; ee noproved -“" 2904/1 e22: roa ea THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 8 March 1979 " National Intelligence Officers MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution 25X14 FROM: | | ationa ntelligence Officer for China SUBJECT: _ Warning Assessment: China 1. Attached is the assessment prepared on the basis of community views expressed at the warning meeting held on 28 February. This memorandum has not been coordinated with the participants but is being circulated among them. 2 The next warning meeting will be held on Wed- nesday, 21 March at 1400 hours in room 7E-62 CIA Headquarters. Please provide the name of. your representative to 25X11 25X11 Attachment: Memo Distribution: I vs 1: State - Mrs. Patricia B rnett "1 = DDO/DCEA/CO 2°- NIO/CH 2 : : 25X1 Army - Col. Jack B. Churchill i : neon a 1 - NFAC/Reg Navy - Capt. Geor sly 1 - NFAC/RES/RSG 20X1 DLA 7 1 - NIO/Warning 25X1_—i«x. [| 1 - NIO/CF 1 - NIO/USSR-EE ; 1 - NIT STAT Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300080012-3 SECRET D5X1 oe Approved F elease 2Q04f12 : eee ace NFAC No. 1213-79 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20503 8 March 1979 National Intelligence Officers MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment National Intelligence officer for Warning FROM: ee ssistant National Intelligence Officer for China SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: China Summary — The main issue facing community representatives at the meeting on 28 February 1979 was the fact that fighting was underway between the Chinese and the Vietnamese. We were no longer —. dealing. with a hypothetical situation, and the details of the war itself dominated the discussion. We explored two general problems: first, would the war spread, and second, what would be its domestic consequences if the Chinese failed to achieve their goals. Our exploration of the first problem was some- what inconclusive (this was primarily a problem, in the first instance, for our Soviet colleagues); we did reach -consensus on the second problem-~we expected leadership instability to develop if the preberne went badly, or appeared to go pacay for the Chinese. » dL. The Possibility of a SinosSoviet Clash. Ail of us at the meeting thought the odds of a Soviet attack on China (or of deep involvement in Vietnam) were directly related to the course of the fighting itself. They rose dramatically if STAT Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-R DP83B00100R00030008001 2-3 Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300080012-3 the Chinese penetrated deeply into Vietnam. We reached no consensus regarding where the likely flash-point would come, however, and our discussion tended to bog down in examination of the tactical situation on the ground in northern Vietnam. Most of us thought that the Chinese would limit their advance, stopping well short of a direct threat to Hanoi, but there ‘A cu ' were some dissents from this view. Several of us felt strongly that Soviet intervention, if it came, would occur in Vietnam, rather than on the Sino~Soviet border. Many of us thought that a Soviet attack on the border would have to be ona ough to require prior mobilization, which we P5X1— We all agreed that the Soviet reaction to ate een remarkably restrained. |: he Domestic Trouble in China. We treated this subject in somewhat less detail, agreeing that it would only become an operative problem if the Chinese were to suffer a military. or diplomatic defeat or some combination of the two arising from the war. Nearly all of us thought that this situation would give rise to recriminations within the current leader- ship. Most of us thought that such infighting, if it occurred, was likely to be serious and would deeply embroil Deng Xiao- ping, whom we generally believed was regarded in China as the architect of the campaign against Vietnam. Most of us thought that Deng's position might be undermined if the Chi- nese failed to achieve their minimum goals in Vietnam, but there are a few dissents from this view.’ Recognizing that this scenario for leadership instability was contingent on an impression of Chinese defeat, some of us thought it was unlikely to be acted out. Many of us thought that if Deng were undermined the “four moderniations" campaign (and prob- ably the corollary opening to the West) would be in trouble, but several of us noted that these policies drew on wide support within China. 25X11 cc: DDCI SECRET - Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300080012-3