passing
67° N, radio service "Anton"."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Defensive measures for Narvik port:

After many requests from Captain U-boats and
Admiral Northern Waters, a decision by the Naval
High Command has been received containing the
requirements regarding the defense of Narvik
port.

The instruction from Naval High Command to
Admiral Polar Coast reads:

"Approve laying of a double anti-torpedo net
down to sea bed off Narvik port. Leave a gap
for passage by means of a hinged screen.
Close this opening after each passage, and mount
a guard. For small vessels leave a gap at the
side, in shallow water, and have it guarded.
Close at night. As material use net now protecting
destroyers in Bogen Bay. Work in Hammerfest and
Narvik in accordance with Naval High Command, Naval
War Staff Qu A 1 SC Secret 15511 dated 22 October
(not to all stations), is not possible until after
the nets have been laid in Kaafjord."

VII. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

11 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AC 4123)
U 354 AC 4167) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 636 AC 4435)
U 277 ice reconnaissance and patrol north of
Bear Island.

In port:

U 307 Hammerfest,
U 360, 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 601 proceeding via inner leads from Bergen to
Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88 in the
Trondheim - Jan Mayen area, 60% covered.
Enemy not sighted.

1 Ju 88 (Meteorological Reconnaissance Staffel) on
reconnaissance in sea area of the Faeroes. 5 steam
trawlers on various courses.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: some radio traffic to
submarines in the operational area.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: minesweeper No. 32;
guardboats Nos. 615, 625, an unknown vessel.

Britain: single units or warships appeared in the
Murmansk area, several in the Archangel area.

e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage: 3 in attack areas, 1 on ice reconnaissance.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 713 (Gosejakob):

- "1. Put out from Narvik on the morning of 12 December to take on torpedoes in Ramsund.
2. Then proceed to Trondheim through Westfjord at a distance of 50 miles from the coast via HA 1. Report putting out from Ramsund by time short signal on 470 kc/s.
3. Radio service "Anton", Northern Waters very long wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Teleprinter message sent to Group North/Fleet:

"Owing to the damage to U 713 (Gosejakob) due to his running aground while unloading the meteorological transmitter on Bear Island, and to the extension of U 307 (Herrle)'s period in dock due to depth-charge damage which was only discovered after his arrival, as well as the probable extension of U 737 (Brasack)'s period in dock, there will only be four boats available for operational duties during January 1944. The position will not improve until the end of January.

At present U 354 (Herbschleb) and U 387 (Büchler) are already on their second operation without an intermediate overhaul. The whole problem is thrown into relief by the Naval High Command's radio reconnaissance report, according to which a QP convoy actually appears to have sailed without being intercepted either by the U-boat patrol line or by the German Air Force. The Naval War Staff's decision regarding Captain U-boats' application for new boats is still outstanding."

(Signed) Petors.

12 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AC 4123)
U 354 AC 4167) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 636 AC 4435)
U 277 ice reconnaissance and patrol north of
Bear Island.

In port:

U 307 Hammerfest,
U 360, 713 Narvik,
U 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 307 put out from Hammerfest at 0900
proceeding to Trondheim (open water passage).
U 601 proceeding via inner leads from Bergen to
Trondheim, put in to Trondheim at 1830.
U 713 put out from Narvik at 0600 for Trondheim,
put out from Ramsund at 1300.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes -
AB 7734 - Vaernes. Route covered 50%, enemy not
sighted.
2 BV 138, 6 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance between 55°
and 62° 30' N, enemy not sighted.
1 Ju 88 in sea area around Faeroes, enemy not
sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces:

Admiral West Coast reports:

"At 0110 on 11 December, midget submarine in

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Bergen harbor. Sighted by harbor patrol boat about 500 meters from MRS 25. Submarine proceeded at about 5 knots, half submerged. Dived, but shortly after turret appeared again above water. Searches with the help of all available boats so far without result."

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardship No. 75, minesweepers Nos. 32, 69, guardboat No. 625.

Britain: some units or warships appeared in the Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage: 3 boats in attack areas, 1 boat on ice patrol.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. (a) Plans:

The Director of the Naval Meteorological Service reports that 2 meteorological buoys and one meteorological shore transmitter were sent off from Bremen on 8 December on the steamer "Porto Alegre" accompanied by Inspector Kukuck: meteorological buoy No. 126, transmitting frequency 5155 kc/s, is to be laid off Jan Mayen; meteorological buoy No. 127, 4215 kc/s, to be laid in the Barents Sea; meteorological shore transmitter No. 130 as spare set.

(b) Organizational:

With reference to the U-boat situation reported yesterday by Captain U-boats, Group North/Fleet has requested Naval War Staff, 2nd Division C-in-C U-boats, Ops. to come to an early decision on the allocation of further U-boats to Captain U-boats, Norway.

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re IV b):-

In view of our earlier experiences a U-boat will be set aside to lay the meteorological buoys only after they have arrived and are found to be in working order.

(Signed) Peters.

13 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AC 4123).
U 354 AC 4167) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 636 AC 4435).
U 277 ice reconnaissance and patrol north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 601, 711, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 307 open water passage from Hammerfest to Trondheim.
U 713 open water passage from Narvik to Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes - AB 7730 - Vaernes, no report of enemy sighted. 50% of reconnaissance area covered.
6 Ju 88, 2 BV 138 on sea reconnaissance between

CONFIDENTIAL

55° and 62° N off the coasts of Norway and Jutland as far as 1° W and east of the Faeroes. 1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of sea area around the Faeroes, enemy not sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: some radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

"L 22" mentioned by name.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardship No. 75, minesweepers Nos. 45, 53, guardboat No. 625.

Britain: little Murmansk broadcasts, brisk Archangel broadcasts (5 radio messages).

- (e) By G.I.S. stations:

Reliable agent of Denmark G.I.S. station reports:

"Convoy of 6 heavily laden ships of average tonnage put in to Reykjavik on the morning of 9 December."

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage: 3 in attack areas, 1 on ice patrol.

1159

Radio message 1159/721 sent to U 587 (Büchler):

"Report ice limit to the north by short signal of last three grid square numbers."

Thereupon short signal 1909/726 received with report from AC 1767.

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat report:

Short report from U 307 (Herrle), fourth operation, (see Appendix II/4).

As this report indicates that not all the vessels

sighted on 1 December were reported at the time,

radio message 1101/718 was sent to "Herrle":

"Report number and type of vessels sighted on 1 December."

Thereupon radio message 1158/722 was received from him.

"Sighted 3 destroyers, 1 corvette, 2 large vessels (probably 1 cruiser and 1 merchant ship)."

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III e) and VI:-

The short report submitted by U 307 (Herrle) after putting in to Hammerfest, shows that not all the enemy vessels sighted on 1 December were reported by him at the time. I therefore considered it necessary, in view of the G.I.S. report (Para. III e)), according to which 6 heavily laden ships of average tonnage put in to Reykjavik on 9 December, to clarify this question.

U 307's reply revealed that 3 destroyers, 1 corvette and 2 large vessels (probably 1 cruiser and 1 merchant ship) were actually sighted. Before, only 3 escort vessels, hydrophone bearings and a suspected westbound convoy had been reported by the U-boat. Because of poor visibility the direction in which the vessels were traveling could not be made out clearly.

The incomplete reporting of the sighted vessels was an error. As matters stood on 1 December, every additional piece of information would have been of the greatest value to Command for taking further measures (for instance, a new intercept position further west).

The arrival at Reykjavik on 9 December of 6 heavily laden steamers may possibly be connected with our sightings of 1 December.

By dead reckoning, this small convoy might have passed Bear Island passage at that time, then hauled off to northwest and so avoided our U-boat patrol line. If they had hauled off very far to northwest they might even, under certain circumstances, have been outside the range of our aircraft.

Further clarifications cannot take place until after the boat has put into Trondheim.

2. Re IV b):-

The ice limit is only a little more to the north than Lübsen (U 277) reported. Air reconnaissance reported an apparently detached ice-field southeast of Bear Island. As Hope Island to the southeast is still reported ice-free, we must still reckon with the possibility of a passage north of Bear Island. Therefore U 277 must remain there on patrol.

(Signed) Peters.

14 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AC 4123)
U 354 AC 4167) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 636 AC 4435)
U 277 on ice reconnaissance and patrol
north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 601, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 307 proceeding from Narvik by open
water passage to Trondheim.
U 713 put in to Trondheim from Narvik
at 0315.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance
Banak - Bear Island - Hope Island - special
task of laying meteorological transmitter -
Banak. Special task executed. Flying
route not exhaustively covered.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes -
AA 9668 - Vaernes. 25% covered, no enemy
sighting.
1 FW 200 with radar from Namsos to the Faeroes.
Reconnaissance area partially covered, no enemy
sighting.
1 Ju 88 in the sea area of the Faeroes. No
report of enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) By radio intercept service: .

Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: destroyers "E", "J", minesweeper No. 33, motor vessel "Ps 75".

Britain: no units or warships appeared.

Radio traffic with Britain: a few Murmansk and Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage: 3 in attack areas, 1 on ice patrol.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 711 (Lange):

"1. Put out from Trondheim on 15 December, noon.

2. Proceed at a distance of 50 miles from the coast to Westfjord - Narvik.

3. Radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave."

Owing to the sudden dropping out of the chief engineer the boat had to lie in readiness at Trondheim for seven days until a new chief engineer had arrived from home. This delay is very unfavorable, considering the present difficult U-boat situation.

An application has been made to Admiral Commanding U-boats to order a reserve chief engineer to be permanently available in the Northern area.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Peters.

15 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AC 4123)
U 354 AC 4167) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 636 AC 4435)
U 277 on ice reconnaissance and patrol
north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 601, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 307 put in to Trondheim from Hammerfest
at 1600.
1530 U 711 from Trondheim by open water passage
to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance
Vaernes - AB 7857 - Vaernes. Enemy not
sighted, 50% covered.
2 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance between west
coast of Norway and the Faeroes without
sighting enemy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: some radio traffic
to submarines in the operational area.
Murmansk area: minesweepers Nos. 115, 116,
117, motor vessel "Ps 75".
Britain: no units or warships appeared.

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(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Reliable agent of Denmark G.I.S. station reported from Reykjavik:

"Convoy of 9 ships of average tonnage and 2 tankers put out on the afternoon of 12 December."

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage: 3 in attack areas, 1 on ice reconnaissance south of South Cape.

1057 Radio message 1057/749 sent to U 277 (Lübsen):

"Report ice limit for independently routed steamers again from South Cape to AC 17. Remain there and report changes."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re III e):-

The destination of the convoy (9 steamers, 2 tankers) is unknown, probably in the direction of England.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II

Most Secret

Short reports

1. Short report from U 387 (Büchler), third operation.
2. Short report from U 354 (Herbschleb), sixth operation.
3. Short report from U 713 (Gosejakob), third operation.
4. Short report from U 307 (Herrle), fourth operation.

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APPENDIX II/1

COPY

Teleprinter message to:

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C
U-boats, Operations.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 13th U-boat Flotilla.


Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 387 (Büchler), third operation

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| 23 October | Put out from Harstad, 6 December put in to Hammerfest. Proceeded to attack area AB 3523 via AB 3917. |
| 27 October | AE 7580 patrol of Ice Fjord. |
| 30 November | Attack area AB 3568. |
| 12 November | AB 3523. |
| 24 November | Proceeded to AC 1968 against suspected convoy. |
| 26 November | Attack area AB 3914. |
| 28 November | AB 3914 to AB 3568. |
| 2 December | Patrol line AB 5573 against reported ships. |
| 3 December | Patrol line AB 5531. |
| 4 December | Returned to Hammerfest round Bear Island. No enemy sighted. |

Captain U-boats Norway. Secret 3982. A Ops.



CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/2

COPY

Teleprinter message to:

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C
U-boats, Operations.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 354 (Herbschleb), sixth operation.

Put out from Tromsø on 25 October, 1943.
Put in to Hammerfest on 6 December.
Proceeded to Hope Island, there from
27 to 30 October. Disembarked
meteorological party "Svartisen".

- | | | |
|----|----------|--|
| 1 | November | Attack area AB 3523. |
| 12 | November | AB 3568. |
| 22 | November | Proceeded via AB 3861 to AC 1896
against suspected convoy. |
| 25 | November | Back to attack area AB 3973. |
| 27 | November | AB 3914 and 3568. |
| 1 | December | On report of escort vessel proceeded
via AB 6180 to patrol line AB 5575,
AB 5593, AB 5539. |
| 3 | December | Returned via Bear Island to Hammerfest.
No enemy sighted. |

Rubber dinghies unsatisfactory for
landing. Floor broke in surf and
generally too frail for loads.
Suggestion: flat bottomed sheet metal
boats.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Secret. 3975 A Ops

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APPENDIX II/3

COPY

Teleprinter message to:

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C
U-boats, Operations.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Emergency for information 13th U-boat Flotilla.
6. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).

Clear as multiple address message

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 713 (Gosejakob), third
operation

Special operations:

1. Installation of meteorological radio transmitter "Christian" in 74° 30' N, 19° E.
 2. Reconnaissance of Tunheim radio station.
- 22 November Put out from Narvik, 8 December put in to Harstad. 9 December put in to Narvik. Proceeded via AC 4167 to attack area AC 1932, depth of sweep 30 miles, against suspected QP convoy.
- 26 November New attack area AB 3523.
- 28 November North of Bear Island to carry out special mission.
- 29 November Attack area AB 3973 on report of carrier-borne aircraft.
- 30 November North coast of Bear Island, half of meteorological transmitter put ashore.
- 1 December Proceeded via AB 6180 to AB 5977. Patrol line until 2 December against western convoy.
- 2 December Moved patrol line 20 miles on 330°.
- 3 December Patrol line AB 5925, proceeded on 70°.

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5 December Now attack area AC 4167.

6 December Carried out special operations 1 and 2 on north coast of Bear Island, made considerably more difficult by darkness, snow drifts, current, and surf. Large rubber dinghies damaged and unusable.

7 December Returned to Andfjord.

No enemy aircraft, no sightings. No change at Tunheim as compared with June, blew up the smaller masts.

Captain U-boats, Norway 4000 A Ops.

APPENDIX II/4

COPY

Teleprinter message to:

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Division.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Operations.
3. Emergency Group North/Flect.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency for information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 307 (Herrle), fourth operation.

- 27 October Put out from Hammerfest, 9 December put in to Hammerfest. Proceeded to attack area AB 3973 and AC 1625.
- 28 October To AB 3973.
- 30 October - Patrol in AB 3973, depth of sweep
21 November 30 miles. No enemy sighted.
- 22 November Proceeded to patrol line, then attack area AC 4368.
- 25 November To AB 6397.
- 28 November - Patrol in AB 6352, depth of sweep
30 November. 30 miles.
- 1 December While withdrawing from destroyer, approaching on bearing 0°, suddenly found myself in what seemed to be a convoy. The direction in which it proceeded could not be clearly made out because of poor visibility. Was spotted by corvette, crash dived after starshell was fired. Depth charges, minor damage. Pursued the enemy, no contact.
- 2 December AB 5893 in patrol line to AB 5826.
- 3 December Proceeded to AC 4123.
- 5 December To AC 4153. 5 to 8 December patrol in AC 4153.
- 8 December Relieved by U 354 (Herschlob), returned to Hammerfest.

Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret. 4037 A Ops.

APPENDIX III

COPY

Teleprinter message to:

Emergency Group North/Fleet.
Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, C-in-C
U-boats, Operations.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Reference: U-boat situation in Northern Waters,
teleprinter message Captain U-boats,
Norway, Most Secret 3873, dated 26
November (to Group North/Fleet only).

1. As already reported in the above reference, of the 6 U-boats at present operating against the suspected convoy, 3 boats (U 387, U 354, U 307) will have to be recalled within a few days, as their endurance at sea will have expired and they are urgently in need of repair. A further boat will have to be withdrawn in the middle of December.
2. New boats becoming available are U 711 on 8 December, arriving in the operational area on 11 December, and U 601 on 11 December, in the operational area on 15 December.
3. Since radio reconnaissance as well as the appearance of enemy escort groups in the operational area, indicate the running of convoys, the problem of having even a moderately adequate number of U-boats at operational readiness in time to intercept and attack these convoys has become particularly pressing. A special difficulty will be the interception of enemy traffic in the absence of exhaustive air reconnaissance.
4. Because of the above conditions it is considered essential to increase immediately the U-boat strength in Northern Waters by returning at least four of the U-boats intended for operations in the Atlantic. It is requested that preferably U 960 (Heinrich) and U 302 (Sickel), both of whom have experience of Northern Waters, should be temporarily transferred.
5. Admiral Northern Waters has cognizance of this and supports the request.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 3941.

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WAR DIARY
OF
CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY
16 - 31 DECEMBER, 1943
PG/31849

16 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AC 4123)
U 354 AC 4167) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 636 AC 4435)
U 277 ice reconnaissance and patrol
north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 307, 601, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 711 by open sea passage from Trondheim
to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance,
route Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E -
Banak. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance,
route Vaernes - AB 7415 - Vaernes without
sighting enemy. Area 40% covered.
2 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of sea area off
Scotland between Moray Firth and the northern
tip of the Shetlands. No enemy sighting
report.
2 FW 200 on reconnaissance of sea area between
west coast of Norway and the Faeroes without
sighting enemy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. Traffic intercepted at 1819 on 16 December between Pummanki (off Petsamo) with 2 Russian M.T.B.s.
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardships Nos. 75, 77, minesweeper No. 45; guardboats Nos. 610, 625.
Britain: no units or naval vessels appeared. Radio traffic with Britain: Murmansk broadcast busy, no Archangel broadcast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage: 3 in attack areas, 1 on ice reconnaissance.

0242 U 277 (Lübsen) reported in short signal 0203/768
1327 that the new ice limit is in AB 3378, and in short signal 1310/773 in AB 3385 and AC 1441.

The ice limit has therefore recoded north-eastwards.

In radio message 1119/771 the boats were informed that a convoy put to sea from Reykjavik on 12 December.

1125 Radio message 1125/772 sent:

"Reliefs scheduled as follows:

1. On 19 December, "Herbschleb" by "Lange", return passage Narvik - Trondheim.
2. On 20 December, "Büchler" by "Hansen", return passage to Trondheim."

2321 Short signal 2310/779 received from U 387 (Büchler):

"Request rendezvous with U 354 (Herbschleb)."

Radio message 2345/780 therefore sent:

"Büchler" and "Herbschleb" to meet at 1000 in AC 4152."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

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(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 601 (Hansen),
see Appendix III/1.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re IV b):-

According to his report, U 277 (Lübsen) seems to consider that the ice to the north of Bear Island can no longer be penetrated.

(Signed) Peters.

17 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AC 4123)
U 354 AC 4167) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 636 AC 4435)
U 277 - ice reconnaissance and patrol
north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 307, 601, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 711 put in to Narvik at 1930
from Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance,
route Vaernes - AB 7721 - Vaernes. No enemy

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sighting report. Area 50% covered.
2 FW 200 on sea reconnaissance between west coast of Norway and the Faeroes. No enemy sighting report.
2 FW 200 on reconnaissance of sea area between 55° N and 63° N and from the west coast of Norway to 0°.
1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of sea area around the Faeroes without sighting enemy.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

2322 Radio message 2230/790 received from U 636 (Hildebrandt):

"Most Immediate.

According to hydrophone bearing, single ship with buoy on course 70° in AC 4465.
Am pursuing."

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.
Iokanka area: guardships Nos. 77, 80; guardboat No. 518; minesweepers Nos. 53, 64.
Britain: some units or warships appeared in radio traffic with Murmansk and Archangel.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage, 3 in attack areas, 1 on ice reconnaissance.

The meeting between U 387 (Büchler) and U 354 (Herbschleb) apparently did not take place today, as "Büchler" proposed the meeting for tomorrow in short signal 1300/784.

A further report about the ice limit in AC 1718 was received from U 277 (Lübsen) in short signal 2127/789.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

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(d) Miscellaneous:

As U 601 (Hansen) is still having difficulty with his battery, and as 5 newly arrived radar interception sets are to be taken to Narvik, "Hansen" received orders by teleprinter message, supplementing yesterday's sailing order, to proceed via Westfjord - Narvik.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re III a):-

The buoy reported by U 636 (Hildebrandt) together with the single ship seems to be a noise box. This may be either an attempt deliberately to mislead our U-boats, intercepted or suspected by the enemy, in order to divert them from an approaching convoy, or a systematic search, with the latest instruments, of our U-boat positions as suspected by the enemy. Both possibilities seem to indicate that a convoy is under way. At a speed of 9 knots, the ships which put out from Reykjavik on 12 December might now have arrived off the Bear Island passage. A communication from Naval War Staff, 2nd Division, shows that they expect that the enemy may already have taken counter-measures against the T5 torpedo. It is not impossible that the escort vessel in this instance was already equipped with these new instruments.

In order to make quite certain that the boats will not fall to leeward of the enemy, I consider that the attack areas should be moved further east. U 277 (Lübsen), who is at the ice limit north of Bear Island, will have to be included in this new disposition. Needless to say only limited operations can be carried out with 4 boats.

(Signed) Peters.

18 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 277 AC 1988.
U 387 AC 4355.
U 354 AC 4622.
U 636 AC 4658.

In port:

U 360, 711 Narvik,
U 307, 601, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 601 put out from Trondheim at 1645 for
Narvik.
U 711 put out from Narvik at 1330 for the
operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route
Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak. Not
exhaustive, nothing to report.

2 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance, route Vardø -
AC 1975 - AC 1994 - Vardø. Vardø - AC 2775 -
AC 2794 - Vardø.

1 Ju 88 broke off in AG 8935 because of engine
trouble.

1 Ju 88 carried out exhaustive radar reconnaissance
of flying route. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance Vaernes -
AB 7735 - Vaernes, 30% covered, no enemy sighting
report.

2 Ju 88 on reconnaissance between the Faeroes and
Shetlands area exhaustively covered, no enemy
sighting report.

1 Ju 88 in sea area around the Faeroes, nothing
to report.

Late report on the air situation on 17 December:

2 FW 200 on radar reconnaissance in sea area between
55° N and 63° N and westwards as far as 0° E, no enemy
sighting report.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

0226 Radio message 0010/793 received from "Hildebrandt":

"No further hydrophone bearing, suspect enemy submarine. Am breaking off pursuit."

1230 Radio message 0345/701 received from "Hildebrandt" (delayed through failure of radio link):

"2 escort vessels with search gear in AC 4463 up to 0700. Apparently not intercepted in spite of close proximity, easterly search course."

This position is not yet very far from that reported earlier by "Hildebrandt".

In radio message 1015/702 "Hildebrandt" defined the noise heard from the single ship more closely:

"Loud rattling screw-noises, covering noise."

1810 Radio message 1645/706 received from U 387 (Büchler):

"Faint depth charges heard in AC 4319. No bearing."

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

"L 20" and "M 200" named.

Iokanka area: minesweepers Nos. 53, 64; guardboat No. 503.

Britain: no units or warships appeared.

Radio traffic with Britain: moderate number of broadcasts from Murmansk and Archangel.

British Admiralty to (PQ) convoy at 2011 on 17 December:

Alteration of ports of destination:

1. "Empire Archer", one unknown and "Fort Astoria" to Economia (north harbor of Archangel).

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2. "James A. Farrel" (7,715 tons) -----
(120 groups missing) to Economia and
(4 groups missing) "Ingon" to Molotovsk.

5. The ships named under 1. are to try
to arrive on -----(2 groups missing).

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in attack areas east of Bear Island
passage.

0049 In order to intercept the vessel heard by
U 636 (Hildebrandt), or the formation to which
it belongs, by a close formation of U-boats,
new attack areas ahead of the suspected enemy
course and about 90 miles further east, were
ordered:

Radio message 0049/791:

"Make for attack areas at increased speed.
"Lübsen" 1988, "Büchler" 4355, "Herbschleb"
4622, all AC, "Hildebrandt", in case contact
has been lost and not regained, AC 4658."

0051 Radio message 0051/792 sent to "Hildebrandt":

"As soon as situation permits give particulars
of reported buoy."

0152 Radio message 0152/794 sent to group "Eisenbart":

"Stand on and off in new attack areas by equal
distances to north and south, irregular courses,
starting at 0900 on 18 December from the southern
end, and reaching the northern end at 1800;
repeat every 9 hours."

By means of these regular movements in the attack
areas, equal distances between the boats and the
greatest concentration of the patrol will be effected.

0602 U 277 (Lübsen) reported in short signal 0526/796
that the ice limit is in AC 1748 and that he has
only 22 cbm. fuel. This position corresponds
roughly with that reported by U 387 (Büchler).

1445 According to "Hildebrandt"'s reports, the attack
areas seem to be too far north of the suspected
enemy route and are therefore to be transferred
further south, especially as "Hildebrandt" seems
still to be further west.

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Radio message 1445/704:

- "1. Group "Eisenbart" to move one attack area further south, unless contact has been made. New area AC 4925. At 1800 move again from north to south, back at 0300 and so on.
2. "Hildebrandt" to report position by short signal."

The grid square reported by "Büchler" lies relatively far north. Therefore

radio message 1832/708 was sent:

"Group "Eisenbart" again to occupy northern attack areas. At 0300 on 19 December be at northern limit, then 9 hourly movements within attack areas."

2015 In short signal 2007/711 U 636 (Hildebrandt) reported his position in his attack area as AC 4681.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 711 (Lange),
(see Appendix III/2).

1855 Radio message 1741/707 received from "Lange" about a collision with a patrol vessel, stating that he has commenced return to Narvik because of damage suffered.

In order to be able to carry out the relief of U 277 (Lübsen) on time despite the breakdown of "Lange", radio message 2205/713 was sent:

"U 601 (Hansen) to make for AC 45 at maximum speed keeping 50 miles from the coast. Narvik scheduled later."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Organizational:

In radio message 1325/18/20 the three boats U 716 (Dunkelberg), U 957 (Schaar) and U 314 (Basse), were placed under the command of Group North/Fleet for Captain U-boats, Norway with immediate effect, until further notice, by Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boats, Ops. Group North/Fleet was requested by teleprinter message that the boats should be re-directed at once to be equipped at Narvik for Northern Waters.

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VII. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III a):-

The radio message intercepted by German Naval High Command radio intelligence, which directs individual steamers to ports of destination, as well as the enemy search group which has appeared in the Bear Island area, indicate the running of a PQ convoy. In my opinion it is probable that the convoy is off Bear Island or west of it. Unfortunately, today's air reconnaissance was not exhaustive, so that no clear picture was obtained. Air reconnaissance tomorrow will have to clear up the situation.

2. Re IV d):-

U 601 (Hansen) will have to remain in one of the attack areas at least until U 277 (Lübsen) will have returned after replenishing supplies in Hammerfest. One of the boats to be relieved can take over at sea the radar interception sets which "Hansen" is carrying, and take them to Narvik, so that all boats putting to sea may be equipped with them. This is of particular importance, since it appears that the boats of group "Eisenbart" were located by the search groups, which seem to have gone ahead of the convoy, without their knowing it, while the convoy then managed to by-pass our patrol on a different course, as a result of the information gained by the search groups.

3. Re VI:-

The three new boats will probably not arrive until after this convoy too will have passed by unmolested.

(Signed) Peters.

19 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 277 from AC 1988 to AC 1879.
U 387 from AC 4355 to AC 4246.
U 354 from AC 4622 to AC 4513.
U 636 from AC 4658 to AC 4549.

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In port:

U 360, 711 Narvik,
U 307, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 601 proceeding from Trondheim to AC 45.
U 711 put in to Narvik at 0630.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Sea reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88, route Kirkenes - AC 8173 - AC 5184 - AC 4364 - AC 8143, nothing to report. Exhaustive. 4 BV 138 sea reconnaissance, route Billefjord - AC 7319 - AC 4264 - AC 4249 - AC 7344 - Billefjord. Area 35 km. both sides of flying route exhaustively covered by radar. Nothing to report.

Assignment with flying route Billefjord - AC 7374 - AC 7565 - AC 4431 - AC 4426 - AC 7377 - Billefjord carried out, nothing to report. Area 40 km. on both sides of flying route exhaustively covered by radar.

Assignment with flying route Billefjord - North Cape - AC 7367 - AC 4656 - AC 4653 - North Cape - Billefjord carried out. Not exhaustively covered owing to showers.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance route Vaernes - AB 7762 - Vaernes. 70% covered, no enemy sighting report. 1 Ju 88, route Vaernes - AE 9415 - Vaernes. Reconnaissance area exhaustively covered. No enemy sighting report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

0320 Radio message 1947/719 received from U 354 (Herbschlob):

"Illuminant rocket from dark horizon at 1600 in AC 4388, then gunfire from 1500 m. Distinct hydrophone bearing showed only 2 fast vessels, search group. 31 depth charges after hydrophone hunt. Surfaced at 2030, silhouette of patrol vessel astern, approaching with infra-red."

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(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "L 20" and "M 200" named.

Britain: single units or warships appeared in the Archangel area. During the night of 18/19 December, 6 radio messages from Murmansk to Whitehall (wavelength 71.91 m.). Normal Murmansk broadcast, increasing Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

As "Herbschleb"'s report may refer to the same anti-submarine group as that reported yesterday by U 636 (Hildebrandt), and as yesterdays' air reconnaissance brought no results, group "Eisenbart" was moved about 60 miles westward to meet the suspected convoy. This will once again bring it closer to the Bear Island passage which can be more effectively patrolled and at the same time withdraws it from the anti-submarine group, and the last position known to the enemy.

0412 Radio message 0412/721 sent to group "Eisenbart":

"At 0600 on 19 December proceed to new attack areas, grid square AC: "Lübsen" 1879, "Büchler" 4246, "Herbschleb" 4513, "Hildebrandt" 4549, depth of sweep 30 miles. Be at northern limit at 1600, 9 hourly north and southward movement within attack areas."

After today's air reconnaissance had not resulted in any sighting report, though admittedly it was very incomplete and covered only a small area, group "Eisenbart" was moved back again into the most favorable position in the Bear Island passage south of the ice limit.

1445 Radio message 1445/724 sent:

"At 1700 group "Eisenbart" to proceed to new attack areas, depth of sweep 30 miles: "Lübsen" AC 1788, "Büchler" 4156, "Herbschleb" 4431, "Hildebrandt" 4468. At 0000 on 20 December be at southern limit, 9 hourly north and southward movement within attack areas."

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(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

0500 Radio message 0500/648 sent to U 314 (Basse), U 957 (Schaar) and U 716 (Dunkelberg):

"Make for Westfjord - Narvik at increased speed at a distance of 50 miles from the coast."

In radio message 2348/18/31 U 957 (Schaar) reported that both his Naxos dipoles had broken down. In radio message 0259/646/92 he was ordered to proceed to Bergen immediately to exchange Naxos aerials, and in radio message 0936/35:

"Proceed to Narvik as ordered after exchange of Naxos aerials."

1119 Radio message 1119/723 sent to U 277 (Lübsen):

"Return passage as required by fuel situation for short replenishing of supplies at Hammerfest, report arrival. Relief by "Hansen" scheduled for 21 December."

1507 Radio message 1148/38 received from Naval War Staff, 2nd Div.:-

"After crossing 67° N, "Dunkelberg", "Schaar", and "Basse" will come under the command of Admiral Northern Waters."

Owing to damage received U 711 will have to go into dock.

Transfer order for U 711 (Lange):

1. After undocking put out from Narvik forenoon of 20 December. Report putting out from Bogen Bay by time short signal on 470 kc/s.
2. Proceed via inner leads, with escort from Bodø to Trondheim, at 2200 on 20 December.
3. Radio service "Anton".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Organizational:

According to a teleprinter message from Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boats, Ops., "2 of the type VII C boats shortly putting to sea from Germany are to be equipped for operations in Northern Waters."

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VII. Survey of the situation:

Re III a):-

According to "Herbschleb"'s report it would appear that the search group first located him. It is regrettable that so far none of the Northern Waters U-boats is equipped with radar interception gear. On the one hand, the task of the boats is made much more difficult by this, and on the other, it seems that the enemy, after establishing the presence of the boats by means of radar, re-intercept the boats optically by means of infra-red location. In this way, any search group sent ahead is in a position to make out the U-boat patrols and to inform the approaching convoy, which will then take the appropriate evasive action. Further, it is regrettable that none of the Northern Waters boats is equipped with "Zaunkönig" acoustic torpedoes.

(Signed) Peters.

20 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 277 AC 1788)
U 387 AC 4156) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 AC 4431)
U 636 AC 4468)

In port:

U 360, 711 Narvik,
U 307, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 711 put out from Narvik at 1000 for
Trondheim.
U 601 proceeding from Trondheim to
AC 45.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Because of weather conditions at the base, 1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance with flying route Banak - Bear Island - AB 5931 - AB 9655 - Bardufoss, not exhaustive, nothing to report.

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Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance of Jan Mayen area. Reconnaissance area 70% covered. No enemy sighting report.

1 Ju 88 in sea area around the Faeroes, no enemy sighting report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

"L 20" named.

Murmansk area: 2 unknown vessels (5803, 5806).

Britain: in the afternoon, 2 transmissions from units or warships in Murmansk area.

Radio traffic with Britain: no Archangel broadcast.

Murmansk broadcast very busy (10 radio messages).

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage in attack areas.

1637

Radio message 1637/734 sent:

"At 0600 on 21 December:

1. "Lübsen" to return to Hammerfest via AC 4250.

2. Group "Eisenbart" to move one position to northward. Be at northern limit of new attack areas at 0900. 9-hourly north and southward movements.

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3. U 601 (Hansen) to occupy attack area AC 4468, depth of sweep 30 miles, join group "Eisenbart".

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 314 (Basse) reported in radio message 0203/17 that he required periscope repairs in Trondheim, and in radio message 0629/19 received orders to put in to port there. U 1060 (Brammer) is on its way to Narvik as supply boat with new torpedoes (T 5).

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Organizational:

5th U-boat Flotilla reported by teleprinter message:

"The following are reported available for duties in Northern Waters: U 984, ready to put to sea on 25 December, and U 287, ready to put to sea on 28 December.

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. Re IV d):-

Of the three newly allotted boats two have already had to put in to intermediate ports. The relief of group "Eisenbart" has been correspondingly delayed.

2. Re II:-

The following survey of the situation was received from Luftflotte 5 by teleprinter message:

"No further information about a running PQ convoy or enemy battle group at sea has been received. The forces at our disposal, conditions of daylight and the weather do not permit reconnaissance operations against the convoy suspected by the Navy after 19 December."

This refusal by the Luftflotte is regrettable; with regard to the question as a whole the following points must be made:

1. For months now there has been more or less complete lack of clarity about enemy movements in the polar regions.
2. Up to the present it has not been possible to confirm whether or not any convoys have been running.

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3. Air reconnaissance of the ports of Archangel, Molotovsk and Murmansk, which would be of the greatest importance for clarifying the situation, has not been carried out for a considerable period.

The small forces at the disposal of Captain U-boats, Norway are not sufficient to compensate the absence of air reconnaissance. It is quite possible that convoys have passed without our knowledge and therefore without being attacked.

(Signed) Peters.

21 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AC 1788)
U 354 AC 4156)
U 636 AC 4431) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 601 AC 4468)

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 307, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703, 957 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 711 proceeding via inner leads from Narvik to Trondheim.
U 277 at 0600 proceeding from AC 1788 to Hammerfest.
U 314 put in to Trondheim at 1645.
U 957 put out from Bergen at 1500 northwards.
U 716 proceeding to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Armed shipping reconnaissance Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet by 3 FW 190, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AB 7761 - Vaernes. Area 40% covered. No enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1 Ju 88 in the sea area around the Faeroes: in AE 9864 1 merchant vessel of up to 3,000 G.R.T., 1 escort vessel, course 20°.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: minesweeper No. 117.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: minesweepers Nos. 45, 114, guardboat No. 625.

At 2325 on 21 December, radio traffic at sea between Russian M.T.B.s "12" and "13" and the commander of Fisher Peninsula Defenses (Tsip Navalok).

Britain: several units or naval vessels appeared in the Murmansk area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats east of Bear Island passage in attack areas.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

In order to be able to distribute in time the new radar interception sets brought by U 601 (Hansen), to boats about to put to sea, radio message 1230/741 was sent:

"1. "Lübsen" and "Hansen" to meet at 1800 on 21 December in AC 4545 to transfer four "Borkum" and "Naxos" sets and mail for Captain U-boats. After 1800 "Hansen" to send low frequency direction signal on "F" according to "Communication regulations for combined operations between the German Air Force and Navy".

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2. Short signal "No" if transfer not possible.
3. "Hansen" to return one set for "Hildebrandt".

Sailing order for U 957 (Schaar) sent in radio message 1111/660 to Group North/Fleet and 11th U-boat Flotilla:

- "1. Put out from Bergen on afternoon of 21 December.
2. Proceed to AC 41 50 miles from the coast.
3. Operational Order No. 1, radio service "Anton" until confirmation of passing 67° N, and Northern Waters very long wave, then Northern Waters wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Re VI d):-

U 716 (Dunkelberg) and U 957 (Schaar) can be used immediately to relieve U 387 (Büchler) and U 354 (Herbschleb), so that U 277 (Lübsen) need not put to sea again, as the fifth boat of Group "Eisenbart", until after Christmas. This boat can be relieved later for dock repairs by the third new boat U 314 (Basse).

(Signed) Peters.

22 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AC 1788)
U 354 AC 4156) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 636 AC 4431)
U 601 AC 4468)

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 307, 314, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

- U 711 proceeding via inner leads from Narvik to Trondheim.
- U 277 proceeding from AC 1788 to Hammerfest, put in to Hammerfest at 1320.
- U 957 proceeding from Bergen to the operational area.
- U 716 proceeding to Narvik, put in to Narvik at 0900, put out from Narvik at 1830.
- U 314 put out from Trondheim at 2120 for the operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, as far as AF 1257 without sighting enemy. Reconnaissance area 80% covered.

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance as far as AE 9130. Reconnaissance area 80% covered.

2 Ju 88 on reconnaissance off east coast of Scotland between Kinnaird Head and the northern tip of the Shetlands.

Reconnaissance for re-interception of convoy reported by meteorological reconnaissance Staffel 5, by 3 FW 200, 1 BV 138 and 1 Ju 88 between 55° N and 66° 30' N as far as 9° W.

2 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of sea area between the west coast of Norway and the Faeroes.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Radio message 1210/M/197:

"In AE 9323 convoy of about 40 merchant ships 2 - 3,000 G.R.T. each with escort vessels, one possible aircraft carrier, course 40° - 60°, speed 10 knots."

Radio message 0439/106:

"In AE 9321 3 vessels, in AF 5766 one larger vessel. Entire result of reconnaissance uncertain."

(c) By naval forces: None.

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(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: minesweepers Nos. 114, 116, and possibly one more (6113). Radio traffic between another Russian M.T.B. and Pummanki.

Britain: one unit or naval vessel appeared in Murmansk area.

Radio traffic with Britain: Murmansk broadcast as usual, Archangel broadcast increasing.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats southeast of Bear Island in attack areas.

1355

Radio message 1355/753 sent on receipt of the first convoy report from the air reconnaissance:

- "1. At 1045 in AE 6983 convoy of 40 transports and escort vessels sighted from the air, course 45°, speed 10 knots. Possibly also a carrier.
2. Contrary to teleprinter message 4124 "Lübsen" to get ready and put to sea at once, proceeding to AF 37 at maximum cruising speed. Keep 50 miles from the coast."

Originally the air report mentioned troop transports. The 4 nearest boats were therefore ordered to concentrate off Westfjord, as an attempt by the enemy to land seemed possible.

1352

Radio message 1352/663 sent to U 957 (Schaar):

- "1. Make for AF 37 at maximum cruising speed.
2. Northern Waters wave from now on."

Further, U 314 (Basse) and U 716 (Dunkelberg) are to steer for AF 37 after they put to sea.

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U 1060 (Brammer), approaching Narvik, received orders to put in to port as fast as possible, although, owing to its design as a transport boat, it probably cannot be put into operation.

The outward bound Atlantic boat U 763 (Cordes) received orders from C-in-C U-boats to operate on the reported convoy if in a favorable position. After the German Air Force had reported merchant ships instead of troop transports, the approaching boats were diverted to reinforce group "Eisenbart":

1735 Radio message 1735/756 sent:

- "1. "Lübsen" to report departure from Hammerfest by time short signal. Contrary to series number 753 occupy AC 4733 as new attack area, depth of sweep 25 miles.
2. U 716 (Dunkelberg) to put to sea on the forenoon of 23 December from Andfjord, join group "Eisenbart".
3. U 957 (Schaar) to proceed via AF 31 to AC 44."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 716 (Dunkelberg),
see Appendix III/4.

Sailing order for U 314 (Basse),
see Appendix III/3.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. (a) Plans:

Teleprinter message 4143 sent to Group North/Fleet:

- "1. After Flieger Fuehrer North (West) had corrected his original report regarding troop transports (at 1210), it was planned to concentrate all boats for the present off the Bear Island passage.
2. Tonight U 314 (Basse) will put to sea from Trondheim and U 716 (Dunkelberg) from Narvik. Contrary to earlier orders, (Lübsen) is now to occupy the most southerly attack area of the Bear Island passage patrol line after putting out from Hammerfest on 23 December.

3. If tomorrow's air reconnaissance produces fresh information, U 314, U 716 and U 957 can be diverted at any time."

(b) Organizational:

Teleprinter message to Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boat Ops., and Group North/Fleet received from 5th U-boat Flotilla:

"In accordance with telegraphic order from Admiral Commanding U-boats, U 278 and U 984 are not to be used for operations in Northern Waters, as they are fitted with 3.7 cm. guns. U 276 and U 361 instead probably about middle of January as operations permit. Exact date follows."

A teleprinter message was then received from Naval War Staff 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boats, Ops.:-

1. With immediate effect, U 425, U 956, both in Bergen, (previously scheduled for the Atlantic) and U 973, in Kiel, are placed under the command of Group North/Fleet for operations in Northern Waters until further notice.
2. Boats previously named by 5th U-boat Flotilla hereby canceled.
3. Admiral Commanding U-boats is placing six newly selected U-boats into a flotilla under the command of Captain U-boats, Norway."

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re IV b):-

At a speed of 9 knots the reported convoy may reach the Bear Island passage on 26 December. It will probably be possible by the evening of 24 December to draw up four boats ahead of the convoy in addition to the four southwest of Bear Island passage. This total of 8 boats, of which about half are now equipped with "Borkum" and "Naxos" and 3 with T 5 torpedoes, will enable us to form a sufficiently long patrol line southwest of Bear Island passage.

In this way the boats will have a greater area for attack to leeward, and it will not be so easy to discover the formation as it would be in the Bear Island passage.

(Signed) Peters.

23 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 AC 1788)
U 354 AC 4156) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 636 AC 4431)
U 601 AC 4468)

In port:

U 277 Hammerfest,
U 360, (1060) Narvik,
U 307, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 711 put in to Trondheim at 0145 from
Narvik.
U 277 put out from Hammerfest at 2355
for AB 6275.
U 957 proceeding from Bergen to AB 6855.
U 716 proceeding from Narvik to AB 6823.
U 314 proceeding from Trondheim to
AB 6895.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Planes Nos. 1 and 2 covered their reconnaissance
areas exhaustively without sighting enemy.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance of
Jan Mayen area. Reconnaissance area fully
covered. No enemy sighting report.
1 Ju 88 westwards as far as AE 9166. 80%
of flying route covered. Enemy not sighted.

On sea reconnaissance and for re-interception
and shadowing of the enemy convoy reported on
22 December: 6 FW 200, 2 Ju 88, 1 (F) 22,
2 BV 138 in sea area between 65° and 68° N and
the west coast of Norway and 10° W.

Luftflotte 5 telegraphs:

"Reference reconnaissance against PQ convoy:

1. C-in-C of the German Air Force has refused

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to provide additional forces to attack the present PQ convoy.

2. Luftflotte 5 has at its disposal no forces suitable for attack.
3. Further reconnaissance on the previous scale on the convoy would therefore constitute an unnecessary waste of men and material, unless the Navy intends to attack.
4. Group North/Fleet was therefore requested for a corresponding statement of its plans."

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Aircraft No. 3 sighted at 0811 in AF 1535 one light cruiser of "Dido" or "Jamaica" class, 5 destroyers course 90°.

At 1216, 10 miles northwest of the position of the naval vessels, a strong formation of more than 20 units intercepted by radar in low-lying fog. Visual recognition not possible.

1 aircraft with the formation, probably Ju 88 or Beaufighter. Altitude 800m., no attack. Anti-aircraft fire from light naval forces.

1125

Convoy re-intercepted in AF 1559. Consisted of 17 merchant ships (8 - 10,000 G.R.T.), 3 tankers, 2 medium and 1 heavy cruiser, also 3 light cruisers, 5 destroyers and 4 escort vessels. Convoy in seven lines-ahead. Escort vessels in partial screen. No contact between 1600 and 1755. Convoy intercepted again at 1755 in AF 1614. In AF 1356 convoy course 36°, speed 10 knots. Light and heavy anti-aircraft fire from escort vessels. No loss.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: destroyer "J", guardboat "MO 122".

Pummanki area: M.T.B.s 12, 13, 14, 22 (1931 - 2350).

Britain: isolated units or naval vessels appeared in Archangel and Murmansk area.
Radio traffic with Britain: very little
Murmansk broadcast, brisk Archangel broadcast.
At 2350 radio traffic between 4 Russian M.T.B.s and Cape Pummanki.
Murmansk radio station at 2306 and 2323 sent 2 very urgent operational radio messages to Whitehall for Admiralty and "Meteorological Office", wavelength 71.91 m.
At 0354 traffic between Pummanki and M.T.B.s 12 and 13.
At 0621 urgent radio telephony between Lazar Point and Russian M.T.B. 14.
At 1931 radio traffic at sea between Russian M.T.B. 22 and Cape Pummanki.

(c) By G.I.S. stations:

Reliable agent of Danish G.I.S. station reported from Reykjavik:

"6 ships of average tonnage put to sea in ballast at midday on 20 December from Reykjavik."

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in Bear Island passage in attack areas,
4 boats en route.

1119 Radio message 1119/766 sent:

- "1. U 314 (Basse) to proceed via AF 31 to AC 44, and join group "Eisenbart".
2. "Büchler" to report ice limit to the north."

The possibility of traffic passing north of Bear Island is to be checked once more.

1355 As a result of the new convoy report, radio message 1355/770 was sent to group "Eisenbart":

"At 1125 on 23 December convoy sighted from the air in AF 1816, consisting of 17 large merchant ships, 3 tankers, close formation, 1 tanker in the middle. Cruiser group and several destroyers with them. Corvettes as close escort. Course 30°, speed 10 knots."

Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boats, Ops., was requested by teleprinter message to give a

CONFIDENTIAL

decision as to whether U 1062 (Albrecht), which is on its way to the Atlantic, may be used to operate on the PQ convoy.

1533

In radio messages 1533/772 and 1552/773 group "Eisenbart" was ordered to move to positions west of the Bear Island passage:

- "1. "Büchler" to report ice limit westwards as far as 75° N.
2. Group "Eisenbart" to depart at 2000 on 23 December to new attack areas, depth of sweep 25 miles, all AB:
U 387 (Büchler) 3789, U 354 (Herbschleb) 6162, U 636 (Hildebrandt) 6196,
U 601 (Hansen) 6518, U 716 (Dunkelberg) 6573, U 277 (Lübsen) 6823, U 957 (Schaar) 6855, U 314 (Basse) 6895.
At 1800 on 24 December be at southern limit of attack areas, north and southward movements every 9 hours, therefore at northern limit at 0300.
3. "Dunkelberg" to join mobile patrol 25 miles south of the most southerly position."

Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., informed us in a teleprinter message that neither U 763 (Cordes), nor U 1062 (Albrecht) may be used against the PQ convoy.

1911

Radio message 1911/776 sent regarding the possible cruiser group sighted by air reconnaissance in AF 1298.

In radio message 2041/777 the boats were informed that, on the basis of new discoveries, it is probable that this is the same convoy as was reported earlier.

2154

Radio message 2154/781 sent:

- "1. "Dunkelberg", "Hansen", "Hildebrandt", "Herbschleb", and "Büchler" each to move one attack area further south.
2. "Lübsen" to proceed to AB 6275 to deliver "Borkum" and "Naxos" to "Herbschleb" at 2000 on 24 December. Next, report arrival in AB 6162, for delivery to "Büchler", by time short signal. Then occupy attack area AB 3789.
3. "Eisenbart" to observe radio silence except for tactical reports."

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Special operations by single boats:

In short signal 1721/774 U 387 (Büchler) reported the ice limit in AC 1755, and in 2257/780 in AC 1778.

(d) Miscellaneous:

0045 Short signal 2317/105 received from U 636 (Hildebrandt):

"Request rendezvous with U 601 (Hansen)."

Radio message 0253/762 was therefore sent:

"Hildebrandt", "Hansen" to meet at 1000 in AC 4453 to hand over "Borkum" and "Naxos". Be back at northern limit at 1500."

V. Reports of success: None.

VI. Organizational:

Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boats, Ops. informed us in a teleprinter message, that U 973 (Paepenmüller), which has been assigned to Northern Waters, is to try out the new conning tower VI, and that U 362 and U 673 are to be sent to the Northern area for the same purpose in January 1944.

VII. Survey of the situation:

Re IV. b):-

According to dead reckoning the convoy's speed of advance is 9 knots. It may reach Bear Island passage approximately on the evening of 25 December. By the evening of 24 December the 8 available boats should have arrived in their new attack areas 90 miles west of Bear Island passage. I then intend to let the boats advance in a reconnaissance line towards the approaching convoy so as to extend the area in which it may be attacked, and in order to intercept it on the morning of 25 December during the exceptionally short period of light. U 277 (Lübsen), who will put out from Hammerfest again tonight, should, if possible equip the two remaining boats, U 387 (Büchler) and U 354 (Herbschleb), with the new radar interception sets while proceeding to the operational area. However, he reported from Hammerfest that there are no instructions for the installation and use attached to these sets, so that probably only the "Borkum" sets can be put into operation.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

24 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 387 ice reconnaissance northeast of
Bear Island, then AB 6162.
U 354 from AC 4156 to AB 6196.
U 636 from AC 4431 to AB 6518.
U 601 from AC 4468 to AB 6573.

In port:

U 360 Narvik, (1060 Ramsund),
U 307, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 425, 703, 956 Bergen,
U 973 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 277 proceeding from Hammerfest to
AB 6275.
U 716 proceeding from Narvik to
AB 6823.
U 957 proceeding from Bergen to
AB 6855.
U 314 proceeding from Trondheim to
AB 6895.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance,
route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape or
ice limit - Banak, nothing to report. Not
exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Almost exhaustive early reconnaissance by
4 aircraft with radar.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

4 FW 200 (LL), 2 Ju 88 on reconnaissance to
re-intercept the enemy convoy reported on
23 December, between 69° and 71° 15' N and as
far as 0° 45' W.
2 Ju 88 in the sea area between 55° and 62° N
westwards as far as 0°, operation in progress.
1 Ju 88 of meteorological reconnaissance Staffel 5
on meteorological reconnaissance as far as
AB 7737 without sighting enemy.
Reconnaissance area 80% covered.
1 Ju 88 as far as AE 9415, no enemy sighting
report. Reconnaissance area 80% covered.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1220 Enemy convoy sighted in AB 8455.
12 merchant vessels of up to 5,000
G.R.T., 3 destroyers, loose escort,
course 50°, speed 8 knots.
Medium and light anti-aircraft fire.

1330 Contact with convoy from AB 8146 to
to 8152. Sighted: 2 cruisers, 2 merchant
1500 ships, 2 small escort vessels ahead.
Course 60 - 70°, speed 10 knots.
Further particulars not made out because of
bad visibility. Several aircraft sighted
at and around convoy. Among them one
probable Catalina.
According to radar the convoy is in the shape
of a narrow band stretching over about 15 km.
Convoy made out at a distance of about 15 km.
by the light of gun flashes.
Strong pulses in AB 8576, probably ranging,
at a distance of 5 - 10 km.

1320 Convoy intercepted in AB 8197, only 1 patrol
vessel and one other naval vessel, which could
not be made out distinctly, were sighted.
No losses from convoy anti-aircraft defenses.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic
to submarines in the operational area.
Murmansk area: destroyer "H", minesweeper
No. 114, one unknown vessel (5801).
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardships Nos.
10, 15, guardboats Nos. 610, 615, 625.
Radio traffic with Britain: moderate number
of broadcasts from Murmansk and Archangel (4
each).
Britain: one unit or naval vessel at sea
at noon in Murmansk area.
Radio traffic between Russian M.T.B. and
Pumanki (at 1552).
Main Naval D/F Station Kirkenes reported:
bearing of 292.1° obtained on British unit at
1850 on 24 December.
Naval D/F detachment Heligoland Bight reported
a British unit in AF 1220 at 1829, bearing
inaccurate (three-line fix).

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

8 boats drawing up in attack areas in front of

approaching PQ convoy southwest of Bear Island passage.

1323

Radio message 1323/794 sent:

"According to air report, convoy in AB 8452 at 1220, course 50°, speed 8 knots. Speed according to dead reckoning 9 knots."

As, since the re-interception of the convoy, indications of its route are becoming more and more definite, the boats are to be drawn up in a patrol line which will enable them to intercept the convoy at dawn tomorrow. The inner wing of this patrol line will lie somewhat nearer to the estimated convoy course, while the boats at the other end are to try once more to take over the new instruments from U 277 (Lübsen) who has put to sea from Hammerfest.

1423

Radio message 1423/795 sent:

"1. At 2200 on 24 December depart to patrol line from AB 5622 to 9136, arrival by 0600 on 25 December. Order remains "Lübsen", "Büchler", "Herbschleb", "Hildebrandt", "Hansen", "Dunkelberg", "Schaar", "Basse".

2. "Herbschleb" to give direction finder signal "F" from 2000 with minimum frequency for rendezvous with "Lübsen".

3. "Lübsen" to try to meet "Büchler" en route. No D/F signals.

4. Where instructions for "Naxos" are missing use only "Borkum".

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

No further measures.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Beacon wave "B" has been fixed for U-boats as well as aircraft in accordance with "Communication regulations for combined operations between the German Air Force and Navy". 442 kc/s for distress signals.

- V. Reports of successes: None.
- VI. U-boat report from U 277 (Lübsen), third operation,
(see Appendix IV/1).
- VII. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III b):-

Because of the bad visibility conditions at this time of year the Air Force often report only locations by radar sets, while the sighting reports frequently cover only parts of the convoy. A heavy battle group has not so far been intercepted.

The reports from the Main Naval D/F Station Kirkenes and of the Naval D/F Detachment Heligoland Bight (see para. III d)) may point to the approach of a heavy battle group.

2. Re IV a):-

With the patrol line 120 miles long, the distance between the individual boats is 20 miles. We may therefore assume that with the present comparatively good weather conditions the U-boats will intercept the convoy on the forenoon of 25 December.

(Signed) Peters.

25 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 277 AB 5622.
U 387 AB 5661.
U 354 AB 5669.
U 636 AB 6478.
U 601 AB 6719.
U 716 AB 6755.
U 957 AB 6794.
U 314 AB 9136.

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 307, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 425, 703, 956 Bergen,
U 973 Kiel.

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(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Danak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak. Not exhaustive, nothing to report. No ice observation because of weather.

1 Ju 88 on ice, harbor and airfield reconnaissance of West Fairway as far as Kanin Nos.

Not exhaustive because of weather conditions.

Flying route Vardø - Kanin Nos - Shoina - AW 2963 - Morjovets - AW 2910 - Ponoï - AW 2071 - Iokanka - Teriberka - Vardø.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

3 BV 138 on convoy reconnaissance.

Not exhaustive. Flying route of aircraft No. 1:

Tromsø - AC 7410 - AB 6118 - AB 6147 - AB 9384 broken off because of weather and darkness. Radar only partly working. No enemy sighted.

Route of aircraft No. 2:

Tromsø - AB 9669 - AB 5392 - AB 5627 - AB 6872 - Tromsø. Radar broke down in AB 9263. No enemy sighted.

Probing reconnaissance by 3 BV 138 without sighting enemy. Only partly covered.

Route of aircraft No. 2:

Tromsø - AB 9838 - AB 5768 - AB 8121 - AB 8629 - Tromsø. Broken off because of weather and darkness. No enemy sighted.

Route of aircraft No. 3:

Tromsø - AB 9855 - AB 7333 - AB 7385 - AB 8521, broken off because of darkness. No enemy sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AF 1139 - Vaernes. Reconnaissance area 80% covered. No enemy sighted.

1 Ju 88 in the sea area around the Faeroes.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

1020 Radio message 0901/704 received from U 601
(Hansen):

"Convoy passed over me in grid square 6720.
Enemy is steering 60°."

1222 He reported further in radio message 1102/706:

"Am shadowing destroyers and several
silhouettes in AB 6722, course northeast."

1528 Radio message 1226/708:

"Convoy on starboard beam in AB 6723,
course 60°, speed 8 knots, seaway 7, rain,
atmospheric pressure 990 millibars, falling,
visibility 2 miles, 95 cbm."

1512 Radio message 1409/709:

"Convoy in AB 6496, course east, low speed."

1607 Radio message 1410/711:

"Driven off by destroyer. Contact lost in
AB 6496, bad visibility, seaway 6."
("Hansen" had been ordered in radio message
1548/713 to send direction finder signals if
in danger of losing contact or if discovered
by the enemy.)

1607 Short signal 1556/712 received simultaneously
from U 716 (Dunkelberg):

"One destroyer in AB 6574."

That is about 6 miles further east than
"Hansen"'s last report.

1800 Radio message 1636/715 received from "Hansen":

"Dived because of escort vessel in AB 6575.
Three hydrophone bearings on 150° true.
Reciprocating engines."

That is 12 miles further than "Hansen"'s report
at 1400.

1850 Radio message 1803/717 received from "Hansen":

"AB 6584. Am pursuing in accordance with last
hydrophone bearing, seaway 8, atmospheric
pressure 982 millibars, falling, visibility 1
mile. Offensive action limited."

This position again lies about 12 miles further east

than the previous one.

2029

Radio message 1503/719 received from "Dunkelberg":

"AB 6574. Bow miss on destroyer with T 5 torpedo, angle on the bow zero, range 3000, depth 5. Submerged, convoy passed overhead. Multi-unit hydrophone broken down."

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Ponoi harbor frozen up to the outer coast. 1 patrol vessel in AC 9748, course north-east.

Aircraft No. 3: convoy located in AB 6727 30 km. away. On convoy until 1050 and from 1200 to 1340. Light anti-aircraft and L.A. armament defense.

1008

Sighting report: 3 destroyers in AB 6725, type not recognized because of bad visibility and darkness.

Came upon convoy escort at height of 200 m., identified probable cruiser silhouette.

No battle group sighted in the vicinity.

Convoy located 50 km. away in AB 5616.

Ships could not be identified.

Medium anti-aircraft fire.

According to location the convoy extends over 20 km.

Isolated vessel intercepted 15 km. away on bearing 180°.

1 BV 138 with radar located convoy in

AB 6712. Spread over 10' - 15 km. in

AB 6732. Probably 4 columns.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Iokanka area: guardships Nos. 80, 81, guardboats Nos. 501, 508, minesweeper No. 62.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardship No. 25, guardboats Nos. 610, 613, 615, 623, 625, minclayer No. 90.

Britain: no units or naval vessels appeared.

Radio traffic with Britain: very little Murmansk and no Archangel broadcast.

Urgent radio traffic between Russian M.T.B. "14" and Pummanki at 1650.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

1045 On receipt of the first report from "Hansen",
radio message 1045/705 was sent:

1. Group "Eisenbart" to operate on "Hansen"'s report. Free to attack.
2. When shadowing, U-boats to transmit D/F signals on shadower wave "B" according to "Communications regulations for combined operations between the German Air Force and Navy", as do aircraft.

1559 Radio message 1559/714 sent:

"Despite air reports the convoy's course is assumed to be approximately 70°."

Air reconnaissance had several times reported that according to locations the convoy was on a northwesterly course. It is suspected that a very broad convoy formation has led to a 90° difference in the appearance of the convoy course on the radar screens.

1812 Radio message 1450/716 received from U 636 (Hildebrandt):

"Only limited ability to submerge owing to heavy chlorine formation, am breaking off operation. Hammerfest. AB 6491, weather."

Radio message 1917/720 therefore sent:

1. "Hildebrandt" to proceed to Hammerfest at maximum cruising speed, make ready as quickly as possible.
2. Group "Eisenbart" to make use of opportunities to attack even in high seaway."

Since no further reports on the enemy were received from the boats after 1636, radio message 2151/722 was sent to group "Eisenbart":

"If there is no contact or definite clues, occupy at maximum continuous speed patrol line from AC 1778 to AC 4734, order "Lübsen", "Büchler", "Herbschleb", "Hansen", "Dunkelberg", "Schaar", "Basse"."

This patrol line lies at the narrowest point between the reconnoitered ice limit and the Norwegian coast, so that with the supposed speed of 9 knots, the convoy could be there at 0800 tomorrow. It has also been taken into account that the ice may be forced back northwards by the strong south wind.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

No further measures.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

1. The convoy was intercepted according to plan on the morning of 25 December. Unfortunately none of the boats except U 601 (Hansen) and U 716 (Dunkelberg) obtained contact. The reason for this is doubtless the bad visibility (1 - 2 miles) and the very stormy weather (wind south 7 - 8) which deprive the boats of any general view of the situation, and limits the use of their armament. As contact was lost at about 1600 and, in spite of the closing in of the other boats, was not regained, I consider occupation of the Bear Island position the safest measure for regaining contact tomorrow morning.
2. The "Scharnhorst" and 5 destroyers put to sea at 1700, in order to attack the convoy on the morning of 26 December. The re-interception of the convoy is therefore all the more important. I hope that the boats which have closed in as a result of the convoy reports will contact it during their fanwise approach to the patrol line before actually reaching the latter. Sea and wind indicate a northerly course for the convoy, for with an exact easterly course these would come on the beam and make progress very difficult for the heavily laden ships. There is further the consideration that, even though our Air Force hardly constitutes a serious threat to the enemy, the convoy will, nevertheless, endeavor to keep as far as possible from the base of our naval forces, in particular, as the further north it were to be attacked by them, the more time and opportunity the suspected heavy enemy group would have to intercept our forces. For although no enemy battle group has yet been intercepted by our air reconnaissance, the experiences of the previous year, must make us expect its presence. After the surrender of Italy the provision of the necessary capital ships and cruisers should be possible. Since, therefore, I suspect a northerly convoy course, I am pushing the patrol line as closely as possible to the ice-limit off Bear Island.

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I am worried about the extremely bad weather conditions. Although I believe that the boats will be in the patrol line across the Bear Island passage punctually tomorrow morning, it seems to me very doubtful whether the U-boats will obtain contact during the night, which would be an essential condition for the operation of our battle group, and, still more important, whether they would be able to maintain contact. As in the opinion of Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten we cannot, after today's weather forecast, expect the air reconnaissance to fly early tomorrow morning, and as similarly Flieger Fuehrer North (West) cannot carry out the reconnaissance scheduled for the evening of 25 December west of Bear Island for the interception of the suspected enemy battle group, the prerequisites for the operation of the "Scharnhorst" and the destroyers are lacking as far as I can judge. In my capacity as Captain U-boats, and also as deputy for Admiral Northern Waters, I have reported my views to C-in-C Naval Group Command North/Fleet at 2000 on 25 December.

(Signed) Peters.

26 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 277 AC 1778.
U 387 AC 4143.
U 354 AC 4157.
U 601 AC 4188.
U 716 AC 4453.
U 957 AC 4491.
U 314 AC 4734.

In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 307, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 425, 703, 956 Bergen,
U 973 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 636 proceeding from the operational area
to Hammerfest.

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II. Air reconnaissance:

Flioger Fuehrer North (West):

2 Ju 88, 3 BV 138 on reconnaissance with radar against PQ convoy. Most of the area covered several times by radar. Sighting and location reports: the more westerly Ju 88 had strong interference in set from enemy radar. Otherwise no further observations. Submarine located in grid square 4644, not approached. In AC 4279 own destroyer intercepted by radar and later sighted, course north, high speed. Recognition signals exchanged.

1126 In AC 4514 4 of our own destroyers located, course north, high speed, recognition signals exchanged.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak. Exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flioger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flioger Fuehrer North (West):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 He, route Vaernes - AF 1138.

1 Ju 88 on route Sola - AF 7598 - AE 9834 - Sola. No enemy sighting report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

0951 Short signal 0945/732 received from U 277 (Lübsen):

"Convoy in AB 6365."

The most northerly boat of the patrol line has thus come upon the convoy while still en route.

1030 Radio message 0930/734 then followed:

"Came upon convoy suddenly, convoy had set lights. Fix inaccurate."

1238 Radio message 1130/739 from "Lübsen":

"4 silhouettes, several destroyers, suspect partial convoy. Easterly course. Driven off, am in pursuit. Wind southwest 7, seaway 6, atmospheric pressure 985 millibars, visibility 2 miles."

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"Lübsen" received orders in radio message 1121/737 to send direction finder signals at once. In order to bring up the battle group we must accept that "Lübsen" will thereby betray his presence and give the convoy its first warning.

1327 "Lübsen" reported in radio message 1245/740:

"Depth charges on bearing 350°, am in AC 4158."

1631 Radio message 1411/746 received from U 387 (Büchler):

"Forced to submerge by 2 escort vessels in AC 4153, varying courses, no further hydrophone bearings."

That corresponds roughly with "Lübsen"'s report.

1945 Radio message 1715/750 received from "Lübsen":

"Heavy artillery and anti-aircraft fire in sector true bearing 130° to 170°. Am in AC 4285."

From reports meanwhile received from the "Scharnhorst", it appears that a battle is in progress between the "Scharnhorst" and heavy British naval forces which shadowed her in the morning, and surrounded the "Scharnhorst" on the return journey to Gamvik and forced her into battle.

2025 First, radio message 1643/751 received from "Lübsen":

"Hydrophone bearing at 1500 in AC 4275. Suspect destroyer. Withdrew in easterly direction. No contact with convoy since 1100. Wind southwest 5 - 6, seaway 6 - 7, atmospheric pressure 987 millibars, visibility 3 miles."

Second, radio message 1845/754 from "Lübsen":

"Continuous gunfire from 1615 to 1830. Query own battle group, otherwise suspect diversionary movement and convoy in northern part of AC 42."

2039 Short signal 1806/755 received from U 387 (Büchler):

"Contact lost at 1545."

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2131 He reported in radio message 2045/764:

"Am in AC 4252, bearing about 20°, presume gunfire. More than 15 miles away." (Corrupt).

The "Scharnhorst" action is probably more than 70 miles away from "Lübsen" and "Büchler" in a southeasterly direction.

2203 Radio message 2048/765 received from "Lübsen":

"Hydrophone bearing at 2000, zig-zagging destroyer. Course 350° (magnetic). Suspect convoy in AC 4220. Depth charges at regular intervals in A 45. Short signal 0945 should read: AC 4421."

"Lübsen" has apparently calculated a correction from the estimated position of the convoy, as reported at 0945, of 45 miles in a southeasterly direction. According to this, the convoy must have been advancing on a course of 70° since noon yesterday, and must have crossed the patrol line approximately at the center.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1012 Several vessels located in AC 4774.

1012 Contact maintained. Visual reconnaissance
to not possible because of darkness and bad
1135 visibility.

Judging by the image on the radar screen, one large and several smaller vessels. Probably high speed and southerly course, from accurate direction finder positions obtained during shadowing.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: little radio traffic to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: guardboat "Mo 132", 2 unknown vessels (5802, 5804).

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardships Nos. 22, 25, guardboats Nos. 501, 610, 615, 625.

Britain: no units or naval vessels appeared.

Radio traffic with Britain: very little Murmansk and no Archangel broadcast.

Polyarno transmitted a very urgent radio message (second priority) to all submarines at 1128.

At 1645 Polyarno sent a most urgent radio

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message (5 figure cipher) second priority to all naval forces in the Northern Waters area.

At 1950 a very urgent radio message (second priority) from Polyarno to all submarines in the operational area.

According to radio traffic, a QP convoy coming from Russia is at sea, received a radio message from the British Admiralty at 1135 on 25 December.

From 2231 to 2236 a British unit or naval vessel (AU) was sending 3 radio messages on wavelength 71.91 to Murmansk, among them one with 8 addressees including "SBNO Murmansk".

"AU" on bearing 309°, inaccurate.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

8 boats in patrol line in Bear Island passage.

0043 Radio message 0043/726 sent (to boats at sea only):

"Own battle group "Scharnhorst" and 5 new destroyers put out from LoppHAVET at 2300 on 25 December. Intention to attack convoy about 0900 on 26 December."

In radio message 0122/729 special attention was drawn to the procedure for U-boats during the presence of surface forces in the operational area. (Operational Order No. 1, para. 25). Sighting is ordered to be reported.

1021 Radio message 1021/735 sent:

"Eisenbart" to operate on convoy, "Lübsen" at 0925 in AB 6365."

Several requests for direction finder signals from the shadower were received from the boats.

1426 In radio message 1426/743 the boats were informed of the action between the battle group and British heavy units in AC 4333.

Since it appears that none of the boats has still contact,

1629 radio message 1629/749 was sent to group "Eisenbart":

"1. If at 1700 there is no contact or clues,

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proceed at maximum continuous speed to patrol line from AC 2747 to 5474, old order.

2. Take into account homeward bound battle group."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

No special measures.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

When it became clear that the "Scharnhorst", separated from the destroyers, was hard pressed in AC 4677, the boats were withdrawn from the convoy and dispatched at maximum speed to the scene of the battle.

1815 Radio message 1815/753:

"Most Immediate. Group "Eisenbart" to make for AC 4940 at maximum speed."

1845 Radio message 1845/757 sent as an explanation to boats at sea only:

"Scharnhorst" in action with heavy units in AC 4910."

2018

In order to check the progress of the boats in the heavy weather and to be able to follow their approach to the scene of action, their positions were requested in radio message 2018/762. It was estimated that they would not be able to arrive before 0100.

The boats reported their positions as follows:

2200 U 716 (Dunkelberg) in AC 4293.
2200 U 387 (Büchler) in AC 4283.
2240 U 314 (Basse) in AC 4614.

After it became clear from the last reports of the "Scharnhorst" and from the radio intercept service that the "Scharnhorst" sank at about 1930, radio message 2247/772 was sent to Group "Eisenbart":

"1. In order to search for survivors of the "Scharnhorst", after arrival proceed singly from position line AC 4668 to 4687 for a distance of 70 miles on course 140° at increased speed.
Order: "Basse", "Schaar", "Dunkelberg", "Hansen", "Herbschleb", "Büchler", "Lübsen".

2. Report position of sinking immediately. Suspected to be in 5740."

Further radio message 2343/777 to group "Eisenbart":

- "1. All except "Hildebrandt" at liberty to attack warships.
2. Radio beacons at Vårdø, Gamvik, Helnes, Ingøy continue to operate.
3. Presence of Russian submarines in the search area not impossible."

U 636 (Hildebrandt), the course of whose return passage to Hammerfest lies across the route of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla returning to port from the operational area, was requested for a position report in order to clarify a location. He reported his position as AB 6584 at 1015.

In radio message 2118/765 he was forbidden to attack and warned of the destroyers on course south.

Sailing orders for U 425 (Bentzien) and U 956 (Mohs):

- "1. Put out from Bergen at noon on 28 December.
2. Proceed to AC 47 at a distance of 50 miles from the coast, according to Order No. 14, maximum cruising speed.
3. Operational Order No. 1, radio service "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave. After report of passing 67° N, Northern Waters wave."

Sailing order for U 360 (Becker),
(see Appendix III/5).

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

1. My fears that because of the weather the U-boats would not regain contact during the night, have unfortunately been confirmed. The element of surprise for the "Scharnhorst"'s attack was thereby lost. Not until 0951 was a report on the convoy received from the most northerly boat U 277 (Lübsen). When it came, it confirmed the assumption that the convoy would take a course as far north as possible. The fact that it had set lights, is a sign of the extremely bad visibility and weather conditions. Precise details of the strength

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and composition of the convoy, and type and strength of the escort were not reported, so that these particularly important data for the battle group could not be transmitted. In the course of the morning contact was broken because of the weather and heavy anti-submarine activity. It was only partially regained, mostly by hydrophone bearing.

It was not possible to draw definite conclusions about the convoy from the reports received.

2. When it could be seen from the afternoon's radio messages that the "Scharnhorst"'s position was becoming extremely serious, I immediately ordered all the boats to steer for a grid square near the "Scharnhorst", and at the same time obtained Group North/Fleet's consent by telephone. At the earliest, the boats could arrive at this position at about 0100 on 27 December.
3. After the "Scharnhorst" had been sunk I ordered all six U-boats to form a 30 mile wide search line for the rescue of survivors, in such a way, that all the possible places of sinking reconstructed from the ship's last reports would be covered by the area to be traversed. With the prevailing seaway (south 8) and poor visibility it is however extremely doubtful that survivors of the "Scharnhorst" will be picked up. If the "Scharnhorst"'s last report can be relied on, the place of sinking must have been in AC 4960.

(Signed) Peters.

27 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 277)
U 314)
U 354)
U 387) proceeding from AC 4668 - 4687) in search
U 601) to AC 5759 - 5778) line.
U 716)
U 957)

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In port:

U 360 Narvik,
U 307, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 425, 703, 956 Bergen,
U 973 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 636 put in to Hammerfest at 1220 from
the operational area.
U 360 put out from Narvik at 1400 for
Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Sea reconnaissance against PQ convoy by
1 Ju 88. Assigned flying route Kirkenes -
AC 8188 - AC 3773 - AC 2955 - AC 8173 -
Kirkenes. Flying route altered because
of weather, as follows:

Kirkenes - Vardø - AC 8188 - AC 6187 -
AC 5392 - Kirkenes.

Area covered by radar AC 8155, AC 8137,
AC 5823, AC 5337, AC 5188, AC 5945, AC 8446.
Visual reconnaissance at 250 m. not possible
because of showers and darkness.

3 FW 200 on fan reconnaissance, route
Trondheim - AC 7396 - AC 2433 - AC 2836 -
AC 7334 - Petsamo.

1445 Departure from position line AC 7396.
Flying route exhaustively covered by radar,
no observations.

1 FW 200 on route Trondheim - AC 4894 -
AC 4234 - AC 1949 - AC 2779 - AC 4596 -
Petsamo.

1405 Departure from position line AC 4894.
Flying route exhaustively covered by radar.

1 FW 200 on route Trondheim - AC 7223 -
AC 1526 - AC 2829 - AC 5523 - AC 5773 -
Petsamo.

1425 Departure from position line AC 7313.
Flying route was covered only to a range
of up to 30 km. diameter, owing to periodical
icing up of the radar set. No observations.
Area covered by radar: AC 7133, AC 1798,
AC 1851, AC 1535, AC 1526, AC 1616, AC 1613,
AC 2697, AC 3717, AC 3775, AC 8184.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance
westward as far as AE 9124. Reconnaissance area

exhaustively covered, enemy not sighted.
1 Ju 88 on route Vaernes - AB 7723 -
Vaernes. Reconnaissance area 25%
covered, no enemy sighting report.
3 FW 200 sea reconnaissance for Flieger
Fuehrer North (East) against QP convoy
in Northern Waters.

Reconnaissance against blockade runner in
the Skagerrak by 2 Ju 88 with radar.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

0110 Radio message 1700/26/763 received late
from U 716 (Dunkelberg):

"Forced to submerge in AC 4281 by escort
vessel after previous location. Wind
southsouthwest 4 - 5, visibility 2 miles,
seaway 4 - 5."

That tallies with the reports from U 277
(Lübsen).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

One target located in AC 5359.
Convoy intercepted by radar in AC 1949.
Radar image a circle of 20 km. diameter.
Formation of convoy recognizable.

One light signal in AC 4838, a large
white ball which divided into 3 red stars.
No observations by radar.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 1128, 1950 and 2115 on 26 December
very urgent radio message from Polyarno
to all Russian submarines in the operational
area. At 1645 a very urgent radio message
to all Russian naval forces in the Northern
Waters area.

From 1625 to 1921, numerous and partly
most urgent tactical signals between British
units, especially "DGO" (probably formation
leader) and "JLP" (probably sub-leader).
At 1920, order from "DGO" to "JLP" for torpedo
attack. At 1936, most urgent radio message
from "DGO" to home radio station "Horsea"
for Admiralty. In the evening several radio
messages from British units or naval vessels
to Murmansk and from Murmansk to home radio
station Whitehall. At night, bearing
295.13° obtained on several British units
or naval vessels in traffic with Reykjavik
or Murmansk. At 0247 our Air Force radio
stations reported a British unit (AC) located
in AC 8213.

Britain: 8 units intercepted during naval engagement. Otherwise some units or naval vessels appeared in the Northern Waters area. Heavy increase in Murmansk broadcast, very little Archangel broadcast. Norwegian polar coast: frequent transmissions to submarines in the operational area. Murmansk area: 1 unknown vessel (5803). Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: guardships Nos. 25, 77, minesweeper No. 45, guardboats Nos. 610, 615, 625.

At 1155 Polyarno broadcast a very urgent radio message (Most Immediate) to all naval forces in Northern Waters Fleet, Archangel, Iokanka and Belushya.

PQ convoy proceeding to Russia received a radio message at 1149 on 27 December from the British Admiralty (probably ports of destination).

Northern Waters: British unit "JLP" sighted an unknown unit at 0943 on bearing 149°, 12 miles away, course 140°. Own position 73° 38' N, 20° 30' E, later enemy speed 28 knots, course 40°, then lively tactical traffic from several units (radio links) Scapa and Cleethorpes.

At 1223 fresh sighting by unit "JLP" on bearing 094°, 1 mile away on westerly course. Own position 74° 15' N, 22° 37' E.

"JLP" shadowed, and reported current alterations in course and speed, and received tactical orders from "DGO" (Flag Officer). At 1651 "DGO" reported a battle cruiser 72° 26' N, 25° 31' E and at 1655 gave orders to open fire with starshells. At 1722 "JLP" had lost contact. At 1726 "DGO" reported that according to radar location the enemy was 7 miles away on bearing 60°. Own position 72° 57' N, 25° 55' E. At 1810 "DGO" requested position of target. At 1819 and 1903 radar data were transmitted. At 1919 "DGO" ordered an unknown unit: "Finish her off with some more torpedoes."

At 1952 "DGO" sent to "Ulli" (collective callsign?): "Clear target area, except for ships with torpedoes and destroyer with searchlight."

About midnight British home service and overseas broadcasting services announced: "'Scharnhorst" sunk by Home Fleet off North Cape."

Polyarno sent several urgent radio messages for submarines from 1128 - 2115.

At 2236 and at 0034 on 27 December bearings obtained from Kirkenes on one British unit each on 309° and 295°. Further bearings from Kirkenes, 356° and 349° at 0110, and 13° at 0135.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

After a vain search on the scene of the "Scharnhorst"'s engagement, the boats were again freed to attack the convoy.

1657 Radio message 1657/710 sent to Group "Eisenbart":

"1. Break off search.

2. Proceed at once to patrol line from AC 6177 to 5858, old order from "Basse" to "Lübsen".
Maximum continuous speed."

2218 Radio message 2218/712 sent:

"According to reports at hand, simultaneous approach of a QP convoy possible."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

No further measures.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Further position reports were received from boats set to search the scene of the "Scharnhorst" action:

2300 U 354 (Herbschlob) in AC 4259,
0000 U 601 (Hansen) in AC 4375.

0019 Radio message 0019/778 sent:

"Group "Eisenbart" to report passing position line by time short signal."

Since the boats will probably be able to make only slow progress against the heavy seas, they will arrive at the position line at very different times.

The first boat should cover the scheduled 70 miles by about 1300.

0705 Radio message 0705/795 sent to group "Eisenbart":

"After covering 70 miles as ordered, continue search on opposite course."

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Boats reported passing the position line:

U 957 (Schaar) at 0330,
U 277 (Lübsen) at 0515,
U 354 (Herbschleb) at 0630,
U 601 (Hansen) at 0752,
U 314 (Basse) at 0430,
U 387 (Büchler) at 0530.

The report from U 716 (Dunkelberg) was not received until 1600 in the afternoon.

The report from U 314 (Basse) contained a second corrupt group, which could mean either a position, but also: "Have taken over prisoners."

Radio message 1119/701 was therefore sent:

"Basse" from Captain U-boats. Short signal "Yes", if "Scharnhorst" survivors, otherwise repeat."

After the request had been repeated he reported in radio message 2315/714:

"Position AC 5743. In 5474 smell of oil, nothing else. All naval grid squares. Message No. 701 missing. Wind west 8, seaway 8, visibility 2 miles, atmospheric pressure 902 millibars."

1005 The first boat in the search line, U 957 (Schaar), reported in radio message 0919/797 from AC 5751: wind southeast 8 and seaway 7.

Under these conditions further search seemed hopeless.

1509 Radio message 1509/706 sent to group "Eisenbart":

- "1. After reaching old position line via position line 2, search from AC 5416 to 4665 in a new 70 mile wide strip on 140°. Report arrival at position line 2."
2. "Dunkelberg" to report time of turning in first strip."

He reported in message 1637/709:

"1630, am in position line 2."

The search was finally called off by radio message 1657/710.

The grid square from which "Basse" reported the smell of oil, lies northoast of the suspected position of the sinking. Otherwise there are no signs of the "Scharnhorst".

V. Reports of successes: None.

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VI. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III b):-

The location by the German Air Force of the convoy in AC 1949 does not make it clear whether this is a PQ or a QP convoy. For the PQ convoy the position is very far back. This might be explained by an evasive movement to the north after the "Scharnhorst" had put to sea, but also from the desire to let an important convoy proceed on as safe a course as possible even though it meant lengthening the route and therefore the time at sea. Moreover the located position of the convoy is only a short distance from an approach point for stragglers named in radio traffic at the beginning of December.

2. Re III d):-

The course of the "Scharnhorst" action can be followed easily from the radio intercept service reports.

3. Re IV a):-

The new patrol line has been placed 9 miles ahead of the present convoy position as estimated by dead reckoning on the basis of the located position. The northeasterly end of this patrol line lies near to yet another approach point for stragglers, while the southwesterly end covers most of the convoy routes used by the enemy last year. The order of the boats is such that the fresh boats, with their latest type of torpedoes and location gear will have the longest distance to cover against the heavy seas and will arrive at the most probable place of meeting with the convoy, while the boats which have been at sea for the longest time will have to cover the shortest route.

(Signed) Peters.

28 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 314 AC 6177.
U 957 AC 5638.
U 716 AC 5656.
U 601 AC 5681.
U 354 AC 5912.
U 387 AC 5861.
U 277 AC 5858.

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In port:

U 636 Hammerfest,
U 307, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 425, 703, 956 Bergen,
U 965 Arendal,
U 973 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 360 proceeding via inner leads from Narvik to Hammerfest.
U 425 put out from Bergen at 1700 for the operational area.
U 956 put out from Bergen at 1700 for the operational area.
U 965 put out from Arendal at 0800, put in to Kristiansand (South) at 1710.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

3 FW 200, 1 Ju 88, and 3 BV 138, all with radar and 2 Ju 88 without radar on fan reconnaissance against enemy convoy. One target located in AC 5635 and one in AC 5649 (possibly submarine).
Area covered by radar: AC 8514 - AC 6615 - AC 6346 - AC 6233 - AC 2593 - AC 2815 - AC 2492 - AC 2483 - AC 7324.
1 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance with radar, route Kirkenes - AC 8174 - AC 2854 - AC 2489 - AC 7364 - Kirkenes. No locations. Off 74° N brief radar interferences similar to foreign ranging.
Area covered by radar: AC 8426 - AC 2842 - AC 2483 - AC 7324.
1 Ju 88 on visual reconnaissance and after severance of radio communications with radar. Flying route Kirkenes - Berlevag - AC 8145 - AC 8155 - AC 8165 - AC 5769 - AC 8245. Exhaustive over an area of 10 miles on either side of flying route. No observations.
8 FW 290 on route Fisher Peninsula - middle of Kildin - AC 8597 - AC 8556. No sighting report.
2 BV 138 on fan reconnaissance.
1 BV 138 on sea reconnaissance with radar, broken off because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance as far as AB 7851. Area 30% covered. No enemy sighted.
1 Ju 88 on route Sola - AF 7551 - AE 9614 - AE 8539 - AF 8524 - Sola.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

1815 Short signal 1756/727 received from U 387 (Buchler):

"At 1730 land plane in AC 5678, southwesterly course."

Subsequent inquiries showed that it was one of our own planes.

2224 Short signal 2213/733 received from U 957 (Schaar):

"More than 5 steamers in AC 5637."

2248 Short signal 2240/736 received from "Schaar":

"I am being pursued by an unknown ship, destroyer."

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 0917 urgent tactical signal to British radio station Murmansk from British unit "JLP".

At 0948 one urgent tactical signal from British radio station Murmansk to all naval forces.

At 1040 and 1155 Polyarno broadcast very urgent radio messages to all Russian submarines in the operational area and all Russian naval forces.

Norwegian polar coast: lively radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "M 105" named several times.

Murmansk area: 1 unknown vessel (5801).

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: minesweepers Nos. 45, 108, guardboats Nos. 610, 615, 626.

Britain: several units or naval vessels appeared in the Northern Waters area.

Radio traffic with Britain: during the day very lively transmissions from units to Murmansk. Very lively Murmansk but no Archangel broadcast.

Northern Waters: at 0917 a British unit sent a tactical radio message from Murmansk, followed at 1001 by an urgent message from British radio station Murmansk to Home Fleet.

At 1716 a further British unit sent an urgent radio message to Murmansk. At 1040 Polyarno radio station sent a very urgent radio message to all Russian submarines, and at 1155 an

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urgent coded radio message to all naval forces, to Archangel, Iokanka and Belushya. At 0657 a British unit sent a most urgent message (open radio) to Cleethorpes for "Admiralty" and "N.O.i/c (Londonderry)". At 2046 all Russian destroyers at sea received a very urgent radio message (third priority) from Polyarno, and at 2150 all naval forces, one radio message with highest priority. The same station called 3 destroyers at 2100.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

In radio message 0049/760 U 354 (Herbschleb) reported severe sea damage. He was reminded in radio message 0422/718 of the importance of intercepting the convoy, but reported in short signal 0845/719 that he was returning to Narvik.

In radio message 1343/723 he was ordered to proceed to Andfjord via AC 5450 and 4450, in order if possible to touch the scene of the "Scharnhorst" action.

Radio message 1122/721 sent in order to fill "Herbschleb"'s place in the patrol line:

""Büchler" and "Lübsen" to move up 20 miles along the patrol line. New patrol line from AC 6177 to 5838."

In order to give the boats a definite fix from which to work out their positions the radio beacons at Ingöy and Vardö were set. U 314 (Basse) and U 957 (Schaar) were requested to report their positions, in order to confirm whether all boats had reached the patrol line. In short signals 1516/724 and 1522/725 they reported their positions in the patrol line.

1925

Radio message 1925/730 sent to group "Eisenbart":

- "1. According to today's reconnaissance the PQ convoy is expected to be to the northeast.
2. Radio silence except for reports on the enemy. Preferably by short signal."

If the convoy is not intercepted by 2400, it is probable that it has hauled off further to the north and east. Moreover, the air reconnaissance located only two of our own U-boats in the area covered. A new patrol line further eastwards was therefore ordered.

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2045 Radio message 2045/732 sent to Group "Eisenbart":

"If no contact, proceed at 0000 on 29 December to patrol line AC 6965 to 6844, old order, maximum continuous speed."

2240 On receipt of the report from "Schaar", radio message 2240/737 sent:

"Group "Eisenbart" to operate on "Schaar"'s report, more than 5 steamers in AC 5637. Attack and sink!"

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

No further measures.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 1060 (Brammer):

- "1. Put out from Narvik at 0900 on 29 December.
2. Proceed at a distance of 50 miles from the coast, to Skudenes. Arrival report 48 hours in advance by short signal "UKVL-RJME". Pick up escort through Admiral West Coast.
3. Radio service "Anton".
4. Be prepared for danger of air and submarine attacks, specially from AB 84 onwards."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Organizational:

Teleprinter message received from German Naval High Command Naval War Staff, Quartermaster, Admiral U-boats:

- "1. By order of the C-in-C of the Navy, the allocation of U-boats to Captain U-boats, Norway is to be brought up to a total of 24 boats.
2. Report whether, by strictest standards, the equipment of the U-boats, supplies for the bases and dockyard capacity are sufficient; if necessary submit requirements."

Teleprinter message received from Admiral Commanding U-boats:

- "1. By our Most Secret....., dated 23 December,

U 314 (Basse), U 425 (Bentzien),
U 716 (Dunkelberg), U 956 (Mohs),
U 957 (Schaar), U 973 (Paepenmüller)
were placed administratively under the
command of the 11th U-boat Flotilla,
with effect from 1 January, 1944.

2. In Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boats,
Ops., Most Secret of 27 December the number
of Northern Waters boats was ordered to be
made up to 24.

The following boats are therefore allocated
to Northern Waters flotillas as from 1
January, 1944:

- a) U 472 (v. Forstner), U 965
(Ohling), U 919 (Nordheimer) from
5th U-boat Flotilla to 11th U-boat
Flotilla.
- b) U 739 (Mangold) from 9th U-boat Flotilla
to 13th U-boat Flotilla.
- c) U 278 (Franze) from 7th U-boat Flotilla
to 11th U-boat Flotilla.
- d) U 313 (Schweiger) from 8th U-boat Flotilla
to 11th U-boat Flotilla.

4. U 355 (La Baume) which was ordered
to remain in the 11th U-boat Flotilla until
the middle of January, 1944, is now to stay
there until further notice."

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III a) and IV a):-

The report from U 957 (Schaar) seems to confirm
the position of the PQ convoy as estimated by
dead reckoning, although it is remarkable that
the air reconnaissance did not intercept it.
"Schaar" does not however report a course, so
that we are left in doubt as to the direction
in which the boats are to operate. The reported
position lies somewhat to the west of the patrol
line, so that it may perhaps be concluded that
the convoy is on a southeasterly course. We
must, however, wait for more detailed reports
from "Schaar".

It is to be hoped that the next 2 boats will
reach the convoy soon. For the time being
we must assume that this is the PQ convoy.

2. Re III b):-

The radio traffic between Archangel, Iokanka,
Belushya, etc., and Russian destroyers at sea
may be connected with U 957 (Schaar)'s contact
with the enemy. The lively Murmansk traffic
may possibly indicate the imminent putting in
or sailing of convoys.

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3. Re IV d):-

U 1060 (Brammer) is scheduled to take a second cargo of "Zaunkönig" torpedoes to Narvik.

(Signed) Peters.

29 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 277)
U 314)
U 387) operating on convoy intercepted
U 601) by U 957 in AC 5637.
U 716)
U 957)

In port:

U 636 Hammerfest,
U 307, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen,
U 965 Kristiansand (South),
U 973 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 354 proceeding from the operational area to Narvik via AC 5450 and AC 4450.
U 425) proceeding from Bergen to the
U 956) operational area.
U 360 proceeding via inner leads from Narvik to Hammerfest, put in to Hammerfest at 0600, put out from Hammerfest at 2300 for the operational area.
U 965 put out from Kristiansand (South) at 0730.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak. Exhaustive survey of flying route, no shipping traffic observed.
1 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance with radar.
Area covered: AC 9141 - AC 1674 - AC 3534 - AC 3465 - AC 5878. No locations.

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2 FW 200 on fan reconnaissance with radar.
Area covered by radar: AC 9564 - AT 1867 -
AT 1573 - AT 1443 - AC 3382 - AC 3294 -
AC 3282 - AC 5473 - AC 5867 - AC 3862 -
AC 6243 - AC 5972 - AC 9564. No locations.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance,
route Vaernes - AB 7876 - Vaernes.
Reconnaissance area 60% covered. No enemy
sighting report.
1 Ju 88 in sea area around the Faeroes, no
enemy sighting report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

0220 Radio message 0120/739 received from U 957 (Schaar):

"In naval grid square 5637 attacked fast vessels,
locating with infra-red rays, with 2 "Zaunkönigs",
submerged, 3 explosions."

0316 Short signal 0307/740 received from U 957:

"Contact lost since 2300."

"Schaar" was requested in radio message 0433/742
to report at once course, type and number of
vessels sighted.

0530 Radio message 0435/744 received from "Schaar":

"Re message No. 733: definitely 4 vessels
with reddish-yellow lights, further silhouettes
not definite, course not made out, compass
interference, fix not accurate, am pursuing
southwards, AC 5620."

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic
to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: destroyers "E", "H" and "I",
3 unknown vessels (25801, 5802, 5810).

Britian: several units or naval vessels in
Murmansk area.

Russian radio traffic: lively exchange of messages in direct traffic Archangel - Kola.

Britain: lively Murmansk broadcast (7 messages), no Archangel broadcast.

Destroyer "J" - at sea according to radio traffic - at 1244 received the same urgent message from Archangel as Destroyer "C" received from Polyarno at 1203.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

As no course was given in "Schaar"'s sighting report of 2213, radio message 0107/738 was sent:

"If there are no other reports of course, expect southerly courses."

As no more contact reports were received radio message 0451/743 sent to group "Eisenbart":

"If no contact or further reports, continue search individually. Reckon on south-easterly courses, and enemy speed being 7 knots."

Radio message 1021/747 sent in order to distribute the boats once more according to a definite plan, and to draw them up in front of the probable convoy course:

"If no definite clues, group "Eisenbart" occupy patrol line from AC 6965 to 6844 at maximum speed, old order."

The patrol line, which now only consists of 6 boats is to patrol a longish stretch by regular movements to east and west. Therefore radio message 1913/756 sent:

1913

"Group "Eisenbart" 4 hourly movements in patrol line, 20 miles on bearing 90° and back, start at 2200 on 29 December."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Radio message 1451/752 sent for the 4 boats which put out from Bergen and Hammerfest:

"U 360 (Becker), U 425 (Bentzien), U 636 (Hildebrandt), U 956 (Mohs) to make for AB 82. Form group "Isegrimm"."

The boats should reach the QP convoy's position as estimated by dead reckoning during the course of 30 December.

U 965, who is approaching Bergen from the south, may possibly still be in time to join as a fifth boat in the operation against the QP convoy.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

From a teleprinter conversation with U 360 (Becker) it emerges that U 636 (Hildebrandt)'s departure will be somewhat delayed because of symptoms of chlorine poisoning among the crew.

Radio message 1227/750 sent as sailing order:

"U 360 (Becker) and U 636 (Hildebrandt) to put out from Hammerfest at 0000 on 30 December to AB 65 at maximum cruising speed."

V. Reports of successes:

According to his report, U 957 (Schaar) has apparently torpedoed one or two patrol vessels.

VI. (a) U-boat reports:

Short report from U 636 (Hildebrandt) on fifth operation, (see Appendix IV/2).

(b) Organizational:

In reply to the order from Admiral Commanding U-boats, re the increase of boats in the Northern area to 24, the following teleprinter message was dispatched:

"Equipment of U-boats and supplies at bases are adequate. A separate teleprinter message with details of dockyard capacity and supply of torpedoes follows."

The following teleprinter message received from Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boats, Ops. in connection with the allocation of 3 experimental U-boats to Captain U-boats, Norway.

"1. The boats equipped with the experimental conning tower, that is U 973 (Paepenm^oller), U 362 (Franze) and U 673 (Saver) are not included in the total of 24 boats to be allocated to the Northern area. These three boats are also to be placed temporarily under the command of Captain U-boats, Norway while they are being tested in actual operations against the enemy. Admiral Commanding U-boats will arrange their temporary allocation to the flotillas."

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2. Similarly, Admiral Commanding U-boats is to allocate one further boat not yet named, in addition to the newly transferred U 739 (Mangold) and U 313 (Schaar), number of boat and earliest possible operational readiness to be reported.
3.
4. The preparation of these boats takes precedence over Atlantic boats."

VII. Survey of the situation:

The following possibilities now exist with regard to the PQ convoy.

1. Very soon after passing through the Bear Island passage the convoy took a southeasterly course and has put into Murmansk or has split up and proceeded along the coast towards Archangel.
2. The convoy hauled off to north and east when the "Scharnhorst" appeared and then steered directly for its port of destination.
3. The convoy hauled off far to the northeast for the reasons given in 2. and is now steering southward along the coast of Novaya Zemlya beyond the range of our air reconnaissance, without regard to the increase in time and lengthening of the route this involves.

If the first supposition is correct, the convoy could have reached its port of destination without being intercepted by our U-boats, as on 27 December these were being used to search for survivors from the "Scharnhorst".

In the second case, it must have passed our patrol line without being intercepted by it. This seems unlikely under the circumstances.

I am therefore still counting on the possibility that the convoy has hauled off to the northeast for the reasons given in this Diary for 27 December, and is now proceeding southward along the coast of Novaya Zemlya. For these reasons I shall transfer the patrol line so far east, that the convoy's course should cross it if my assumption is correct.

(Signed) Peters.

30 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 314 AC 6965.
U 957 AC 6956.
U 716 AC 6944.
U 601 AC 6864.
U 387 AC 6854.
U 277 AC 6844.

In port:

U 636 Hammerfest,
U 307, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 360 proceeding from Hammerfest to
operational area.
U 425 proceeding from Bergen to the
operational area.
U 956 proceeding from Bergen to the
operational area.
U 965 proceeding from Kristiansand (South)
to Bergen.
U 354 proceeding from the operational
area to Narvik.
U 636 put out from Hammerfest at 1140
for the operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 BV 138 on strip reconnaissance against QP
convoy. Flying route Billefjord - AC 7317 -
4834 - 4833 - Billefjord. Exhaustive, nothing
to report. Area covered by radar: AC 7328 -
4913 - 4671 - 4585 - 4576 - 4819 - 7256.
1 Ju 88 on shipping, harbor, ice and airfield
reconnaissance, route Kirkenes - Vardø - Teriberski -
Iokanka - Kanin Nos - Cape Gorodetski - Ponoï Bay;
from Mezen - Konushin - Ponoï - along the Kola
coast - Teriberski - AC 8593 - Vardø - Kirkenes.
1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance,
route Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 10° E - Banak.
Flying route exhaustively covered except during
showers, nothing to report.
2 BV 138 on strip reconnaissance (radar) against
QP convoy. Area exhaustively covered by radar:
AB 9398 - 6689 - 6652 - 6525 - 6285 - 6191 - 6426 -
6489 - 6823 - 9533.

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1 Ju 88 on strip reconnaissance (radar) against PQ convoy. Flying route Kirkenes - Vardø - AC 9754 - AT 4769 - AT 4497 - AC 8939 - Vardø - Nautsi. Flying route covered as far as 70° 30' N by visual reconnaissance to a width of 60 km. From 70° 30' N exhaustively covered by radar. No sightings, no locations.
1 FW 200 flew over area covered by radar: AC 872(?) - AW 2229 - AT 4885 - AT 4571 - AC 3995 - AC 3955 - AC 8273 - AC 8187.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations reported.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in Jan Mayen direction. No enemy sighted. Reconnaissance by meteorological reconnaissance Staffel 1 with flying route Sola - AF 7942 - AE 9863 - Sola.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1 patrol vessel hove to in AW 2217.
3 patrol vessels hove to 15 km. off northern tip of Cape Svyatoi Nos.
1 patrol vessel each hove to in AW 2344, AW 2359, AW 2393, AW 2617.
In AC 9462, radar ranging for short periods.

2221 At 1324 in AC 6584 a faint radar echo probably a submarine.
At 1456 in AC 6546 a large radar echo, probably 2 to 3 ships.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian destroyer "C" received urgent message (3rd priority) from Polyarno at 1203 on 29 December. At 1244 Archangel transmitted the same message to Russian destroyer "J".
At 2020 Russian destroyer "E" passed Terski-Orlov (AW 2678) and announced its return from Sosnovets/Gorlo Straits (AW 2895) to Kola Bay for 0200 on 30 December.
At 2154 a British unit sent an urgent message (operational) to Murmansk for "C-in-C Plymouth" and 2 unknown addressees.
At 2218 Polyarno broadcast a message of greatest urgency (first priority) to all naval forces, Northern Waters Fleet.

Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "L 20" named.
Murmansk area: destroyer "C", guardboat "MO 131", motorboats "PS 48", "PS 75", 4 unknown vessels (5800, 5801, 5812, 5828).
Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: destroyer "J", minelayer No. 90, guardboats Nos. 610, 615, 625, 3 unknown vessels (6403, 5502, 0662).
Britain: several units and naval vessels appeared in Murmansk area.
Russian radio traffic: forenoon lively transmissions from Archangel to Kola, other radio traffic normal.
Inexact bearing of 125° obtained on British unit or naval vessel during traffic with Murmansk (wavelength 71.91 m.).

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Reliable agent of Danish G.I.S. station reported from Reykjavik on 28 December:

"Two ships of average tonnage arrived in Reykjavik in ballast on 22 December without escort. Probably lost convoy during hours of darkness."

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

Since the air reconnaissance has not intercepted any enemy formation, and since, according to dead reckoning, the convoy should have reached our patrol line, the latter was once more transferred southwards, off the entrance to Gorlo Straits.

1718 Radio message 1718/770 sent:

- "1. Group "Eisenbart". If no contact, depart at 1900 to form patrol line from AC 9597 to 9477; old order, maximum cruising speed.
2. Bear in mind position of mines given in Appendix 2 to the Operational Order. Do not cross 69° N to the south."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

The two boats approaching from Hammerfest, and the two approaching from Bergen, were ordered into attack areas along the probable convoy route, in order to intercept if possible the QP convoy which may be running.

Radio message 1722/769:

- "1. Group "Isegrimm" to occupy attack areas as follows, depth of sweep 30 miles:

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"Mohs" AB 5584, "Bentzien" 5837,
"Becker" 5971, "Hildebrandt" 8316.

2. After 1200 on 31 December 9 hourly movements to and fro in the attack areas to southwest and southeast, beginning at the southeastern end. Irregular courses."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Organizational:

Teleprinter message received from Naval War Staff 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boats, Ops.

Subject: Boats with torpedo mine equipment for Northern Waters:

"Through the allocation to Captain U-boats, Norway of U 956, 957, 965, 900, as per order, a total of 6 boats with torpedo mine equipment is now available. This number is regarded as adequate....."

Before this order, only two boats with this equipment, U 601 (Hansen) and U 636 (Hildebrandt) were left.

VII. Survey of the situation:

1. Re III d):-

The urgent radio messages intercepted by radio intelligence during the night of 28 - 29 December are probably connected with the units reported by U 957 (Schaar).

2. Re IV. a):-

The final patrol line against the PQ convoy now lies 50 miles north of the operational limit (because of danger from mines). If the convoy was making for Archangel and has not yet reached its port of destination, it should be intercepted here. According to dead reckoning, however, this possibility is very slender. It is remarkable that during the last few days the German Air Force has intercepted nothing by radar in spite of brisk activity. Up till now, no reports have been received of merchant ships putting in to Russian ports.

(Signed) Peters.

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31 December, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

U 314 AC 9597.
U 957 AC 9587.
U 716 AC 9577.
U 601 AC 9497.
U 387 AC 9487.
U 277 AC 9477.
U 360 AB 5971 depth of sweep 30 miles.

In port:

U 307, 711, 713, 737 Trondheim,
U 355, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 425 proceeding from Bergen to AB 5837.
U 956 proceeding from Bergen to AB 5584.
U 636 proceeding from Hammerfest to AB 8316.
U 354 proceeding from operational area to
Narvik, put in to Harstad at 1300.
U 965 put in to Bergen at 1430 from Kristiansand
(South).

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 on ice and shipping reconnaissance
southwest of the south coast of Kola - Dwinhklzep (?) -
Summer coast. Ice conditions off ports of Archangel
and Molotovsk.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance,
route Banak - Bear Island - 73° N, 17° E - Banak.
Flying route not exhaustively covered. Nothing
to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

1 BV 138 on sea reconnaissance, route Tromsø -
AB 6265. Broken off prematurely because of
weather and icing up.

1 BV 138 route Tromsø - AB 9564 - Tromsø. No
enemy sighted.

1 BV 138 on route Tromsø - AB 9564 - Tromsø.
Broken off because of icing up.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 FW 200 on sea reconnaissance against QP convoy
west of Bear Island, between 1° and 4° W, and
northwards to 74°. No enemy sighted.
Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 He 111, route

Vaernes - AB 7873. Route 40% covered.
No enemy sighted.
1 Ju 88 in the sea area around the Faeroes.
No enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1223 In AW 5225 (Gorlo Straits) 2 patrol vessels, course northeast.
Telephone message received from Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

"At 1050 4 merchant vessels of 6 - 10,000 G.R.T. in AW 5555 (off entrance to Archangel harbor). 5 escort vessels. Harbor installations free of ice."

1225 Telephone message received from Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

"The receipt of this information concludes the part of Flieger Fuehrer North (East) in the reconnaissance against the PQ convoy."

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 1020 on 30 December, guardship No. 81 was 12 miles northeast of Svyatoi Nos and reported a German aircraft on westerly course.

Norwegian polar coast: moderate radio traffic to submarines in the operational area. "L-120" named.

Murmansk area: minesweepers Nos. 106, 135, one unknown vessel (5812).

Iokanka area: guardships Nos. 20, 23, 25, 26, 27, 80, 81, minesweepers Nos. 31, 42, 59, 62, guardboats Nos. 501, 502, 503, 514, 519, 610, 615, 620, 625.

Gorlo Straits/Archangel area: minesweepers Nos. 45, 112, 113, 114, 116.

Britain: one unit or naval vessel appeared in each of Murmansk and Archangel areas.

Russian radio traffic: on coastal defense wave for Murmansk coast (57 m.) lively radio traffic.

During the night of 30/31 December very urgent message to all ice-breakers, otherwise normal radio traffic.

Britain: slight Murmansk, lively Archangel broadcast. Isolated transmissions from units and naval vessels to Murmansk and Archangel.

During the daytime on 30 December an unusually large number of naval vessels (4 minesweepers, 6 guardships, 9 guardboats) appeared in the

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Iokanka area according to radio traffic, and at times also in the Gorlo Straits/ Archangel area.

Early on 31 December QP convoy was in Wick radio area (North Scotland); it received two radio messages from Admiral Liverpool.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

According to reports from the German Air Force and radio intelligence, the convoy seems to have called at Murmansk and proceeded further via Iokanka to Archangel.

2047 Radio message 2047/790 sent:

"If no contact, Group "Eisenbart" to start at 1200 on 1 January via position line 1, from AC 6837 to 6777, arriving at 0200 on 2 January, at 1600 to position line 2 from AC 5383 to 5862 and at 0500 on 3 January to position line 3 from AC 4331 to 4697. Further orders to follow."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

In order to set up a close patrol of the Bear Island passage again, the 4 boats from the west were also dispatched there.

1457 Radio message 1457/779 sent:

"Group "Isegrimm" to proceed at 0000 on 1 January from position line 1 from AB 5591 to 5988, via position line 2 at 1700 from AB 6186 to 6814, via position line 3 at 0600 on 2 January from AB 6352 to 6685 to attack areas, depth of sweep 30 miles: "Mohs" AC 4143, "Bentzien" 4187, "Becker" 4455, "Hildebrandt" 4723, report ice hindrance."

1902 U 425 (Bentzien) reported in radio message 1645/784 that he had lost U 956 (Mohs) and was about 23 hours behind him. He will not be able to arrive at position line 1 until the afternoon of 1 January.

2043 Radio message 2043/789 therefore sent:

"1. New attack areas: "Mohs" AB 5584, "Becker" 5837, "Hildebrandt" 5971, "Bentzien" 8316.

2. Group "Isegrimm" to proceed via position lines according to message number 779 at 1600 on 1 January, all times 16 hours later."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

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(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 965 (Ohling):

- "1. Put out from Bergen on the afternoon of 2 January.
2. Proceed to AB 66 at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.
3. Operational Order No. 1, radio service "Anton", after report of passing 67° N, U-boats Northern Waters wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

In view of the observations by the German Air Force (4 merchant vessels, 6 - 10,000 G.R.T., 5 escort vessels off Archangel) it may be assumed that the PQ convoy has reached its port of destination, without incurring losses.

The result of this convoy operation is not satisfactory.

I consider that the main reasons for this are the following:

1. Apparently the enemy sends search groups ahead of every convoy, which find out our U-boat positions with the aid of radar and infra-red locations, attack the boats, and report them. Acting on these reports, the convoy has an opportunity of evading our patrol lines. This is what has apparently happened in several cases.
2. Another disadvantage is the fact that only some of the boats were equipped with "Borkum" and "Naxos" sets as well as with "Zaunkönig" torpedoes. They were thus very inferior to the enemy escorts and in most cases the sudden appearance of enemy patrol vessels and destroyers took them by surprise.
3. The weather was particularly unfavorable. Windstrengths of 7 - 9 with corresponding seaway were almost continuous. This, together with at times very poor visibility made it far more difficult for the boats to gain contact, to maintain it, and to guide one another to the scene of action.
4. Air reconnaissance was made considerably more difficult by the weather, and its effectiveness limited. It must be emphasized that the German Air Force throughout used all its available forces

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for the operations it was requested to carry out. Weather conditions caused frequent icing up of radar sets, so that, unfortunately, there were many occasions when the enemy forces and steamers in the operational area were not all intercepted.

5. In addition to all this, the lack of operational experience in Northern Waters of the U-boat commanders, the greater proportion of whom were new, no doubt played its part.

I regard the operation against the PQ convoy as concluded, and intend to order the U-boats to proceed back to the Bear Island passage via position lines, in order to comb the area for possible stragglers. Several boats which are due to go into dock will be relieved there.

(Signed) Peters.

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APPENDIX III.

COPY

Most Secret

Sailing Orders

1. Sailing orders for U 601 (Hansen).
2. Sailing orders for U 711 (Lange).
3. Sailing orders for U 314 (Basse).
4. Sailing orders for U 716 (Dunkelberg).
5. Sailing orders for U 360 (Becker).

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APPENDIX III/1

COPY

Teleprinter message:

Emergency 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Red - Most Secret

Sailing order for U 601 (Hansen).

1. Put out from Trondheim on forenoon of 18 December.
2. Proceed, keeping 50 miles from the coast, to relieve U 387 (Büchler) in attack area AC 4123, depth of sweep 30 miles, at 1200 on 21 December.
3. Operational Order No. 1, radio service "Anton" as far as 67° N, then U-boats Northern Waters wave.
4. Group "Eisenbart": U 636 (Hildebrandt) AC 4435, U 354 (Herbschleb) 4167, U 387 (Büchler), and U 277 (Lübsen) on ice reconnaissance as far as AC 17. U 711 (Lange) proceeding from Andfjord to relieve U 354. Daily meteorological flights to Spitsbergen by Ju 88.
5. Ice limit: AB 3378 - 3680 - AC 1747 - 1767 - AC 12. Passage possible on 76° N.
6. QP convoy passed through Bear Island passage on 1 December. Smaller convoys still to be expected.

Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret - 4077 A. Ops.

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APPENDIX III/2

Most Secret

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 18 December, 1943

Sailing order for U 711 (Lange)

1. Put out from Narvik at 1330 on 18 December.
2. Proceed via Tjeldsund - Andfjord, from Lodingen["] to Harstad with district pilot.
3. Proceed, keeping 50 miles from the coast, to relieve U 354 (Herbschleb) in attack area AC 4622, depth of sweep 30 miles.
4. It appears that at the end of November the first convoys since last March both in an easterly and in a westerly direction were running. Enemy submarines within our own formations are always to be expected.
5. Our forces: Group "Eisenbart": U 277 (Lübsen) AC 1988, U 387 (Büchler) in AC 4355, U 354 (Herbschleb) in AC 4622 and U 636 (Hildebrandt) in AC 4658, all depth of sweep 30 miles.
Daily meteorological flights to Spitsbergen by Ju 88.
6. Ice limit: AB 3295 - 3385 - AC 1748 - 1767 - AC 12.
Further details by radio message.
7. Operational Order No. 1, U-boats Northern Waters wave.

Peters.

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APPENDIX III/3

COPY

Teleprinter message:

Most Immediate 13th U-boat Flotilla.
Most Immediate Group North/Fleet.

Clear as multiple address message

Red - Most Secret

Sailing order for U 314 (Basse)

1. Make ready as quickly as possible and put to sea at once.
2. Proceed to AF 37, keeping 50 miles from the coast, maximum cruising speed. Report arrival by time short signal.
3. Operational Order for Northern Waters No. 1, Northern Waters wave at once.

Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 4139 A. Ops.

APPENDIX III/4

Most Secret

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway. 22 December, 1943.

Sailing order for U 716 (Dunkelberg)

1. Put out from Narvik at 1800 on 22 December, take into account U 1060 putting in.
2. Proceed via Tjeldsund - Andfjord, from Lødingen to Harstad with district pilot.
3. Occupy attack area AC 4468, depth of sweep 25 miles, at 0000 on 24 December.
4. Since the beginning of December, convoy traffic has been running in both directions through Bear Island passage. At 1045 on 22 December 40 transports (2 - 3,000 G.R.T.) and escort vessels were sighted in AF 6983, course 45°, speed 10 knots.
5. Own forces:
Group "Eisenbart": U 387 (Büchler) AC 1788, U 354 (Herbschleb) AC 4156, U 636 (Hildebrandt) AC 4431, U 601 (Hansen) AC 4468, depth of sweep 30 miles, U 277 (Lübsen) AC 4733, depth of sweep 25 miles. U 957 (Schaar) proceeding via AF 31 to AC 44, U 314 (Basse) from Trondheim to AF 37. Daily meteorological flights to Spitsbergen by Ju 88.
6. Ice limit:
AB 3290 - 3380 - AC 1440 - 1740 - 1780 - AC 12.
Weather by radio message.
7. Operational Order for Northern Waters No. 1, U-boat Northern Waters wave.

Peters.

APPENDIX III/5

Most Secret

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway

On board, 27 December, 1943

Sailing order for U 360 (Becker)

1. Put out from Narvik at noon on 27 December for Ramsund to take on torpedoes. Radio service "MC", 470 Kc/s. Report departure from Ramsund by time short signal.
2. Proceed through Tjeldsund via inner leads "Rot" to Hammerfest via Tromsø, from Lødingen to Tromsø with district pilot. Escort from Tromsø through Admiral Polar Coast. Report readiness to sail from Hammerfest.
3. Operational Order No. 1, U-boat Northern Waters wave.
4. Own forces:
 1. Group "Eisenbart": U 277 (Lübsen), U 314 (Basse),
U 354 (Herbschleb),
U 387 (Büchler), U 601 (Hansen),
U 716 (Dunkelberg), U 957
(Schaar).
 2. Putting out from Bergen: U 425 (Bentzien),
U 956 (Mohs).
- Own air reconnaissance: FW 200, BV 138, Ju 88;
offensive operations: He 115 (aircraft torpedo).
5. PQ convoy was in AC 42 at noon on 26 December. QP convoy approaching according to radio intelligence. Heavy British forces in the operational area. Take into account Russian submarines.
6. Ice limit on 24 December: AB 3942 - AC 1778 - 1755.

Peters.

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APPENDIX IV.

Most Secret

Short reports

1. Short report from U 277 (Lübsen), third operation.
 2. Short report from U 636 (Hildebrandt), fifth operation.
-

APPENDIX IV/1

COPY

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret

Short report from U 277 (Lübsen), third operation

- | | |
|---------------|---|
| 14 November | Put out from Hammerfest, 22 December put in to Hammerfest. Proceeded to attack area AB 3914, group "Eisenbart". |
| 17 - | AB 3914. |
| 23 November | |
| 23 - | Patrol line AC 1968 to 4365 against PQ convoy. |
| 27 November | |
| 27 November - | Acting on report of escort vessel, attack area AB 3973 to 3914. |
| 1 December | |
| 1 - | Patrol line AB 5573 to 8319. |
| 2 December | |
| 2 - | Patrol line AB 5531 to 5967. |
| 3 December | |

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- 3 -
6 December Attack area AC 1755.
- 6 -
9 December First ice reconnaissance northwestward.
- 8 December Enemy submarine in AB 3539 at 0047.
No possibility of attack except by
machine-gunfire.
- 9 -
14 December Attack area at ice limit in AB 36.
- 14 -
18 December Second ice reconnaissance from South Cape to AC 17.
- 18 -
19 December Attack area AC 1988.
- 19 -
21 December Attack area AC 1897 and 1708.
- 21 December Return journey to Hammerfest via AC 4250.
Enemy not sighted again.

Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret - 4164 - A. Ops.

APPENDIX IV/2

COPY

Teleprinter message:


1. Emergency Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
2. Emergency Naval War Staff, 2nd Div., C-in-C
U-boats, Ops.
3. Emergency Group North/Fleet.
4. Emergency Admiral Commanding U-boats.
5. Admiral Northern Waters (copy).
6. Most Immediate, for information of 13th
U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret


Short report from U 636 (Hildebrandt),
Fifth operation

- | | |
|---------------------|---|
| 22 November | Put out from Hammerfest, put in to Hammerfest on 27 December. Via AC 43 to attack area after changing equipment. |
| 24 -
29 November | In group "Eisenbart" eastwards of and off Bear Island. |
| 29 November | At 1116 wheeled aircraft reported in AC 6397 (Ju 88). |
| 1 December | At 0458 in AB 6391, alarm given for vessel. Searchlights and gunfire attack. |
| 1 -
4 December | Patrol line against QP convoy. |
| 2 December | At 0424 in AB 5965, alarm given for vessel. Infra-red location. |
| 6 December | Attack area AC 4435. |
| 17 December | At 2230 in AC 4465, screw noises covered by rattling, course 70°. |
| 18 December | Search group passed overhead at 0415, remained undiscovered. At 1624 in AC 4651, 32 medium-loud depth charges (Herbschlob). |
| 19 -
23 December | In attack areas AC 4658 - 4925 - 4549 - 4468 - 4431. No sightings. |
| 25 December | From 0600 operated on PQ convoy report |





REINDEER PENINSULA



LIEFDE FJORD

MOUNTAIN

HILL

STEEP BANK

LANDING POINT

LAGOON

HUT

